¹ For clarity, we will refer to the members of the Lendino family by their given names.

² Defense counsel further inquired whether Mr. Grunin’s particular Hyundai had self-aligning torque. Mr. Barrette responded, “Every vehicle designed has that feature.”

³ Dr. Jessie Taber’s first and last names are spelled various ways throughout the report of proceedings. Throughout this opinion, we will use the spelling “Dr. Jessie Taber” or “Dr. Taber.” - 10 - 1-20-0598 his accurate address, work schedule, or travel destination. Mr. Grunin also told paramedics that he was tired, and his medical records revealed that one of his seizure symptoms was fatigue. ¶ 28 Dr. Kanner noted that emergency room records indicated that Mr. Grunin had a “significant history” of epilepsy and was taking medications commonly prescribed to people with epilepsy. At the hospital, Mr. Grunin underwent a CT scan, but not an electroencephalography (EEG) test, which is used to measure electrical activity in the brain. The treating physician’s notes revealed that Mr. Grunin reported a loss of consciousness and no memory of the accident, but no head pain. Dr. Kanner opined that a lack of head pain meant that Mr. Grunin was not concussed, which left a seizure as the only explanation for his confusion. Based upon Mr. Grunin’s statement that he was tired, Dr. Kanner suggested that he may have had multiple seizures on the day of the accident. Although Mr. Grunin denied having recent seizures while being treated in the emergency room after the accident, Dr. Kanner believed that Mr. Grunin “probably” had more frequent seizures than he realized and that no one observed them because he lived alone and worked at night. ¶ 29 Mr. Grunin’s medical records included a December 10, 2018, e-mail from Mr. Grunin to his treating neurologist stating that on December 9, 2018, his mother observed him in a “daze” or “staring spell” for 30 to 40 seconds and that he did not remember anything from that time period. In the response, the neurologist stated that it sounded as though Mr. Grunin had a seizure. Dr. Kanner noted that Mr. Grunin received a driving restriction in 2010 after a seizure but was not under a driving restriction when the accident occurred. ¶ 30 Dr. Kanner opined that Mr. Grunin followed his physicians’ orders. Mr. Grunin visited Dr. Maslew’s office on January 19, 2006, due to a sleep disorder and seizure, resulting in an EEG, bloodwork, and an adjustment to his antiepileptic medication. A September 10, 2010, note by Dr. Taber stated that although Mr. Grunin had an abnormal EEG in 2003, his results were normal in - 11 - 1-20-0598 2005 and 2008, and Mr. Grunin’s last seizure convulsion was in early September 2010. On April 7, 2017, Dr. Taber diagnosed Mr. Grunin with “focal epilepsy with dyscognitive seizures,” noted Mr. Grunin was experiencing “staring episodes,” and considered adding a second antiseizure medication. ¶ 31 On June 15, 2018, following an episode of confusion, Dr. Taber increased the dosage of Mr. Grunin’s medication and ordered an EEG, which showed abnormal electrical activity in the temporal lobe of Mr. Grunin’s brain. Dr. Kanner interpreted this EEG to mean that Mr. Grunin was experiencing seizures. Dr. Kanner reached this conclusion even though Mr. Grunin had denied having seizures. The medical records indicated that Mr. Grunin’s boss brought a staring spell to Mr. Grunin’s attention. An EEG administered on July 5, 2018, was abnormal, but no driving restriction was imposed upon Mr. Grunin. ¶ 32 Dr. Kanner explained that if Mr. Grunin’s foot was on the gas pedal before a seizure, it was not “unlikely” that his foot would continue to push on the pedal as the seizure began and he stared motionless. Dr. Kanner opined that the increase in speed between the first accident and the second “has to be explained” by Mr. Grunin’s foot “continuously” pushing on the gas pedal and that Mr. Grunin was unaware of his “automatic behavior.” Dr. Kanner also testified to the following possibilities: (1) Mr. Grunin had a seizure during the first accident; (2) the stress of the first accident triggered a seizure; or (3) the seizure began during the first accident and continued until the second accident. ¶ 33 Dr. Kanner found it significant that Mr. Grunin did not veer before the crash because, in his opinion, normal human “survival instinct” would cause a person to avoid an obvious obstacle such as a collision. As no evidence suggested that Mr. Grunin was suicidal or distracted while driving, the “only other explanation” for Mr. Grunin driving directly into the Lendino’s vehicle at - 12 - 1-20-0598 such a high rate of speed, was that he was unaware of his actions. Dr. Kanner concluded that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Mr. Grunin’s collision with the Lendino family’s vehicle was the result of a seizure and that he could not control his body. ¶ 34 During cross-examination, Dr. Kanner acknowledged that he was not Mr. Grunin’s treating physician, had not conducted a clinical interview of Mr. Grunin, and was paid $15,000 for his expert consultation in the case. Nevertheless, he reiterated his opinion that Mr. Grunin suffered a focal epileptic seizure with loss of awareness after the first collision but before the second collision. Although it was difficult to establish “objectively” exactly when the seizure happened because no one witnessed it, Dr. Kanner believed the seizure occurred “within [the] period of time [of the accident].” Dr. Kanner could not “completely” rule out that the seizure occurred before the first crash. It was also possible that Mr. Grunin struck the first vehicle, experienced a seizure, and then maneuvered into the correct lane because he only had a partial loss of awareness or acted “reflexively.” However, as the seizure progressed, Mr. Grunin would have lost “full awareness” of his surroundings. ¶ 35 Dr. Kanner testified that he was “trying to make sense” of the accident but that no one knew for sure what happened during the initial collision. He also testified that nothing suggested that Mr. Grunin did not have a seizure. During cross-examination, he agreed that speeding could be volitional when a person has “full awareness,” but evidence that Mr. Grunin looked toward the rearview mirror did not establish that his conduct was volitional because a person can look around during a seizure without that action being volitional. Dr. Kanner considered the possibility that striking a vehicle, driving around it, and looking in the mirror might have meant Mr. Grunin was not having a seizure but ruled it out. Dr. Kanner opined that a person having a focal seizure that - 13 - 1-20-0598 manifested through “motionless steering with a lack of movement of the wheel” could drive without swerving for 3100 feet or could veer off the road. ¶ 36 Dr. Kanner was aware that Mr. Grunin did not tell the emergency room physicians or his treating physicians that he may have had a seizure during the crash. It was not until December 2018 that Mr. Grunin told his physicians about a seizure that may have occurred the day prior to the collision. On May 8, 2019, when Dr. Taber asked Mr. Grunin about the crash, Mr. Grunin stated that he: was tired and probably should have gone to sleep rather than travel; did not think he missed his medication; and remembered turning onto Milwaukee Avenue and then being transported in an ambulance. Mr. Grunin’s medical records did not state that he experienced a seizure on the day of the crash. Although Dr. Kanner did not speak with Dr. Taber, he “[a]bsolutely” believed that Mr. Grunin had a seizure. ¶ 37 During redirect examination, Dr. Kanner further stated his belief that Mr. Grunin was not exaggerating or feigning his symptoms. He noted that from the “beginning” of the ambulance ride, Mr. Grunin was confused, disorientated, and unaware of the accident. The fact that Mr. Grunin did not remember the accident and gave incorrect answers to basic questions “made no sense.” Moreover, in the past, Mr. Grunin was aware of his seizures only because others observed them. ¶ 38 During recross-examination, Dr. Kanner acknowledged that on June 15, 2018, Mr. Grunin visited Dr. Taber and reported a staring spell, and Dr. Taber treated him for a seizure. In December 2018, Mr. Grunin contacted Dr. Taber again, and Dr. Taber noted that Mr. Grunin had a seizure. Dr. Taber’s notes did not state that Mr. Grunin had a seizure on July 21, 2018. During re-redirect examination, Dr. Kanner testified that Mr. Grunin only reported seizures after being told about them. That further supported his opinion that Mr. Grunin was unaware of when he had a seizure. - 14 - 1-20-0598 ¶ 39 In rebuttal to Dr. Kanner’s testimony that Mr. Grunin had suffered a seizure, the State presented Northbrook firefighter-paramedic Thomas Longaker, who testified that he responded to the accident and treated Mr. Grunin on July 21, 2018. Mr. Grunin was alert but confused, had a laceration over his eye, and complained of wrist pain. Mr. Grunin was not sleeping, twitching, or convulsing. Mr. Longaker rated Mr. Grunin’s awareness at the time as being a three on a scale of four. Mr. Grunin was aware of his surroundings but not the events leading up to the accident. He provided his name and date of birth, but at times his speech was “confused,” which Mr. Longaker said was consistent with a head injury. Nothing indicated to Mr. Longaker that Mr. Grunin had a seizure, and Mr. Grunin did not report one. ¶ 40 During cross-examination, Mr. Longaker testified that Mr. Grunin indicated that he lived in Glenview. Mr. Longaker was unaware that Mr. Grunin did not live in Glenview and had lived elsewhere for seven years prior to the accident. Mr. Grunin also stated that he was going to visit his mother on a naval base, although she did not live on a naval base. Mr. Grunin was in and out of consciousness, which was not consistent with a seizure in Mr. Longaker’s experience. Although Mr. Longaker acknowledged that he did not attend medical school, he testified that he spoke to a neurologist about seizures during his EMT/paramedic training. He also acknowledged that he was not trained to detect focal seizures and agreed that Mr. Grunin not remembering the accident could be consistent with a seizure. ¶ 41 Dr. Lindsay Jin, who treated Mr. Grunin in the emergency room on July 21, 2018, testified that Mr. Grunin was admitted to the hospital after the accident due to an elevated heartrate and dizziness. Mr. Grunin answered questions and was oriented to his identity and location, and Dr. Jin had no difficulty communicating with him. Mr. Grunin did not provide