Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 14 N.E.3d 919 (Mass. 2014). · Go Syfert
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Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 14 N.E.3d 919 (Mass. 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (25 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jairin Perez v. Commonwealth (mass, 2025-07-30)
Treatment trajectory · 2014 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2014 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jairin Perez v. Commonwealth (2×)
Mass. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, in certain circumstances, under our State double jeopardy protections a defendant may be resentenced, so long as it does "not result in any increase in the aggregate punishment," Tinsley, 487 Mass. at 392, quoting Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014), and does not occur on "any conviction for which the defendant has already fully served his sentence," Tinsley, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Sallop, 472 Mass. 568, 570 (2015).[8] Here, if a resentencing hearing were to result in the defendant having to serve his sentences consecutively rather than concurrently, such a change…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Commonwealth
Mass. · 2023 · confidence medium
In Commonwealth v. Bruzzese, 437 Mass. 606, 614 (2002), the court held that a judge's revocation of the defendant's probation on one of his complaints, which resulted in him serving another year beyond what was contemplated by the order of the initial sentencing judge, "violated principles of double jeopardy," and thus, his "motion under rule 30 (a) should have been allowed." See Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 143 (2015) (rule 30 [a] proper mechanism for judge to correct now unconstitutional life sentence); Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 320 (2014) (rule 30 [a] was "proper mec…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Tinsley (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. · 2021 · confidence medium
Sentences are interdependent when they function to realize an "over-all concept in sentencing" (citation omitted), 19 Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014), for convictions arising out of a single incident, see Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 291 , 292 & 295 n.4 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Noonan
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 320 (2014). a.
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Garrett
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo , 468 Mass. 318 , 321 (2014).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Pacheco
Mass. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014) (double jeopardy considerations prohibit resentencing defendant *211 to any additional period of incarceration or probation if, at time of resentencing, defendant has served entire sentence other than CPSL component); Cumming, supra (defendant who violated term of probation could not be required to serve more than initial ten-year sentence). 5 In this case, the parties dispute the effect of the judge’s 2008 order, issued at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to vacate CPSL, and whether the order was, indeed, a resentencing.
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Sallop (2×)
Mass. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321-322 (2014), citing Cu mming, supra at 473-474 (remanding with instructions not to resentence defendant on convictions as to which sentence had been fully served); Cole, supra at 311 (where defendant already served original sentence, “any resentencing ... necessarily would violate principles of double jeopardy”). 5 The defendant, as noted, had fully served his original sentence as to count 4 when the *571 resentencing judge vacated that sentence and replaced it with a ten-year term of probation.
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Costa
Mass. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014); Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013); Commonwealth v. Talbot, 444 Mass. 586, 597-598 (2005).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Hind, R. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Scott, 22 N.E.3d 171 , 173-74 (Mass. App. 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Parillo, 14 N.E.3d 919, 921 (Mass. 2014) (stating that a judge may not resentence the defendant on convictions “for which the defendant has already served his sentence, because any such resentencing would result in an increase in punishment in violation of double jeopardy principles” (citation omitted)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Walters
Mass. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014) (defendant's community parole supervision for life [CPSL] sentence may have played part in judge's over-all concept of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 472 (2013) ("It would not be possible to sever the CPSL requirement without fundamentally altering that judge's original intent"); Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 735 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 245, 263 (2008) ("The components of the scheme work in combination, not isolation. . . .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Walters (2×)
Mass. · 2017 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parrillo , 468 Mass. 318 , 321, 14 N.E.3d 919 (2014) (defendant's community parole supervision for life [CPSL] sentence may have played part in judge's over-all concept of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cumming , 466 Mass. 467 , 472, 995 N.E.2d 1094 (2013) ("It would not be possible to sever the CPSL requirement without fundamentally altering that judge's original intent"); Commonwealth v. Leggett , 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730 , 735, 978 N.E.2d 563 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. LeBeau , 451 Mass. 244 , 245, 263, 884 N.E.2d 956 (2008) ("The components of the scheme work in c…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Scott
Mass. App. Ct. · 2015 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Cumming, Cole, and Parrillo, supra (defendants did not challenge their convictions, but succeeded in eliminating one component of a sentencing scheme). 6 That risk is delimited by our common law of double jeopardy, which requires that the restructured scheme be “quantitatively fair.” Cumming, supra at 472 . 7 The defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence once served. 8 See Parrillo , 468 Mass, at 321.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Commonwealth
v.
John J. Parrillo
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Jun 11, 2014.
14 N.E.3d 919
Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (John J. Connors with her) for the defendant., Owen J. Murphy, Assistant District Attorney (Roger L. Michel, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.
Cordy.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
Cordy, J.

The defendant, John J. Parrillo, was convicted in 2008 of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H, among other charges. He was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, probation, and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). He appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, CPSL, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), on various grounds, including that his CPSL[*319] sentence is unconstitutional. We transferred the case on our own motion from the Appeals Court and heard the case concurrently with Commonwealth v. Cole, ante 294 (2014), and others raising questions regarding the constitutionality of the CPSL sentence.

