MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: April 11, 2022

Before the Court are the Preliminary Objections (POs)1 in the nature of a demurrer of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) and the Board of Probation Court is the Expedited Application for Summary Relief (ASR)4 filed by Registrant. Upon review, we sustain Respondents’ POs; deny Registrant’s ASR; and dismiss Registrant’s PFR. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has observed:

[Registrant] pled guilty in 2003 to committing a lewd act with a child in South Carolina.[5] The underlying and who, as of February 21, 2018, has not completed registration requirements.” Formerly 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.54(a)(4).

sexual offense took place sometime between 2000 and 2001. In 2019, [Registrant] moved to Scranton, Pennsylvania[,] and by his own admission, did not comply with Subchapter I[ of SORNA]’s registration requirements as a [T]ier II sex offender within the requisite time period. See 42 Pa. C.S.[]§9799.56(a); id. []§9799.55(a). He was charged with a single count of violating [Section 4915.1(a)(2) of the Crimes Code,] 18 Pa. C.S.[] §4915.1(a)(2)[, graded as a second degree felony,] for failing to notify authorities of his address change and to be photographed.

[Registrant] was appointed counsel, but he continued to file documents pro se. [Registrant] indicated a desire to proceed pro se, but then indicated otherwise in his written waiver of counsel colloquy. The [Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas (trial court)] ordered counsel of record to remain as counsel in an order filed on September 25, 2020. On November 4, 2020, [Registrant] pled guilty for failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to [Section 4915.1(a)(1) of the Crimes Code,] 18 Pa. C.S.[] §4915.1(a)(1)[,6 graded as a third degree felony]. However, the [trial] court learned that [Registrant] had mailed a pro se notice of appeal from the [trial] court’s order denying his request to proceed pro se. [Registrant] withdrew the notice of appeal and the [trial] court accepted [Registrant]’s guilty plea. The [trial] court sentenced [Registrant] to 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment.

See also PFR Exhibit A2 (“Pursuant to [S.C. Section] 23-3-430[], any person who has . . . pled guilty . . . to an offense deemed sexual in nature must register with the Sheriff’s Office in their [sic] county of residence. . . . Any person required to register under this program shall be required to register annually for life.”); Powell v. Keel, 860 S.E.2d 344, 352 (S.C. 2021) (“[W]e hold [that S.C. Code Section 23-3-460’s] lifetime registration requirement is unconstitutional absent any opportunity for judicial review to assess the risk of re-offending. . . . We hereby reserve the effective date of this opinion for twelve (12) months from the date of filing [on June 9, 2021,] to allow the General Assembly to correct the deficiency in the statute regarding judicial review.”).

Commonwealth v. Singleton (Pa. Super., No. 1577 MDA 2020, filed October 15, 2021), slip op. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). See also Lehigh County Criminal Docket No. CP-XX-XXXXXXX-2019.7 On direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, Registrant alleged, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, and imposed an illegal sentence when it determined that his conviction under SORNA’s “punitive registration law did not violate state and federal ex post facto laws where the [underlying] sexual offense occurred in South Carolina in 2003 prior to the enactment of Pennsylvania SORNA registration’s requirements.” Singleton, slip op. at 3. Ultimately the Superior Court rejected Registrant’s foregoing appellate claim, and affirmed the judgment of sentence, stating in pertinent part:

[W]e agree with the trial court, the Commonwealth and [Registrant]’s counsel that [Registrant]’s judgment of sentence for his failure to register did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. There is no dispute that it is Subchapter I of SORNA that applies to [Registrant], as that Subchapter was enacted in 2018 to apply to sexual offenders who, like [Registrant], committed their crimes between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012. As our Supreme Court stated in [Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 615 (Pa. 2020),] the retroactive application of Subchapter I “became the operative version of SORNA for those sexual offenders whose crimes occurred between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012.” [Lacombe] directly addressed the question of whether that retroactive application of Subchapter I constituted a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Our Supreme Court held in no uncertain terms that Subchapter I is nonpunitive and is therefore not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. See id. at 605-06; 626-27. As such, even if [Registrant]’s challenges are not waived, they necessarily fail under [Lacombe]. Singleton, slip op. at 5-6 (footnote omitted). See also Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 608 n.5 (“[The defendant] additionally claims Subchapter I violates: 1) the separation of powers doctrine[;] 2) due process[;] and 3) double jeopardy protections. . . . Each of these claims, however, is predicated upon [his] argument that Subchapter I is punitive and, given our holding that Subchapter I is nonpunitive, the claims would fail in any event.”). While that direct appeal was pending, Registrant filed the instant PFR, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief8 to overturn his criminal conviction because: (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the judgment of sentence and he entered his guilty plea under duress; (2) the former SORNA registration requirement purportedly violates his ex post facto, double jeopardy, privileges and immunities, equal protection, and self-incrimination rights, and his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the former SORNA registration