details of the accident to Dr. Jin but was not “confused in a normal conversation.” Mr. Grunin reported a history of - 15 - 1-20-0598 epilepsy and that his last seizure occurred at 15 years of age but did not say that he may have had a seizure that day. Dr. Jin did not observe any indication that Mr. Grunin suffered a seizure. During cross-examination, Dr. Jin acknowledged that confusion can be consistent with a seizure and that a person can have a seizure and not know it. ¶ 42 In closing argument, the State asserted that Mr. Grunin acted recklessly when he fled the first crash and looked back as he sped away at 107 miles per hour. The defense responded that Mr. Grunin did not stop at the scene of the first “fender bender” due to a seizure. In rebuttal, the State argued that a driver who lost consciousness could not drive around another vehicle, enter the “appropriate lane,” avoid other vehicles, and look behind him. The State further noted that Mr. Grunin, who self-reported a “staring spell,” said nothing about a possible seizure on the day of the accident. ¶ 43 On January 10, 2020, the jury found Mr. Grunin guilty of one count of reckless homicide and two counts of aggravated reckless driving. Mr. Grunin filed a motion for a new trial alleging, in relevant part, that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the only “rational explanation” for the accident was a focal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, noting, in pertinent part, that the jury “clearly” did not find Dr. Kanner persuasive. ¶ 44 On March 4, 2020, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the aggravated reckless driving counts into the reckless homicide count and sentenced Mr. Grunin to four years in prison. The State agreed with the court that the aggravated reckless driving counts “would merge” but posited that the court had to impose sentence on those counts. The court replied that three years was “the sentence as to those.” Mr. Grunin’s mittimus states that Mr. Grunin received concurrent terms of four years in prison for reckless homicide and three years for each aggravated - 16 - 1-20-0598 reckless driving conviction, and, that the aggravated reckless driving convictions merged into the reckless homicide conviction. On March 30, 2020, Mr. Grunin filed a notice of appeal. ¶ 45 ANALYSIS ¶ 46 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Mr. Grunin filed a timely notice of appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. July 1, 2017). ¶ 47 Upon petitioning this court for rehearing, we note that the attorneys for Mr. Grunin took umbrage at our issuance of the opinion in this case without conducting oral arguments. Initially, the parties requested oral arguments in this case, which this court granted and set for March 1, 2022. On January 27, 2022, Mr. Grunin’s attorney filed a motion asking this court to postpone oral arguments for an unreasonably lengthy amount of time, requesting a date around after late May 2022. This Court granted the motion to remove the case from the oral argument schedule, to be postponed indefinitely. During the postponement, this court deliberated and decided unanimously that oral arguments were not necessary and would not significantly add to the resolution of the case. See United States v. Salinas-Garza, 811 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir 1987) (stating while the case was originally set for oral argument “prior thereto the oral argument panel after due consideration unanimously came to the conclusion that oral argument would not be of significant benefit in the decisional process of this case because the facts and appropriate legal arguments were fully contained in the briefs and the record of this case.”) Accordingly, in the case before us, this court decided to proceed without oral arguments and issued the original opinion on March 25, 2022. The decision to resolve a case without oral argument is within the province of the court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (“After the briefs have been filed, the court may dispose of any case without oral argument, if no substantial question is presented.”) Moreover, it is not unique for this court to issue - 17 - 1-20-0598 opinions without oral argument. See, e.g., People v. Ortega, 2021 IL App (1st) 182396, ¶ 6, fn. 1; People v. Padilla, 2021 IL App (1st) 171632, ¶ 3, fn. 1. ¶ 48 On appeal, both initially and in his petition for rehearing, Mr. Grunin contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless homicide or aggravated reckless driving. He argues that unrebutted evidence established that he suffered a focal seizure with loss of awareness before striking the Lendino’s vehicle. He asserts that his failure to brake or veer before the collision can only be explained by a loss of awareness and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted recklessly by consciously disregarding a risk. ¶ 49 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the question is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial. Id. “In reviewing the evidence, this court will not retry the defendant, nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Id. A defendant’s conviction will be reversed only when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of his guilt. