Interiano-rosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 264 (BIA 2010). · Go Syfert
Interiano-rosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 264 (BIA 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
36 citation events (36 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: J-H-M-H (bia, 2025-10-07)
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2010 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) J-H-M-H (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
BIA · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
immigration judges have broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit and consider relevant and probative evidence.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) C-A-R-R (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
BIA · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
he proper course of action for the immigration judge would have been to deem the respondent's opportunity to file these documents waived . . . .
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) C-A-R-R (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
BIA · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
he proper course of action for the immigration judge would have been to deem the respondent's opportunity to file these documents waived . . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) I-B-M-S
BIA · 2026 · confidence medium
“Immigration Judges have broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings . . . .” Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); accord Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 568 (1st Cir. 1999); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.36 (2026); INA 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A-M-Z-F
BIA · 2026 · confidence medium
The Immigration Judge is also afforded “broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings.” Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); accord Matter of J-H-M-H-, 29 I&N Dec. 278, 280 (BIA 2025) (“Immigration Judges have broad discretion in conducting immigration proceedings and admitting and considering evidence.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H-A-A-V
BIA · 2025 · confidence medium
Page 234 Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4127 See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); see also INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 (c) (2025).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chukwudi Oleka v. Attorney General United States of America
3rd Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
Matter of Jesus Interiano-Rosa, 25 I & N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J-G-T
BIA · 2020 · confidence medium
Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); see also section 240(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2018); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10 (b), 1240.1(c) (2020); cf. Ruvalcaba-Garcia, 923 F.3d at 1188 (noting that trial courts have broad latitude to assess an expert’s testimony).
examined Cited as authority (rule) R-C-R (3×)
BIA · 2020 · confidence medium
“Immigration Judges have broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit and consider relevant and probative evidence.” Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); see also section 240(b)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.36 , 1240.1(c), 1240.7(a) (2020).
cited Cited as authority (rule) E-F-H-L
BIA · 2018 · confidence medium
Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 266 (BIA 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SANCHEZ-LOPEZ
unknown court · 2012 · confidence medium
As admitted on appeal, the request was made on the same day that the Immigration Judge was scheduled to render his decision and after he had already declared that the record was “closed to any further evidence or argument.” See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010) (stating that Immigration Judges are not required to admit documents that are submitted after a filing deadline).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D-R (2×) also: Cited "see"
BIA · 2011 · confidence medium
Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. at 268 ; see also section 240(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006); Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1955) (stating that “administrative tribunals may receive evidence which a court would regard as legally insufficient”).9 The respondent argues that the DHS’s documentary evidence was inherently unreliable because it was not authenticated and there was no proper chain of custody.10 In the Ninth Circuit, official records and public documents from foreign governme…
discussed Cited "see" F-C-S
BIA · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74 , 77 (BIA 2020) (citing to Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010), regarding an Immigration Judge’s authority to control proceedings and set filing deadlines); see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.31 (h) (2024) (providing authority to Immigration Judges to “set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and related documents” and to deem waived documents not filed by the deadline).
discussed Cited "see" F-C-S
BIA · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74 , 77 (BIA 2020) (citing to Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010), regarding an Immigration Judge’s authority to control proceedings and set filing deadlines); see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.31 (h) (2024) (providing authority to Immigration Judges to “set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and related documents” and to deem waived documents not filed by the deadline).
cited Cited "see" L-A-C
BIA · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010).
cited Cited "see" J. R. VELASQUEZ
unknown court · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 266 (BIA 2010).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." W-Y-U
BIA · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In this case, the Immigration Judge explained that he denied the respondent’s motion to recalendar and kept his case administratively closed to reserve the Immigration Court’s “limited adjudication resources to resolve actual cases in dispute.” First, while we recognize the Immigration Judge’s concerns regarding the most efficient use of limited resources, such matters are secondary to a party’s interest in having a case resolved on the 3 Immigration Judges also have broad discretion to grant continuances “for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29 , 1240.6 (2016); see also M…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." ISLAM
unknown court · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31 (c) (2011) (providing that the Immigration Judge may set deadlines for the filing of applications and that if an application is not filed within the time set, the opportunity to file it is deemed waived); see also Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 549 (BIA 1992).5 5 This case differs from Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010), where we held that the Immigration Judge erred in deeming an application abandoned when the respondent did not file certain documents in support of the application in a timely manner.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Interiano-rosa
ID 3684.
Board of Immigration Appeals.
Jul 1, 2010.
25 I. & N. Dec. 264
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3684

Matter of Jesus INTERIANO-ROSA, Respondent File A094 098 765 - Boston, Massachusetts

Decided June 21, 2010

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

When an application for relief is timely filed but supporting documents are not submitted within the time established, the Immigration Judge may deem the opportunity to file the documents to be waived but may not deem the application itself abandoned.