We note that “[p]etitions for declaratory judgments are governed by the provisions of the requirement impairs his contract with South Carolina authorities removing the reporting requirement there, and the full faith and credit of the South Carolina agreement; and (4) the former SORNA registration requirement violates his fundamental right to travel. Specifically, Registrant points to Exhibit B appended to the PFR in which the South Carolina court “removed [him] from any electronic monitoring upon his release” from the South Carolina prison, and “allowed [him] to move back to New York.” See PFR Exhibit B. However, the Notice of Return of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPP) relating to Global Position Satellite System (GPS) Tracking Program, which Registrant signed, states in pertinent part:

I understand that I must be monitored with this GPS device for the duration of the time I am required to remain on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry (unless I am lawfully released from monitoring by the Court of General Sessions), and I understand that I am required to register and remain on the registry while residing in South Carolina. . . .

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If, following my departure, I intend to re-establish residence in the State of South Carolina, or by default I become a resident of South Carolina by remaining in this State for a total of thirty days during any [12]- month period, I must notify the [SCDPP] office in the county of my South Carolina residence within twenty- four hours of becoming a resident and I must report as instructed to resume GPS monitoring. PFR Exhibit C2 (emphasis in original). See also PFR Exhibit A2 (“Pursuant to [S.C. Code Ann. §] 23-3-430[], any person who has . . . pled guilty . . . to an offense deemed sexual in nature must register with the Sheriff’s Office in their [sic] county of residence. . . . Any person required to register under this program shall be required to register annually for life.”). Thus, contrary to Registrant’s faulty assertion, the reporting requirement imposed by the South Carolina court was not permanently removed by its order; rather, this reporting requirement was merely removed for the period of his absence from South Carolina after he moved to New York. See PFR Exhibits B and C2. As this Court has recently explained:

[T]he only applicable part of Section 9799.54 of Subchapter I is paragraph (a)(4) relating to offenses from a different jurisdiction. Therefore, we must examine whether [the p]etitioner had “completed [his] registration requirements” as of February 21, 2018. 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.54(a)(4). Pennsylvania extends full faith and credit to out-of-state registration schemes. See 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.56(b)(4) (someone who is convicted in “another state” but resides, is employed, or is a student in the Commonwealth, and is required to register under a sexual offender statute of that state where he was convicted, shall register within three business days of arrival in the Commonwealth). When the Commonwealth considers whether an individual convicted in another state must register as a sex offender, the Commonwealth follows the state of conviction’s registration requirements. Rivera v. Pennsylvania State Police, 255 A.3d 677, 683 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). Because Registrant did not complete his South Carolina reporting requirement at the time that he moved to Pennsylvania, or at the time that he pleaded guilty to the Pennsylvania charges based on his failure to register, his SORNA registration was not “complete” under former Section 9799.56(b)(4), and he was required under the former Pennsylvania statute to register while incarcerated, residing, working, or a student in the Commonwealth. Id.9 Moreover, the instant declaratory judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack the legality of Registrant’s Pennsylvania conviction for violating SORNA’s reporting requirements. As this Court has explained: [W]e agree with [the d]efendants that [the p]laintiff may not use a civil action for declaratory judgment in our original jurisdiction to collaterally attack the legality of his criminal proceedings in [the] Bucks County Common Pleas [Court]. Keller[ v. Kinsley, 609 A.2d 567, 568 (Pa. Super. 1992)]. The [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§9541-9546,] is the sole means “by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences” may obtain collateral relief. 42 Pa. C.S. §9542. Keller. Therefore, [the p]laintiff must raise all his common law constitutional claims against [the d]efendants in his PCRA petition. Id. Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 402 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).10 Accordingly, Respondents’ POs are sustained; Registrants’ ASR is denied; and Registrant’s PFR is dismissed.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M.S., : : Petitioner : : v. : : No. 98 M.D. 2021 Pennsylvania State Police, Board : Submitted: January 28, 2022 of Probation, : : Respondents :

ORDER AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2022, the Preliminary Objections of the Pennsylvania State Police and the Board of Probation and Parole are SUSTAINED; the Application for Expedited Summary Relief filed by M.S. is DENIED; and the Petition for Review in the nature of a “1532(b) Motion for Injunction” and “Declaratory Judgment of Enjoinment” is DISMISSED. __________________________________ MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge