Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 489 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 489 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (mass, 2020-04-03)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court
Mass. · 2020 · confidence medium
"The granting of parole, [on the other hand,] is a discretionary act of the parole board." Amirault, 415 Mass. at 116-117 , citing Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1018 (1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Massachusetts Parole Board
Mass. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
Ct. Dept., 395 Mass. 815 , 817 n.l (1985); Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1019 (1986); Greenman, 405 Mass. at 388 n.3; Quegan, 423 Mass. at 836 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Thurston
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
Had the defendant been sentenced on account of his felony conviction to a term of incarceration at Walpole/Cedar Junction in 1987, his parole eligibility date would not have come until he had served at least one-third (generally for nonviolent offenses) or two-thirds (generally for violent offenses) of his sentence. 2 Although there was (and is) no presumption of parole on the parole eligibility date, and the granting of parole was (and is) in the sole discretion of the parole board, see Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1018 (1986); Commonwealth v. Amirault , 415 Mass, at 11…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Board
Mass. · 1996 · confidence medium
While art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights might extend greater procedural protections to Quegan than does the Federal Constitution (see Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1019 [1986]), consideration in a parole decision of a prisoner’s acknowledgment of his wrongdoing or of his refusal to acknowledge his guilt is not arbitrary or unfair.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Amirault (2×)
Mass. · 1993 · confidence medium
Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1018 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Greenman v. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD
Mass. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1019 (1986) (noting lack of resolution of issue).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Albert E. Lanier
v.
Massachusetts Parole Board & others
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Mar 5, 1986.
489 N.E.2d 670
Kenneth J. King for the plaintiff., Michael W. Dingle, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

The plaintiff, Albert E. Lanier, a prisoner confined in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, brought an action seeking (1) a declaration that the defendants violated his rights under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in their actions rescinding an established parole reserve date;[1] [2] and (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring, inter alla, that the parole board reinstate Lanier’s rescinded parole reserve date, effectively granting him parole. A judge of the Superior Court entered an order granting a preliminary injunction reinstating Lanier’s parole reserve date. The defendants sought interlocutory relief from a single justice of the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 118 (1984 ed.). The single justice ordered the injunction dissolved, and Lanier appealed. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.

A preliminary injunction is appropriate when an evaluation of the plaintiff’s claims that he will suffer irreparable harm and that he is likely to succeed on the merits shows that the balance tips in his favor when weighed against the defendant’s corresponding claims. Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443, 447 (1983). Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980).

The plaintiff has not met his burden of showing the likelihood of his success on the merits. Our statutes and case law indicate that the granting of parole is within the discretion of the parole board. See, e.g., G. L. c. 127, §§ 130, 133 (1984 ed.); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 191-192 (1983); Woods v. State Bd. of Parole, 351 Mass. 556, 559 (1967). A similar Federal constitutional claim was rejected by the[*1019] United States Supreme Court in Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). Thus, there is no probability of success shown under Federal law.

Kenneth J. King for the plaintiff. Michael W. Dingle, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

Similarly, Lanier cannot show that his success on the merits under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is likely — until the courts of the Commonwealth determine that he is entitled to greater protection under that article and the relevant State statutory scheme than under the Federal Constitution. At this time, that question has not been so decided. In light of the interlocutory posture of this case, the existence of disputed issues of fact, and the novelty of Lanier’s art. 12 claim, it is not appropriate that we reach the question today.

The order for preliminary injunction entered in the Superior Court on July 9, 1985, is vacated.

So ordered.

2

A “parole reserve date” is a date conditionally established by the parole board for a prisoner’s release on parole. The extent to which this date is binding constitutes part of the plaintiff’s claim. We do not address that argument today because we do not believe it an appropriate issue to resolve prior to the development of an adequate trial record.