The court held today in Cole that G. L. c. 127, § 133D (c), violates our separation of powers principles by delegating the distinctly judicial power to impose sentences to the parole board, an agency of the executive branch. The court further concluded that this unconstitutional provision is not severable from the remainder of the CPSL scheme, thereby rendering the CPSL sentence unconstitutional. See Cole, supra at 308-309. Pursuant to the holding in Cole, we vacate the defendant’s CPSL sentence and remand for resentencing.[1]

Background. In 2008, a jury found the defendant guilty of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13H; simple assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A; and open and gross lewdness, G. L. c. 272, § 16. He was sentenced to several terms of imprisonment in the house of correction, probation with a variety of special conditions, and CPSL, presumably on the indecent assault and battery charge.[2]

In November, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), and requested that his CPSL sentence be vacated. He asserted that under Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 174 (2005), the[*320] imposition of CPSL on a first-time offender was unconstitutional, and he had not been charged and convicted as a subsequent offender, for which CPSL would be mandatory. See G. L. c. 265, § 45. The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motion in June, 2011, without a hearing. In essence, the judge explained that he had exercised his discretion in imposing CPSL “as part of an overall sentencing scheme because of the crimes for which [the defendant] stands convicted, the defendant’s criminal history, as well as his age.” The defendant appealed the denial, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.

Discussion. A rule 30 (a) motion is the proper mechanism by which to challenge the constitutionality of the CPSL sentencing scheme. Commonwealth v. Azar, 444 Mass. 72, 76-77 (2005). Apart from claiming that his CPSL sentence is unconstitutional, the defendant argues on appeal that the judge improperly sentenced him to CPSL as a first-time offender, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 45, after this court’s rulings in Pagan, 445 Mass. at 174, and Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422, 431-434 (2003), which together rendered the imposition of a CPSL sentence on first-time offenders under § 45 unconstitutional.[3] See Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 421 Mass. 472, 475 (1995) (sentence “premised on a major misunderstanding by the sentencing judge as to the legal bounds of his authority” is illegal). We need not assess whether the defendant’s CPSL sentence was properly imposed, because the CPSL sentence is now unconstitutional in any form. See Cole, supra. The defendant’s CPSL sentence therefore must be vacated.

Although the defendant asks that only the CPSL portion of[*321] his sentence be affected, resentencing as to the entire sentencing scheme is appropriate here. See Renderos, 440 Mass. at 435; Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 197 (2008). Where CPSL is imposed as part of an “integrated package” of sentences on multiple convictions, see Renderos, supra, the CPSL sentence “may have played a part in the judge’s over-all concept in sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Talbot, 444 Mass. 586, 597-598 (2005). Therefore, “the judge must be afforded the opportunity to restructure his sentence.” Id. at 598. Accord Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 472 (2013) (“It would not be possible to sever the CPSL requirement without fundamentally altering that judge’s original intent”). There is no violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy in engaging in resentencing when a defendant files a rule 30 (a) motion to correct his sentence, because he “knowingly expose[s] himself to the possibility that his entire sentencing scheme might be restructured.” Id. at 471. However, to accord with double jeopardy principles, resentencing must not result in any increase in the aggregate punishment and must be “quantitatively fair.” Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 737 (2012). See Cole, supra at 311; Cumming, supra at 472-474; Katz v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 305, 316 (1979), citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104, 114-115 (1979).

As far as we can discern from the record, the defendant has served his two and one-half year sentence on the indecent assault and battery conviction and his one-year sentence on the simple assault and battery conviction. He is currently on probation under a suspended sentence on the open and gross lewdness charge. His probation is set to expire on December 8, 2015. The judge may not resentence the defendant on the two convictions for which the defendant has already served his sentence, because any such resentencing would result in an increase in punishment in violation of double jeopardy principles. See Cumming, 466 Mass. at 473-474. The judge in his sound discretion may resentence on the open and gross lewdness conviction, provided the new sentence satisfies the double jeopardy principles set forth in Cumming, supra.

[*322] Conclusion. The defendant’s sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

1

Because we vacate the defendant’s community parole supervision for life (CPSL) sentence on other grounds, we need not consider whether his CPSL sentence violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, by imposing mandatory sentence increases without requiring that the facts meriting the increase be admitted to by the defendant or submitted to a jury.

2

The defendant was sentenced to two and one-half years in a house of correction for the indecent assault and battery charge, one year in the house of correction for the simple assault and battery charge (to be served from and after the first sentence), and two years in the house of correction on the open and gross lewdness charge, suspended for a five-year period of probation to commence from and after his release from the house of correction. The judge also set a number of special conditions on probation, including submitting to deoxyribonucleic acid sampling, complying with Sex Offender Registry Board registry requirements, wearing a global positioning system monitoring device, participating in sex offender treatment, and abstaining from any contact with persons under the age of eighteen or with any intellectual disability.

3

This argument stems in part from some confusion at the defendant’s sentencing as to the basis on which the judge imposed CPSL. The defendant articulates, and the record reflects, three potential bases on which the judge may have rested the CPSL sentence: first, as a repeat offender, pursuant to the third sentence of G. L. c. 265, § 45, despite the fact that the defendant was not charged as such, see Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 174 (2005); second, as a first-time offender, under the first sentence of G. L. c. 265, § 45, which we held in Pagan, supra, was unconstitutional; and third, as a condition of the probation imposed on the open and gross lewdness conviction, which reflected a potential misunderstanding on the part of the judge as to the relationship between CPSL and probation.