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24. ¶ 50 To prove Mr. Grunin guilty of reckless homicide, as charged, the State had to show that, while driving a motor vehicle, Mr. Grunin unintentionally and without lawful justification recklessly performed acts, whether lawful or unlawful, that were likely to cause death or great bodily harm to a person, and those acts—specifically, exceeding the posted speed limit and failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident—caused Alyssa Lendino’s death. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West - 18 - 1-20-0598 2018). To prove Mr. Grunin guilty of aggravated reckless driving as charged, the State had to show that Mr. Grunin drove a motor vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons, which resulted in great bodily harm to Tony Lendino and Amanda Lendino. 625 ILCS 5/11- 503(a)(1), (c) (West 2018). ¶ 51 A person acts recklessly “when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1127 (2003); see also 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2018). “Recklessness may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the record and may be established by evidence of the physical condition of the driver and his manner of operating the vehicle.” Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1127. “Whether the given conduct is reckless is a question of fact for the jury to decide.” People v. Zator, 209 Ill. App. 3d 322, 331 (1991). ¶ 52 Although evidence of excessive speed alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless homicide, excessive speed suffices when combined with other circumstances which indicate a conscious disregard of a substantial risk likely to cause death or great bodily harm to others such that a reasonable person would have acted differently under the same circumstances. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1130. “[I]n finding the evidence sufficient to support a reckless homicide conviction, courts have focused on such factors as driving while intoxicated, driving at an excessive speed, disobeying traffic signals or lane markings, and fleeing the scene of the accident.” People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 78 (collecting cases). “When there is excessive speed *** in a nonemergency situation that causes the death of another person, it is unlikely there would not be other circumstances sufficient to show that the defendant consciously disregarded a - 19 - 1-20-0598 substantial and unjustifiable risk” and that such disregard grossly deviated from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable person in the same circumstances. (Emphasis in original.) People v. Mancinelli, 232 Ill. App. 3d 211, 217 (1992). ¶ 53 Here, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State was sufficient to prove Mr. Grunin guilty of reckless homicide and aggravated reckless driving. Specifically, the evidence established that after colliding with Ms. Brito’s vehicle, Mr. Grunin’s vehicle swerved, then straightened and continued driving along Milwaukee Avenue. In the next 27 to 29 seconds, Mr. Grunin’s vehicle covered approximately six-tenths of a mile at more than 100 miles per hour before colliding, in a centered impact, with the Lendino’s vehicle, which was stopped at a red light. No evidence showed that Mr. Grunin’s vehicle braked or veered to avoid the collision. See People v. Moreno, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3-4 (1983) (reckless homicide conviction affirmed where the defendant was moving “well in excess” of the speed limit, was in the wrong lane, and failed to apply his brakes at the moment of impact); see also People v. Boyle, 78 Ill. App. 3d 791, 797-98 (1979) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was not “criminally liable” for reckless driving because he only sped for the two blocks prior to the collision when his conscious disregard was “indicate[d]” by “excessive speed plus failure to keep a proper lookout”). The State’s evidence showed not only that Mr. Grunin was speeding, collided with Ms. Brito’s vehicle, and continued driving, but that he, thereafter, accelerated to more than 100 miles per hour and failed to reduce his speed or veer to avoid colliding with the Lendino’s vehicle, which was stopped at a red light. ¶ 54 Sergeant Ashleman, the State’s accident collision reconstruction expert, testified that data from Mr. Grunin’s vehicle established that in the five seconds prior to impact with the Lendino’s vehicle, Mr. Grunin’s vehicle accelerated from 100.6 miles per hour to 107.5 miles per hour and that the throttle closed slightly before opening again. It was his opinion that Mr. Grunin controlled - 20 - 1-20-0598 the vehicle immediately prior to impact. Sergeant Ashleman further opined that because Mr. Grunin’s vehicle did not veer before the collision, Mr. Grunin exerted “steering input.” Considering this evidence, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Grunin guilty of reckless homicide and aggravated reckless driving under these facts. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22. ¶ 55 The defense, on the other hand, presented accident collision reconstruction expert Mr. Roger Barrette and Dr. Andres Kanner, a board-certified neurologist with expertise in epilepsy, in support of its theory that Mr. Grunin was not in control of the vehicle immediately prior to the collision. Mr. Barrette testified that a driver’s foot twitching or moving back and forth could explain the throttle fluctuation and that vehicles designed in the United States are designed with self-aligning torque such that when a driver releases the steering wheel, the vehicle still continues straight. Dr. Kanner testified that it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Mr. Grunin suffered a seizure immediately prior to the collision with the Lendino’s vehicle. Dr. Kanner also opined that because normal human “survival instinct” would not permit a person to drive into another vehicle at over 100 miles per hour without trying to avoid a collision and since no evidence suggested that Mr. Grunin was suicidal, the only explanation was that Mr. Grunin was unaware of his actions during the crash because he suffered a seizure. ¶ 56 Dr. Kanner acknowledged that Mr. Grunin’s medical records did not indicate he suffered a seizure on that day and that it was difficult to “objectively” establish when the seizure occurred because Mr. Grunin only became aware of his seizures when others observed them. Dr. Kanner explained that it was possible that Mr. Grunin had a seizure during the first accident, that the stress of the first accident triggered a seizure, or that the seizure began during the first accident and continued until the second collision. That is, Mr. Grunin could have been in control at the time of - 21 - 1-20-0598 the first accident and able to maneuver his vehicle, if the seizure occurred after the first collision and he only suffered a partial loss of awareness or acted on reflex but lost all awareness by the time of the second collision. Dr. Kanner also testified that he could not rule out that the seizure occurred before the first crash. ¶ 57 Here, the jury was presented with two versions of the events leading to Mr. Grunin’s collision with the Lendino’s vehicle—either Mr. Grunin controlled the vehicle during the collision, or he did not. Considering its verdicts, the jury did not find Mr. Grunin’s version of events credible. See People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12 (“It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.”). While Mr. Grunin provided a plausible explanation for his failure to brake or otherwise avoid the collision, specifically that he suffered a focal seizure with lack of awareness, Dr. Kanner could not definitively say when the seizure began. A trier of fact need not seek all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to the level of reasonable doubt. See In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. ¶ 58 Mr. Grunin argues that Dr. Kanner’s unrebutted opinion, made with a “reasonable degree of medical certainty,” that Mr. Grunin suffered a focal seizure prior to the collision is the only explanation for his failure to brake or otherwise avoid the Lendino’s vehicle. He points out that Dr. Kanner found no evidence that he was suicidal and that his symptoms after the crash, including confusion, disorientation, and drowsiness, indicated an epileptic seizure. Since Dr. Kanner is an expert in epilepsy, Mr. Grunin posits that no rational trier of fact could completely disregard his opinion. Mr. Grunin also rejects the testimony of Mr. Longaker offered by the State and takes issue with the State’s failure to offer any expert rebuttal to Dr. Kanner’s expert opinion. - 22 - 1-20-0598 ¶ 59 As discussed, the trier of fact assesses witness credibility including experts, determines the weight afforded to witness testimony, and resolves conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. When faced with conflicting versions of events, a factfinder is “entitled” to choose among them and is not obligated to accept the defendant’s version. People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 231 (2001). This remains true with expert opinions, as well as lay witnesses. Thus, the trier of fact need not accept the opinions of a defendant’s expert witnesses. See People v. Dresher, 364 Ill. App. 3d 847, 855-56 (2006); see also People v. Peterson, 171 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734 (1988). “In situations where medical experts are called to testify, their comparative credibility and the weight to be accorded to their testimony is determined by the trier of fact.” People v. Klein, 2015 IL App (3d) 130052, ¶ 101. ¶ 60 Dr. Kanner concluded that, absent evidence that Mr. Grunin was suicidal or distracted, the only explanation for Mr. Grunin’s collision with the Lendino’s vehicle was that he had a seizure and, therefore, could not control his body. However, Dr. Kanner acknowledged that Mr. Grunin did not self-report a seizure on the day of the accident, Mr. Grunin’s medical records did not state that Mr. Grunin suffered a seizure that day, and no EEG was performed. Dr. Kanner also admitted that, although he believed Mr. Grunin suffered a seizure, he was unable to determine when Mr. Grunin’s seizure began. It could have occurred prior to the collision with Ms. Brito, been triggered by the first collision, or began during the first collision and continued until the collision with the Lendino’s vehicle. ¶ 61 Regarding Mr. Grunin’s ability to control his body during a seizure, Dr. Kanner testified that a person