Edward W. Spannaus, Treasurer of the Larouche Democratic Campaign v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 990 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Edward W. Spannaus, Treasurer of the Larouche Democratic Campaign v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 990 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission (dcd, 2023-09-20)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B) cited 3× in this case · 9 total citations of statute #4 26 U.S.C. § 9041 cited 1× in this case · 22 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.D.C. · 2023 · confidence medium
Cir. 1983)), and that subsequent cases have repeated this jurisdictional label, see, e.g., Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Campaign Legal Center v. Iowa Values
D.D.C. · 2023 · confidence medium
Cir. 1995); Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charles v. Brennan
D.D.C. · 2016 · confidence medium
Election Comm’n, 990 F.2d 643, 645 (D.C.Cir.1993) (per curiam) (pro se litigant not entitled to equitable tolling because he was- “less than fully diligent”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration
D.C. Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
We begin our analysis with the statutory text, bearing in mind that “where filing deadlines are concerned, ‘a literal reading of Congress’ words is generally the only proper reading of those words.’ ” Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 , 105 S.Ct. 1785 , 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A.
D.D.C. · 1996 · confidence medium
Absence of prejudice to the other party and due diligence are important considerations, see Spannaus v. Fed’l Election Comm’n., 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.Cir.1993), but absence of prejudice enters the “calculus only if another factor provides the essential underpinning for equitable tolling.” Dougherty v. Barry, 869 F.2d 605, 613 (D.C.Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A.
D.D.C. · 1996 · confidence medium
Absence of prejudice to the other party and due diligence are important considerations, see Spannaus v. Fed’l Election Comm’n, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.Cir.1993), but absence of prejudice enters the “calculus only if another factor provides the essential underpinning for equitable tolling.” Dougherty v. Barry, 869 F.2d 605, 613 (D.C.Cir.1989).
cited Cited "see" Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission
D.D.C. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.
cited Cited "see" Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics v. Federal Election Commission
D.D.C. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.Cir.1993); Jordan v. FEC, 68 F.3d 518, 519 (D.C.Cir.1995).
cited Cited "see" Absalom F. Jordan, Jr. v. Federal Election Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spannaus, 990 F.2d at 644 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Kidney Center of Hollywood v. Shalala
D.D.C. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C.Cir.1993); Freeman Engineering Associates, Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169 , 177 (D.C.Cir.1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Edward W. SPANNAUS, Treasurer of the LaRouche Democratic Campaign, Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
92-5191.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Apr 20, 1993.
990 F.2d 643
Robert L. Rossi, Boston, MA, was on the brief, for appellant., Lawrence M. Noble, Richard B. Bader, and Marcus C. Migliore were on the brief, for appellee.
Bader, Ginsburg, Per Curiam, Ruth, Sentelle, Wald.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

Edward Spannaus appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for review as untimely. Spannaus sought review in district court of the Federal Election Commission’s decision to dismiss an administrative complaint he filed pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (“the Act”). Under the Act, a petition for review must be filed “within 60 days after the date of the dismissal.” 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B).

Spannaus contends that his petition for review was timely because it was filed within 60 days of the date he received the Commission’s letter notifying him that his complaint had been dismissed. The district court rejected Spannaus’ contention, finding it inconsistent with the plain meaning of the governing judicial review statute. We agree.

The Supreme Court has cautioned that, where filing deadlines are concerned, “a literal reading of Congress’ words is generally the only proper reading of those words.” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1792, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985). Consistently, this court has declared mandatory, i.e., “jurisdictional and unalterable,” statutes that fix the time for seeking judicial review. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 905 F.2d 1568, 1570 (D.C.Cir.1990); Kessenich v. CFTC, 684 F.2d 88, 91 (D.C.Cir.1982).

The judicial review prescription in this case is precise: the 60-day review period runs from the “date of dismissal.” 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B). It is undisputed that the date of dismissal was January 9, 1991. Measured from that date, Spannaus’ April 2, 1991 petition for review was untimely. *

In reaching this decision, we reject the holding in Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 630 F.Supp. 508, 512 (D.D.C.1985), which Spannaus contends should control this case. The district court[*645] in Common Cause held that “the sixty-day review period begins when the complainant actually receives notice of the dismissal.” Although there was no appellate decision on this issue until now, this court cannot extend the filing deadline for Spannaus simply because he relied on an unreviewed and, we now hold, incorrect district court decision. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 948 F.2d 742, 756 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“Everyone in our society bears the risk of getting bad legal advice. And we all also bear the risk of relying on an incorrect district court judgment.”).

Spannaus alternately asserts that, in light of his pro se status and his reliance on Common Cause, the district court violated his due process rights by dismissing his petition. While pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards” than counseled litigants, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), that is not a pertinent factor here, for the district court decision we now review simply respects the statutorily-fixed deadline; in thus following the legislature’s direction, the district court contravened no due process right to fundamentally fair procedures.

Finally, Spannaus urges equitable tolling of the 60-day review period “in light of the late receipt of notice and reliance on the Common Cause case.” As the Supreme Court recently observed, courts have accorded such relief “sparingly,” and have been “much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.” Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). Notwithstanding his reliance on Common Cause, it appears that, in filing late, Spannaus was less than fully diligent. The Commission’s notification letter, which Spannaus admits he received approximately one month before the end of the 60-day review period, conspicuously stated the dismissal date and referred Spannaus to the appropriate judicial review provision. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Spannaus qualifies for the dispensation afforded by the doctrine of equitable tolling. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 458 (“The principles of equitable tolling ... do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”).

For the reasons stated, the decision of the district court dismissing the petition for review as untimely is

Affirmed.

*

This result contrasts with the one we reached in LaRouche v. Federal Election Commission, 990 F.2d 641 (D.C.Cir.1993), also issued today. There, the governing judicial review statute provided for review "within 30 days after the agency action,” 26 U.S.C. § 9041(a), without specifying whether the critical date of that "action" was the date on the agency’s decision or the later date on the notice thereof. We held that the notice date was the critical one, and relied on the FEC’s own regulations in support of that conclusion. Here, however, the statute, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B), permits no such reading; it specifies, unambiguously, “the date of the dismissal.”