FOR RESPONDENT: L. Manuel Macias, Esquire, East Boston, Massachusetts

BEFORE: Board Panel: MILLER, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Members.

MALPHRUS, Board Member:

In a decision dated December 1, 2009, the Immigration Judge deemed the respondent to have abandoned his applications for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203(b) of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193, 2198 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997) (“NACARA”), and, alternatively, for voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The Department of Homeland Security has not filed a brief in opposition. The appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY At a September 15, 2009, master calendar hearing, the Immigration Judge directed the respondent to file his applications for relief by September 29, 2009. The Immigration Judge also directed the respondent to file copies of all docket sheets and police reports relating to any and all arrests and convictions.1 The Immigration Judge instructed that if the respondent’s counsel was unable to obtain any police reports or docket sheets because of the remoteness in time

1 The respondent has five arrests, occurring in 1992, 1994, 1999, 2008, and 2009. His convictions stemmed from his 1999 arrest, pursuant to which he pled to disorderly conduct, assault and battery on a police officer, resisting arrest, and assault and battery.

[*264]

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3684

of some of the arrests, he should submit a declaration describing his efforts and inability to obtain them. Finally, the Immigration Judge asked counsel to submit a brief addressing the respondent’s eligibility for NACARA relief. The respondent timely filed his application for special rule cancellation and numerous supporting documents. The respondent’s submission included a declaration describing, among other things, four of his arrests. It included rap sheets, docket sheets from all five of his arrests, and police reports from his three most recent arrests. The police reports from his earliest two arrests, which occurred in 1992 and 1994, were not in the filing. The respondent’s counsel did not submit a declaration explaining why he was unable to obtain the two oldest police reports, and he did not file a brief addressing the respondent’s eligibility for NACARA relief. At the December 1, 2009, hearing, counsel explained that he was unable to obtain the oldest two police reports because they were no longer available from either the court system or the police department. The Immigration Judge held that the respondent abandoned his applications for relief because he failed to comply with the directives given at the previous hearing. On appeal the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in deeming his applications for relief abandoned. This appeal presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Matter of Almanza, 24 I&N Dec. 771, 774 (BIA 2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2010).

II. ANALYSIS Immigration Judges have broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit and consider relevant and probative evidence. See section 240(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.36, 1240.1(c), 1240.7(a) (2010); see also, e.g., Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 979 (6th Cir. 2009). In this regard, Immigration Judges have authority to set filing deadlines for applications and related documents. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (2010); see also Immigration Court Practice Manual, §§ 3.1(b)(i)(B), (b)(ii)(B), at 33 (June 20, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (“For . . . hearings involving detained aliens, filing deadlines are as specified by the Immigration Court.”). An application or document that is not filed within the time established by the Immigration Judge may be deemed waived. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c); see also Arrellano-Hernandez v. Holder, 564 F.3d 906, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding the Immigration Judge’s decision to deem an application waived because it was not filed within the deadline); Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Immigration Judge’s decision not to consider corroborating evidence submitted after the filing deadline); Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 549 (BIA 1992) (stating Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3684

[*265]

that applications for benefits under the Act are properly denied as abandoned when an alien fails to timely file them). In this case, the respondent’s application was timely filed. The only documents not filed were two police reports, an explanation for not obtaining those police reports, and the requested brief. Under these circumstances, the proper course of action for the Immigration Judge would have been to deem the respondent’s opportunity to file these documents waived and to determine what effect the failure to present them had on his ability to meet his burden of establishing that he is eligible for the relief sought and that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. See section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2010). Deeming the application itself abandoned was not an appropriate disposition by the Immigration Judge. See Casares-Castellon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) does not permit deeming a timely filed application abandoned for failure to file supplemental documents within a specified time). In immigration proceedings, it is important for counsel to comply with reasonable requests from the Immigration Judge. The belief of the respondent’s counsel that he did not need to comply with the Immigration Judge’s request to file a brief because he viewed the issue as “straightforward” is not a legitimate excuse for failing to comply. The respondent has the burden to establish eligibility for the relief he seeks, and the failure to file requested briefs or other documents does not advance the claim. However, the consequence should not be to deem the applications for relief to be abandoned. The respondent should have been given an opportunity to proceed to a merits hearing with his testimony and the documentary evidence that was properly submitted. For these reasons, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for further proceedings, including a hearing on the merits of his applications for NACARA relief and voluntary departure. We express no opinion regarding the merits of the respondent’s applications. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 422 (BIA 1996). ORDER: The appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

[*266]