Guzman, 22 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1999). · Go Syfert
Guzman, 22 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Yuzi Cui v. Merrick Garland (ca9, 2021-09-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Yuzi Cui v. Merrick Garland (3×)
9th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
In its order, the BIA cited to In re Guzman-Arguera, 22 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1999), in which the BIA previously held en banc that it “is without authority to consider a direct appeal from an in absentia order,” and, in “return[ing] [the record] to the Immigration Court without further Board action,” id. at 723 , the BIA majority opinion declined to incorporate the concurring judges’ recommendations to either “treat[] the appeal as a motion” or consider the petitioner’s “removal from the United States . . . stayed,” id. at 724 (Villageliu, J., concurring).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duarte v. Barr
2d Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); In re Guzman, 22 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723 (BIA 1999) (holding that the BIA is ʺwithout authority to consider a direct appeal from an in absentia orderʺ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jiao Hua Huang v. Holder
1st Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Citing Matter of S-M-J, 22 I & N Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1999), the IJ also noted that in asylum cases, “where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts, such evidence should be provided,” but none was.
discussed Cited "see" Girault v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287-88 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting In re S-M-J-, 1999 WL 322974 , 22 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729 (BIA 1997) for the proposition that adverse credibility findings are properly premised “upon inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Denis Isabel Vergara Castellar v. Pamela J. Bondi
7th Cir. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484 , 489–90, 490 n.31 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The Board may become involved … because if the IJ denies the motion [to reopen], then that denial is ap- pealable to the Board.”); see also In re Guzman-Arguera, 22 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (“Only when an alien has exhausted this avenue of relief may he or she file an ap- peal with the Board.”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Guzman
ID 3392.
Board of Immigration Appeals.
Jul 1, 1999.
22 I. & N. Dec. 722
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Interim Decision #3392

In re Ana Delores GUZMAN-Arguera, Respondent

File A23 729 998 - Los Angeles

Decided May 24, 1999

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

The Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an in absentia order in removal proceedings where section 240(b)(5)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5)(C) (Supp. II 1996), provides that such an order may only be rescinded by filing a motion to reopen with the Immigration Judge. Matter of Gonzalez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1993), followed.

Pro se

Margaret David, Assistant District Counsel, for the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Before: Board En Banc: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA, HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ, COLE, MATHON, JONES, GRANT, SCIALABBA, and MOSCATO, Board Members. Concurring Opinion: VILLAGELIU, Board Member, joined by SCHMIDT, Chairman; FILPPU, ROSENBERG, and GUENDELSBERGER, Board Members.

MATHON, Board Member:

In a decision dated November 3, 1997, the Immigration Judge ordered the respondent removed from the United States following her failure to appear for the scheduled hearing. The respondent’s appeal will be returned to the Immigration Court without further action. Any alien who, after written notice has been provided, does not attend a scheduled hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia if the Immigration and Naturalization Service establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convinc- ing evidence that the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable. See section 240(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (Supp. II 1996). Such a removal order may be rescind- ed if a motion to reopen is filed with the Immigration Judge within 180 days after the date of the order of removal and if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances. See section Interim Decision #3392

[*722]

240(b)(5)(C)(i) of the Act. The motion to reopen can be filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice or was in Federal or State custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien. See section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the Act. In the context of deportation proceedings we have held that the Board of Immigration Appeals is without authority to consider a direct appeal from an in absentia order. See Matter of Gonzalez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1993). That holding was based on the provisions of the Act governing in absentia orders rendered in deportation proceedings. See section 242B(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c) (1994). We note that the sections of the Act governing in absentia orders in deportation proceedings are nearly identical to those governing in absentia orders in removal proceedings. Both require an alien who fails to appear for a hearing to file a motion to reopen before the Immigration Judge. Only when an alien has exhausted this avenue of relief may he or she file an appeal with the Board. We also note that the reg- ulations state as follows: Pursuant to 8 CFR part 3, an appeal shall lie from a decision of an immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, except that no appeal shall lie from an order of removal entered in absentia.

8 C.F.R. § 240.15 (1999). We accordingly find that the holding in Gonzalez- Lopez applies equally to removal proceedings. In the present case, the Immigration Judge found the respondent to be removable following her failure to appear for a scheduled hearing. This hearing was held in absentia pursuant to section 240(b)(5) of the Act. The respondent now claims that she never received notice of her hearing date. However, she failed to first file a motion to reopen with the Immigration Judge as required by section 240(b)(5)(C) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 240.15. Accordingly, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. ORDER: The record is returned to the Immigration Court without further Board action.

CONCURRING OPINION: Gustavo D. Villageliu, Board Member, in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman; Lauri S. Filppu, Lory D. Rosenberg, and John Guendelsberger, Board Members, joined

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that in view of our precedent in Matter of Gonzalez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1993), involving similar statutory language, and 8 C.F.R. § 240.15 (1999), a motion to reopen, not an appeal, is the appropriate procedure to challenge an in absentia order. I would not, however, simply return the record to the Immigration Court without further Board action. The record reflects that the appeal was filed within the 30-day appeal limit and complied with the requisite fee and service requirements.

[*723]

Interim Decision #3392

Consequently, if treated as a motion, such motion meets the 180-day gen- eral limit for motions seeking rescission pursuant to section 240(b)(5)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5)(C)(i) (Supp. II 1996), as well as under section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), which has no time limitation, since this respondent alleges that she received no notice of her removal proceedings. Pursuant to section 240(b)(5)(C), the respondent’s removal from the United States would be stayed pending consideration of her contention that she did not appear because she never received notice of her hearing. Accordingly, I would exercise the authority delegated by the Attorney General under 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(d)(1) and (2) (1999) and return the case to the Immigration Court for further action, treating the appeal as a motion, as appropriate and necessary for the efficient disposition of the case. See Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997) (Villageliu, concur- ring); cf. Matter of Mladineo, 14 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 1974) (Board assum- ing jurisdiction by certification for efficiency).

[*724]