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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases ·
…we take very seriously the danger that domestic disputes pose to law enforcement officers . . . .
at p. 450
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Cloud v. Stone
Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012); see id. at 509–10 (collecting cases); see also Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (reasonable to tase suspect who “used profanity, moved around and paced in agitation, and repeatedly yelled at [officer]” while refusing series of verbal commands); Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723 , 733–34 (4th Cir. 2013) (tasers were reasonable while arrestee “posed an immediate threat to the officers’ safety, and was actively resisting arrest,” but excessive after threat and active resistance relented); Brown v. Cit…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Daniel Turner v. City of Los Angeles
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
But see Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443 . (“When a taser is used in drive[- 24 ]stun mode, the operator removes the dart cartridge and pushes two electrode contacts located on the front of the taser directly 25 against the victim.
discussed
Cited "but see"
Zubrod v. Hoch
But see Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 444-46 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (determining that use of Taser in drive-stun mode against motorist who refused to sign a speeding ticket was excessive force).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Ward v. Olson
But see Mottos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 , 444-46 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (determining that use of taser in drive-stun mode against motorist who refused to sign a speeding ticket was. excessive force).
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Farson v. City of Lake Stevens
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted)
we need not 23 decide whether the officers had probable cause to effect a custodial arrest pursuant to washington law because the answer does not affect fourth amendment excessive force claim.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Baker v. Clearwater County
qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if his or her action resulted from a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Pottorff v. City of Fresno
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
three tasings in such rapid succession provided no time for to recover from 3 the extreme pain she experienced, gather herself, and reconsider her refusal to comply.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Tinner v. San Juan County
e ask whether its contours 3 were sufficiently clear that every 'reasonable official' would have understood that what he is 4 doing violates that right.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Correll Thomas v. C. Dillard
(9×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
we take very seriously the danger that domestic disputes pose to law enforcement officers . . . .
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Correll Thomas v. C. Dillard
(16×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
we take very seriously the danger that domestic disputes pose to law enforcement officers . . . .
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Keith Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati
(12×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
a study by six university departments of emergency medicine found that 99.7 percent of those tased by police suffer no injuries or, at most, mild ones.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Nash-Perry v. City of Bakersfield
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
in assessing the governmental interests at stake under graham, we are free to 19 consider issues outside the three enumerated above...
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jeremy Conklin v. Oregon Medical Board, an Oregon State Agency; Nicole Krishnaswami, an individual; Michael Seidel, an individual; and Walter Frasier, an individual
Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability under § 1983 unless a plaintiff shows (1) the official violated the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was “clearly established in light of the specific context of the case at the time of the events in question.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robin Juker; Sherry Francis; Jordin Juker Schmidt; and the Estate of Macey Jaden Juker v. Chase Fiddler, in his official and individual capacities; Jason Pietrzak, in his official and individual capacities; Ryan Pollard, in his official and individual capacities; Kirk Rush, in his official and individual capacities; Craig Sousa, in his official and individual capacities; Dominic Rogers, in his official and individual capacities; Jacob Lee, in his official and individual capacities; Jonathan Howarth, in his official and individual capacities; Ron Winegar, in his official and individual capacities; The City of Boise, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; the Boise Police Department, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; and John and Jane Does I–X
Mattos v. Aguarano, 661 F.3d 433, 422 (9th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Wade Davison v. Edward C. Mooney
But 43 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 451 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 44 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (barring judges from relying on the “20/20 vision of hindsight”). 45 Hyde, 23 F.4th at 871 . 46 Dkt. 26 at 23. 47 See Isayeva v. Sacramento Sherrif’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). even accepting those facts, precedent does not clearly establish that Officer Mooney’s conduct was unconstitutional.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
William Mosher v. J. Alexander and E. Wick
Imminent Threat 16 The “most important” Graham factor is whether the person “posed an immediate 17 threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th 18 Cir. 2011).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Julieann Naki, Individually, and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa‘e Wa‘e Makala Kai Naki, Raymond K. Naki, Sr., Raymond K. Naki, Jr., Anthony Naki, Terina Naki and Palmer Naki v. County of Maui, Maui Police Officer Frederick Welch; Maui Police Officer Nathanael Gandeza; Doe Individuals 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, and Doe Entities 1-10
Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Antonio Guyton v. City of Stockton, et al.
