Lovino, Inc. v. Lavallee Law Offices, 96 A.D.3d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). · Go Syfert
Lovino, Inc. v. Lavallee Law Offices, 96 A.D.3d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
18 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Alva v. Gaines, Gruner, Ponzini & Novick, LLP (nyappdiv, 2014-10-08)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alva v. Gaines, Gruner, Ponzini & Novick, LLP
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court also properly determined that the GGP&N defendants failed to state a cause of action against the Marcus attorneys for common-law indemnification, since the Alvas did not seek to hold the GGP&N defendants responsible for another’s wrong, but directly charged the GGP&N defendants with negligence in allowing the statute of limitations to expire in connection with the claims based on Atzl’s November 2005 conduct (see Rehberger v Garguilo & Orzechowski, LLP, 118 AD3d at 769 ; Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d at 910; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d at 786…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Balkheimer v. Spanton (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Furthermore, the third-party plaintiffs would not be compelled to pay damages for the alleged negligent acts of the third-party defendants (see Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d at 910; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 786, 786-787 [1983]).
discussed Cited "see" Dreyfus v. MPCC Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the third-party defendant, Canatal Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Canatal), which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action in the third-party complaint for common-law indemnification. “[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is ‘a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor’ ” (Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997], quoting Mas v Two Bridges Assoc., 75 NY2d 680, 690 [1990]; see Lovino, Inc. v Lav…
discussed Cited "see" Ponce v. Miao Ling Liu
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
Here, the allegations in the third-party complaint, even as amplified by the evidentiary material submitted in opposition to the third-party defendant’s motion, were insufficient to state a cause of action for indemnification. “[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty *787 running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is ‘a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor’ ” (Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997], quoting Mas v Two Bridges Assoc., 75 NY2d 680, 690 [1990]; see Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909…
discussed Cited "see" Konsky v. Escada Hair Salon, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Brighton Realty’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for common-law indemnification in the third-party complaint. “[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is ‘a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor’ ” (Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997], quoting Mas v Two Bridges Assoc., 75 NY2d 680, 690 [1990]; see Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909 , 909-910 [2012]).
discussed Cited "see" Konsky v. Escada Hair Salon, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Brighton Realty’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for common-law indemnification in the third-party complaint. “[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is ‘a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor’ ” (Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997], quoting Mas v Two Bridges Assoc., 75 NY2d 680, 690 [1990]; see Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909 , 909-910 [2012]).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Accredited Aides Plus, Inc. v. Program Risk Management, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Madden, 119 AD3d at 1024; see also Bovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909 , 909-910 [2012]; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 786, 786 [1983]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." New York Workers' Compensation Board v. Madden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accordingly, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in common-law indemnification against these defendants (see HANYS Servs. v Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 AD2d 61, 66 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 612 [2002]; see also Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909 , 910 [2012]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." New York Workers' Compensation Board v. Madden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accordingly, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in common-law indemnification against these defendants (see HANYS Servs. v Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 AD2d 61, 66 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 612 [2002]; see also Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 909 , 910 [2012]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lovino, Inc., Doing Business as Bodyline Collision
v.
Lavallee Law Offices, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Robert Tassinari, Third-Party
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 20, 2012.
96 A.D.3d 909
Published

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the third-party defendant appeals from (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered April 27, 2011, and (2), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court entered June 13, 2011, as, upon the decision, denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision (see Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509 [1984]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the third-party defendant.

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]). Here, the defendants/ third-party plaintiffs asserted a single cause of action to recover from the third-party defendant any sum which the plaintiffs may recover against them in the main action on the theory of common-law indemnification. “[T]he key element of a common-law cause of action for indemnification is not a duty running from the indemnitor to the injured party, but rather is ‘a separate duty owed the indemnitee by the indemnitor’ ” (Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997], quoting Mas v Two Bridges [*910] Assoc., 75 NY2d 680, 690 [1990]). Indemnity “may be based upon an express contract, but more commonly the indemnity obligation is implied . . . based upon the law’s notion of what is fair and proper as between the parties” (Mas v Two Bridges Assoc., 75 NY2d at 690).

According to the allegations in the third-party complaint, the defendants/third-party plaintiffs are attorneys being sued in the main action to recover damages for legal malpractice based upon their own negligence, which allegedly resulted in the loss of their client’s legal rights (see Lovino, Inc. v Lavallee Law Offs., 96 AD3d 910 [2012] [decided herewith]). While the defendants/ third-party plaintiffs and the third-party defendant both allegedly violated duties to the plaintiffs in the main action, they did not violate the same duty or share responsibility for the same injury, and the defendants/third-party plaintiffs are not being compelled to pay damages for the wrongful act of the third-party defendant (see Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 786, 786-787 [1983]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action for common-law indemnification (id.). Angiolillo, J.P., Eng, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.