experiencing a seizure is unaware of events and exhibits “automatic behavior” and that, at the commencement of a seizure, a person could exhibit partial awareness and maneuver a vehicle prior to losing full awareness of his surroundings. Accordingly, even accepting Mr. - 23 - 1-20-0598 Grunin’s assertion that Dr. Kanner’s testimony was “unrebutted” by the State, the jury was still entitled to evaluate the substance of the testimony and decide whether to accept the entirety of Dr. Kanner’s opinion. Mr. Grunin’s argument on rehearing suggests that because Dr. Kanner’s opinion was unrebutted, the jury was required to believe that, since Dr. Kanner was presented as an expert in epilepsy, his theory that Mr. Grunin suffered a seizure prior to the second collision had to be accepted by the jury in its entirety. However, even if Dr. Kanner’s opinion had some probative value, it was not dispositive for the jury. Notably, while Dr. Kanner opined that Mr. Grunin had a seizure, he could not testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to when Mr. Grunin had the seizure, only that in his opinion, it occurred sometime prior to the second collision. In reality that calls into question an indeterminate time parameter. That question was important in the determination of whether Mr. Grunin’s actions were volitional. ¶ 62 We note that the jury also considered the testimony of the accident collision reconstruction experts in its determination. The State’s expert opined that Mr. Grunin controlled his vehicle at the time of the collision and Mr. Grunin’s expert opined that he did not. See Dresher, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 855-56 (it is the role of the trier of fact to evaluate an expert’s testimony and assess his or her credibility). Here, the jury clearly found relevant portions of Sergeant Ashleman’s testimony and opinion persuasive and rejected Mr. Barrett’s opinion. See People v. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881, ¶ 53 (a trier of fact is not “required to accept the defendant version of the facts”). We cannot say that, under these facts and circumstances, such a determination is unreasonable and warrants overturning the jury’s verdict. ¶ 63 Mr. Grunin’s arguments on appeal and upon rehearing, which mirror those presented at trial, offer an affirmative explanation for the collision with the Lendino’s vehicle, i.e.—he suffered a focal epileptic seizure with loss of awareness and was unaware of his surroundings—which the - 24 - 1-20-0598 jury rejected in favor of the State’s evidence. We decline Mr. Grunin’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. See People v. Abdullah, 220 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693 (1991) (“A reviewing court has neither the duty nor the privilege to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.”). ¶ 64 While Mr. Grunin argues in his reply brief that “every piece of evidence described by the State” was “consistent” with the defense theory that Mr. Grunin suffered a loss of awareness, the question before this court is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22. Although a defense expert testified that the only explanation for Mr. Grunin’s failure to avoid the Lendino’s vehicle was that at some point prior to the collision, Mr. Grunin suffered a focal seizure leading to a loss of awareness, the evidence nonetheless established that Mr. Grunin was speeding, continued driving after one accident, and accelerated immediately prior to hitting the Lendino’s vehicle in the second accident. The jury clearly found that the State’s version of the facts more persuasive. In other words, it cannot be said that no rational trier of fact could find Mr. Grunin guilty considering the evidence presented. A conviction will be overturned only if the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of guilt (Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24). ¶ 65 While this court may have reached a different conclusion had we been the trier of fact, the resolution does not turn on what a different trier of fact may have done. Rather, as discussed, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Grunin guilty when the totality of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. That standard does not permit this court to substitute its judgment on factual issues for that of the trier of fact. Clearly, the jury believed the State’s version of the events and not those presented by the defense. We cannot say that the jury’s conclusion was irrational. Therefore, upon rehearing, we find the evidence - 25 - 1-20-0598 sufficient to establish Mr. Grunin’s guilt on each and every count and affirm his convictions as merged into the conviction for reckless homicide. ¶ 66 CONCLUSION ¶ 67 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 68 Affirmed. - 26 - 1-20-0598 No. 1-20-0598 Cite as: People v. Grunin, 2022 IL App (1st) 200598 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CR-12063; the Hon. Joseph Michael Cataldo, Judge, presiding. Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Hannah Lazar Pieterse, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant: Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. Nowak for and Marci Jacobs, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the Appellee: People. - 27 -