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 24 The court must determine “whether a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the action 25 was unlawful[.]” Tarabochia, 766 F.3d at 1125 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 26 At its base, “[t]he qualified immunity doctrine rests on a balance between, on the one hand, 27 society's interest in promoting public officials’ observance of citizens’ constitutional rights and, 28 on the other, society’s interest in assuring that public officials carry out their duties and thereby 1 advance the public…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jermaine Graves v. North Las Vegas PD, et al.
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). 11 ii.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Leonardo Centeno Lopez v. City and County of San Francisco, et al.
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hampton v. Flores
(2×)
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 439 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jeremy J. Williams v. N. Otter, et al.
“The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘officials can 7 still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 8 circumstances.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hope v. 9 Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eloy Mascorro v. The City of National City, Olegario Garcia, Kaitlynn Norie, Sadiq Al-Mosawi, Reynaldo Velazquez, Marc Vargas, Rowdy Pauu, Jane Does 1–2, and John Does 1–2
“The most important Graham factor is 19 whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Nehad v. Browder, 20 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 21 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Angela Matheney, et al. v. State of Oregon, et al.
The “most important” of these factors is “whether the suspect posed an ‘immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grant v. Multnomah County Jail
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
We consider these means of force to be ‘non- trivial.’” (first quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010); then quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); and then quoting Gravelet- Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2013))).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martinez v. Albright
The nature of the force included the use of a taser in dart mode which is an “intermediate, significant level of force.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 449 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. City of Buhl
And in Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir. 2011), misdemeanor suspects were tased when they refused to exit a vehicle and get out of officers’ way.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jenkins v. Peters
“The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’ ” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rhinehart v. Montgomery
Plaintiff contends that 4 he posed no “immediate threat to the safety of the officer[s],” Opp’n at 2 (quoting Mattos 5 v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011)), and that the black box restraints “lock[] 6 the body into one position,” subjecting him to a painful experience during the transport, 7 Rhinehart Decl. ¶ 9.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. The City of New York
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Warren, 630 F. Supp. 3d 524 , 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (discussing each consideration); Garcia v. Dutchess County, 43 F. Supp. 3d 281, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In addition to the specific Graham factors . . . the Court must also consider any other relevant circumstances . . . [including] an ‘officer’s failure to warn’ before using a taser . . . .” (quoting Mattos v. Aragano, 661 F.3d 433, 451 (9th Cir. 2011))), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Handy v. Jones
Case No. 3:24-cv-00178-SLG, Handy, et al. v. Jones, et al. begin their investigation,”82 noting that, similar to Smith v. City of Hemet, “[Ms. George] was unscathed and not in jeopardy when deputies arrived” and Mr. George was separated from his wife.83 In Lopez, thirteen-year-old Andy Lopez was walking on a sidewalk in the middle of the afternoon and carrying a toy gun designed to replicate an AK-47.84 Officer Gelhaus had never seen a person walking on a street carrying an AK-47 in broad daylight and had confiscated toy guns on three previous occasions.85 While on patrol, Officer Gelhau…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.A. v. Madera County
“The 15 immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect is the most important factor.” Gonzalez v. City of 16 Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th 17 Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rosemary H. Mullins v. County of Fresno
The Ninth Circuit 10 has held that “summary judgment should be granted sparingly in excessive force cases.” 11 Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Glenn v. Washington 12 County, 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)). 13 Relevant factors in “assessing whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable 14 include ‘severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 15 of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 16 by flight.’” Gonzalez, 747 F.3d…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hoskins v. City of San Diego
Excessive Force 9 With regard to any excessive force basis of Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim, the Court 10 similarly finds Plaintiff states a claim. 11 “[A] constitutional complaint of excessive force arises under the Fourth Amendment 12 and constitutes a claim concerning the overall reasonableness of a seizure.” Velazquez v. 13 City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 14 U.S. 386 , 394–97 (1989)). “[T]here are no per se rules in the Fourth Amendment excessive 15 force context; rather, courts must still slosh their way through the factbound mo…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McGuffin v. Oregon State Police
