Friedman v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 609 N.E.2d 1223 (Mass. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Friedman v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 609 N.E.2d 1223 (Mass. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …statutory appeal period ... cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute ✓
49 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Senior Housing Properties Trust v. HealthSouth Corp. (mass, 2006-07-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Senior Housing Properties Trust v. HealthSouth Corp.
Mass. · 2006 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
statutory appeal period . . . cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Morales v. Appeals Court
Mass. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a statutory appeal period . . . cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute
examined Cited as authority (quoted) DeLucia v. Kfoury (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
statutory appeal period ... cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Demello v. Cape Cod Spas & Pools, Inc.
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Despite DeMello’s reasonable reliance on Advo, Inc., we are compelled to note that Rule 4(a) did not include Rule 60(b) motions in its ten-day ambit until May 1,2013 — a date after the court events here. 5 Indeed, at the time period relevant here, it was “well established that a motion for relief brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) ‘d [id] not toll the time limit for taking appeals in civil actions.’” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Okamura, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 42 , 43 & n.2, quoting Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Okamura
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
It is well established that a motion for relief brought pursuant to Rule 60 (b) “does not toll the time limit for taking appeals in civil actions.” Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NES Rentals v. Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc.
Mass. · 2013 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993) (where “there is a statutory appeal period” it “cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beres v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors (2×)
Mass. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Hamel v. Board of Registration of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 449 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2007); Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 666 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cummings Properties, LLC v. Cepoint Networks, LLC
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
A. R, Rule 4 [a] to salvage untimely appeal rejected where rule “would contradict specific provisions of G.L.c. 25, §5 governing timing of appeals); Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993) (statute cannot be overriden by appellate procedure rule of court).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United Co-Operative Farmers, Inc. v. Aro
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Muir v. Hall, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 38, 41 (1994), citing Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. De'Amicis
Mass. · 2007 · confidence medium
Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665-666 (1993) (dismissing appeal for failure to comply with statutory deadline); Morales v. Appeals Court, supra (Appeals Court correctly dismissed appeal from denial of motion for free transcript for failure to file timely appeal under § 27D); Commonwealth v. Clark, supra (failure to file appeal from denial of fee waiver within § 27D time period must result in dismissal of appeal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Servs., 432 Mass. 251 , 265 n.3 (2000) (public employee could not circumvent the thirty-day statutoiy limitation period for appealing adverse administrative determination concerning her discharge by framing her judicial action as one for declaratory judgment); Friedman v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 664 (1993) (filing petition for judicial review of administrative procedure in the wrong court does not toll the thirty-day time limit for filing petition); Bd. of Appeals of Rockport v. DeCarolis, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 348, 352 (1992) (failure to comply with thirty-day limitation for see…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Board (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
L. c. 30A, § 14(1), can be termed jurisdictional, see Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665-666 (1993), does the plaintiff’s complaint fail because, though filed within the time mandated by statute, it did not name the proper party defendant, and named an improper party? 5 Or alternatively, given the plaintiff’s act of timely filing a complaint naming the proper defendant multiple times therein, did the judge have discretionary authority to allow the amendment? 6 It appears settled that complaints seeking judicial review of final agency actions must be filed within…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maitland v. Board of Registration in Medicine (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. · 2007 · confidence medium
Although Maitland acknowledges that the statutory deadline is “jurisdictional” and “not susceptible to extension except in limited circumstances as provided in the statute [not applicable here],” Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., supra at 666; accord Ramaseshu v. Board of Registration in Med., 441 Mass. 1006,1006-1007 (2004), he nonetheless seeks an extension to file his complaint.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramaseshu v. Board of Registration
Mass. · 2004 · confidence medium
See White v. Commonwealth, 439 Mass. 1017 , 1017 n.l (2003); Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rinaldi v. State Building Code Appeals Board
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
In Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 664 (1993), the requirement was interpreted to mean “within thirty days from the time the party receives final notice of the agency.” Rinaldi admits that he was not a party to the board’s proceedings as he never received notice of Santos’s appeal or of the public hearing and therefore never appeared before the board.
cited Cited as authority (rule) LaRoche v. Flynn
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 412 Mass. 464, 465 (1992); Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ben v. Schultz
Mass. App. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that this court “had no authority to grant an extension of time for filing.” Ibid, at 1010. “[A] statutory appeal period . . . cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute.” Id., quoting from Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eastern Energy Corp. v. Energy Facilities Siting Board
Mass. · 1994 · confidence medium
L. c. 25, § 5, which specifically govern the timing of appeals. “[A] statutory appeal period . . . cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute.” Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993) .
cited Cited "see" Plymouth Ret. Bd. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med. , 414 Mass. 663 , 665-666 (1993).
cited Cited "see" McLaughlin v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663, 666 (1993).
cited Cited "see" In re the Valuation of Bell Atlantic Mobile of Massachusetts Corp.
Mass. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993), citing Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 412 Mass. 464, 465 (1992).
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Kobrin
Mass. App. Ct. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 664 (1993).
cited Cited "see" Hamel v. Board of Registration of Funeral Directors & Embalmers
Mass. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., supra at 666.
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Clark
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665-666 (1993), and cases cited.
discussed Cited "see" Covell v. Department of Social Services
Mass. App. Ct. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663, 666 (1993); Flynn v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 668, 669 (1984); Wolbach v. Beckett, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 308 (1985); Board of Appeals of Rockport v. DeCarolis, 32 Mass. Ap.
discussed Cited "see" Daniels v. Board of Registration in Medicine
Mass. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 408 Mass. 474, 479 (1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1107 (1991), S.C., 414 Mass. 663 (1993). 5 The plaintiff argues that Dr. Beck did not perform a sufficiently extensive evaluation of the patients to determine whether they suffered from borderline personality or psychoses.
cited Cited "see" Muir v. Hall
Mass. App. Ct. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 665 (1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Care & Protection of Georgette
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Friedman v. Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 664-665 (1993) (motion under rule 60[b][6] cannot be used to vacate a judgment after the statutory appeal period has expired without an appeal); Tibbits v. Wisniewski, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 732-733 (inexcusable unprofessional conduct by party’s attorney causing adverse judgment against him does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance justifying relief under the “extremely narrow and meagre scope” of rule 60[b][6]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Leonard R. Friedman
v.
Board of Registration in Medicine
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Mar 31, 1993.
609 N.E.2d 1223
Leonard R. Friedman, pro se., Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for the Board of Registration in Medicine.
Lynch.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: Massachusetts Appeals Court (2)
Lynch, J.

The plaintiff, Leonard R. Friedman, appeals from an order of a single justice of this court, denying a petition for review of decisions of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board). We affirm the single justice’s order.

1. Prior proceedings. On June 24, 1987, the board revoked the plaintiff’s registration to practice medicine for gross misconduct in the practice of medicine in violation of G. L. c. 112, §§ 5 (c), 5 (h), and 61, and 243 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (5) (a) (3). Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 408 Mass. 474, 479 (1990). On January 13, 1991, he petitioned the board for reinstatement. On April 12, 1991, he moved to strike certain reasons given by complaint counsel in favor of denying reinstatement because they were not the grounds on which the original revocation occurred. Addi[*664] tionally, he filed a public records request seeking information he now claims to be newly discovered evidence.

In July, 1991, the plaintiff requested a single justice of this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3 (1990 ed.), to order the board not to consider the complaint counsel’s allegedly new reasons for denying Friedman’s petition for reinstatement. After argument, the single justice denied the requested relief on August 13, 1991. According to the board, in December, 1991, it restored the plaintiffs registration subject to specific probationary requirements. On January 8, 1992, the plaintiff moved for relief from the June 24, 1987, decision pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), based on the information he had obtained as part of his public records request. The board denied that motion on February 26, 1992. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration which was denied by the board on March 25, 1992. It appears that the plaintiff appealed from this denial to the Superior Court in April, 1992, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1990 ed.). A Superior Court judge granted the board’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on June 8, 1992.

The plaintiff then filed for relief before the single justice on June 24, 1992, seeking review of the board’s February and March, 1992, decisions, as well as the original revocation of his license in 1987. The single justice of this court issued an order denying the petition, without a hearing, triggering the present appeal.

2. Authorization to review the board’s revocation. “[A] person whose certificate, registration, license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled,” may obtain review by the Supreme Judicial Court of the board’s decision in accordance with the standards provided in G. L. c. 30A, § 14. G. L. c. 112, § 64 (1990 ed.). Such a petition, however, must be filed within thirty days from the time the party receives notice of the final decision of the agency. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (l).[1] The plaintiff is seeking review of the board’s final[*665] decisions, the latest of which, denial of reconsideration, occurred on March 25, 1992. The petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64, filed in the county court on June 24, 1992, was therefore time barred for failure to meet the thirty-day limit of G. L. c. 30A, § 14. The plaintiffs argument, that his appeal is not time barred because Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6) vitiates any statutory limit of a filing time, is without merit. A motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 does not toll the time limit for taking appeals in civil actions. Karen Constr. Co. v. Lizotte, 396 Mass. 143, 145 (1985). Furthermore, here there is a statutory appeal period which cannot be overridden by a contrary rule of court when the manner and time for effective filing of an appeal are delineated in the statute. Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 412 Mass. 464, 465 (1992). Failure to file for judicial review of an administrative decision within the time specified in the statute results in the dismissal of the appeal. See Clemons v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 395 Mass. 174, 176 (1985); Schulte v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 369 Mass. 74, 79 (1975). Filing the petition incorrectly in the Superior Court, instead of the Supreme Judicial Court, will not toll the thirty-day time limit. See New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. Assessors of Dartmouth, 368 Mass. 745, 747 (1975) (adherence to time limitation in statute is prerequisite to effective application for appeal); Greeley v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 350 Mass. 549, 552 (1966) (filing appeal with someone other than official designated in statute ineffective filing); O’Day v. School Comm. of W. Brookfield, 343 Mass. 122, 125 (1961) (petitioner must “bring” petition[*666] within meaning of statute). Filing in the Supreme Judicial Court within thirty days for judicial review is a jurisdictional requirement and not susceptible to extension except in limited circumstances as provided in the statute. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1); Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control, supra at 467; Board of Appeals of Rockport v. De-Carolis, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 352 (1992). While the plaintiff, a law school graduate, is proceeding pro se, he is still bound to the same rules and requirements as one represented by counsel. Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985). Since the single justice’s denial of the petition is sustainable on the above ground, we need not consider the other issues raised.

Order affirmed.

1

An action for judicial review must be commenced within thirty days “after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency or if a petition[*665] for rehearing has been timely filed with the agency, within thirty days after receipt of notice of agency denial of such petition for rehearing. Upon application made within the thirty-day period or any extension thereof, the court may for good cause shown extend the time.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1) (1990 ed.). General Laws c. 112, § 64 (1990 ed.), does not refer specifically to § 14 (1) of c. 30A. The plaintiff, however, does not argue that § 14 (1) does not apply to filings in the Supreme Judicial Court and we can conceive of no reason why it should not.