The purpose of qualified immunity is to “strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
(PC) Warden v. Cowan
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 3 The court must determine “whether a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the action 4 was unlawful[.]” Tarabochia, 766 F.3d at 1125 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 5 At its base, “[t]he qualified immunity doctrine rests on a balance between, on the one hand, 6 society’s interest in promoting public officials’ observance of citizens’ constitutional rights and, 7 on the other, society’s interest in assuring that public officials carry out their duties and thereby 8 advance the public go…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hawkins v. Washoe County
The most 18 important is “whether the subject posed an ‘immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 19 others.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Smith v. City 20 of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 21 These factors are not exhaustive, and courts are “to examine the totality of the 22 circumstances and consider ‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular 23 case[.]’” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. 1 Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
LaTulippe v. Oregon Medical Board
Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability under § 1983 unless a plaintiff shows (1) the official violated the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was “clearly established in light of the specific context of the case at the time of the events in question.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Estate of Daniel Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles
(2×)
In this analysis, the most important question is “whether the suspect posed an immediate threat.” Zion v. County of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kerr-Daly v. City of Eugene
The purpose of qualified immunity is to “strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Anthony Defrancesco v. Robert C. Robbins
Rather, the Supreme Court and our court have developed principles that guide this court in determining whether engaging in the first-prong analysis is “worthwhile.” We consider, for instance, whether the court’s guidance in a particular constitutional area is especially “needed.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leonides Enriquez v. City of Long Beach
(2×)
Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of Enriquez. 1 The second, and most important, Graham factor looks to whether the suspect 2 posed “an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Mattos v. Agarano, 3 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dean v. City of Tacoma
Cnty. of Riverside, California v. Est. of Clemente Najera-Aguirre, 143 S. 15 Ct. 426 (2022) (quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Taylor v. Bay Area Hospital
The purpose of qualified immunity is to “strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 )).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ross v. County of San Diego
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mattos II involved two 16 plaintiffs, a pregnant woman who had been pulled over for speeding, and a woman who 17 had been involved in a domestic dispute with her husband and requested assistance from 18 police. 661 F.3d at 433, 436-439 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
(PC) Rader v. County of Placer
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 22 2011) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Diamond v. City of Sandy
Adel did not, however, provide details about what the underlying crime was, or whether he communicated that belief to the Individual Defendants. officers or their dog”); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 445 (9th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between nonviolent resistance of arrest and violent actions towards officers).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gahr v. Marion County
The purpose of qualified immunity is to “strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ahadi Abu-Al Muhammad v. County of Riverside
“The most important factor is whether the suspect posed an immediate 2 threat.” Id. (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rose v. Farney
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 4 23-2846 (citation omitted).1 The district court correctly held that Rose did not distinctly allege in his complaint that Deputy Farney’s pointing of his firearm at Bradley was a separate use of excessive force independent of the discharge of the weapon.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Troy MATTOS; Jayzel Mattos, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Darren AGARANO; Ryan Aikala Stuart Kunioka; Halayudha MacKnight, Defendants-Appellants, and Maui County, Defendant.
v.
Darren AGARANO; Ryan Aikala Stuart Kunioka; Halayudha MacKnight, Defendants-Appellants, and Maui County, Defendant.
08-15567.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 4, 2010.
661 F.3d 433
Eric A. Seitz, Esquire, Lawrence I. Kawasaki, Esquire, Law Office of Eric A. Seitz, Della Au Belatti, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Moana Monique Lutey, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Department of the Corporation Counsel, Wailuku, HI, for Defendants-Appellants.
Prior report: 590 F.3d 1082.
ORDER
KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:
Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.