Commonwealth v. Villella, 657 N.E.2d 237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). · Go Syfert
Search
Commonwealth v. Villella, 657 N.E.2d 237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the 'four comers of the affidavit”
63 citation events (54 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Commonwealth v. Gallagher (massappct, 2007-01-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 49 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Commonwealth v. Gallagher
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the 'four comers of the affidavit
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Commonwealth v. Decarvalho
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it is well settled that a controlled buy supervised by police provides probable cause to issue a search warrant
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Deron C. Jones.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
When assessing whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, our inquiry "begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'" Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Julius E. Clemente.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
In evaluating whether a warrant application establishes probable cause, our inquiry "always begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'" Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Marcus D. Anding
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Whether in the trial court or in an appellate court, review of a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant "always begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'" Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Kevin Smyth.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
In evaluating whether a warrant application establishes probable cause, our inquiry "always begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'" Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Balboni
Mass. App. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Our inquiry as to whether an affidavit supports a finding of probable cause “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Augustine
Mass. · 2015 · confidence medium
The inquiry “begins and ends with ‘the four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Forbes
Mass. App. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
L. c. 276, § 2B. 6 “Under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, if an affidavit is based on information from an unknown informant, the magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the contraband was where he claimed it was (the basis of knowledge test), and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’ (the veracity test).” Id. at 374-375 (quotations and citations omitted). “[0]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warra…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Fontaine
Mass. App. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
When determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, we consider the statements contained within the “four corners of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Clagon
Mass. · 2013 · confidence medium
Standard of review. “[0]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villela, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Thevenin
Mass. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
Our inquiry as to the sufficiency of a search warrant application begins and ends with the “four comers of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Mora
Mass. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
“It is well settled that a controlled buy supervised by police provides probable cause to issue a search warrant.” Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 427-428 (1995) (upholding an anticipatory search warrant based on a controlled buy within a residence).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Mendes
Mass. · 2012 · confidence medium
We confine our examination of the sufficiency of a search warrant application to the “four comers of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Escalera
Mass. · 2012 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Cavitt
Mass. · 2011 · confidence medium
Review of the sufficiency of the search warrant application “begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Lima
Mass. App. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
The defendant appeals from the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine and records found during the search of 191 Belmont Street, pursuant to a warrant to search the premises there for “[cjocaine [and] . . . [a]ny monies, records, or paraphernalia related to the use or distribution of [cocaine].” He claims that the search warrant affidavit did not provide a sufficient nexus between the defendant, the criminal activity, and 191 Belmont Street. 2 “[G]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ �…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Westbrooks
Mass. App. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
In particular, the defendant contends that sufficient evidence of a nexus was lacking because the warrant affidavit does not contain any description of the interior of 9 Belmont Street, including how many units are in the building, nor does it contain any “description of the means of access or egress between the units in the building.” Likewise, the affidavit does not contain any description of Spider’s supposed activities inside 9 Belmont Street, i.e., where he went, what he did, or who (if anyone) he met with while inside the building, nor does it contain any allegation that Spider eve…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Legette
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
A court reviewing the sufficiency of a search warrant application “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Escalera
Mass. App. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
Second, I dissent because, even apart from the Pina-Medina precedent, I am not persuaded that, within the four comers of the affidavit, the constitutional standard of particularized probable cause was met. “[T]he sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day , 440 Mass, at 297, quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Young
Mass. App. Ct. · 2010 · confidence medium
Facts. “[Ojur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Takvorian
Mass. App. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
In evaluating whether a warrant application establishes probable cause, our inquiry “always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
Mass. App. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
Our examination of a search warrant application for probable cause “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Connolly
Mass. · 2009 · confidence medium
Review of the sufficiency of the showing to justify issuance of a search warrant “begins and ends with the four comers of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Turner
Mass. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Our inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application “begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Pina (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Our inquiry into the sufficiency of a search warrant application “begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Anthony
Mass. · 2008 · confidence medium
In determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant to issue, our inquiry “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Rabb
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Our review of the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit “begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Luthy
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Our review of the sufficiency of a search warrant “begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Stegemann
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
In evaluating his argument, “our inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. at 297 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Toledo
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
Throughout this section, we have added emphasis to key language quoted from the warrant application, supporting affidavit, and warrant. “[O]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Eller
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
We turn first to the defendant’s claim that the search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause to tie his illegal drug sales to his motel room. “[G]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Santiago
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
The motion judge ruled that the search warrant application for 63 Monroe Drive failed to establish the requisite nexus between the objects sought and the location to be searched in that neither the confidential informant nor the police had actually seen any “records, ledgers, or proceeds inside 63 Monroe Drive and police surveillance never discovered Santiago or his accomplice bringing such proceeds, records, or ledgers into 63 Monroe Drive.” 4 Facts. “[Ojur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search war rant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Wade
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
Discussion. “[Ojur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995). “[W]e determine whether, based on the affidavit in its entirety, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that a crime had been committed, Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 715 (2000), and that the items described in the warrant were related to the criminal activity and probably in the place to be se…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Ilges
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
Our inquiry begins and ends with the “four comers of the affidavit,” Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. McAfee
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Tshudy, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 955, 955-957 (1993); Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 427-428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Harmon
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
In determining whether there was probable cause for a search warrant to issue, the reviewing court does not examine the facts subsequently revealed; instead “our inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four comers of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Hardy
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
Our inquiry as to the sufficiency of a search warrant application begins and ends with the “four comers of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Baldasaro
Mass. App. Ct. · 2004 · confidence medium
Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. "[O]ur inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the `four corners of the affidavit.' " Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. O'Day
Mass. · 2003 · confidence medium
However, our inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the “four comers of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Rice
Mass. App. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Blake, 413 Mass. 823, 827-828 (1992); Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 71 (1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
Mass. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 386 (1989); Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Acevedo
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1997 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994); Commonwealth v. Luna, 410 Mass. 131, 134 (1991); Commonwealth v. Collado, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 464, 469 (1997) (drug case where independent police corroboration satisfied Aguilar-Spinelli tests for overall reliability); Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 427 (1995). 2 In sum, the admittedly sparse information provided by CI-1, when joined with the more detailed information and “controlled buy” of CI-D and the corroboration by independent police observations, enabled the affidavit to satisfy the source of knowledge and reliability pron…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Gauthier (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 1996 · confidence medium
Contrast Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 427 (1995) (buyer was confidential informant’s intermediary through whom he would “buy marijuana from the defendant at his residence”). “[B]y far the most common case has to do with the anticipated mail delivery to a certain address of a package known or reasonably believed to contain some form of contraband.
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Bryan A. Henry.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 427-428 (1995). 11 Additionally, where Frais averred that the State police watched the defendant leave his home and drive directly to and from two of the controlled buys, and saw him going either to or from his home for the other two controlled buys, the affidavits established the required nexus between the defendant's home and his drug distribution.
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Hernandez
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003) (“inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit,’ ” quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 428 (1995)).
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. O'Day
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 427 (1995).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Callahan
Mass. App. Ct. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See note 12, infra. Admittedly, the Soares decision (384 Mass, at 155), preceding Ricciardelli and Gendron by more than a decade, recites only that it is “preferable” that an anticipatory warrant define the triggering event with “reasonable precision.” See Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426 , 428 n.l (1995).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Estabrook
Mass. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Commonwealth
v.
Donald R. Villella
No. 94-P-826.
Massachusetts Appeals Court.
Nov 17, 1995.
657 N.E.2d 237
Richard C. Chambers for the defendant., Susanne G. Levsen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Porada.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 81%
Citer courts: Massachusetts Appeals Court (1)
Porada, J.

The defendant, after a jury-waived trial in the jury session of the Peabody Division of the District Court, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana. On appeal he challenges the denials of his motion to suppress, his motion for a rehearing of that motion, his motion for a required finding of not guilty, and his motion in limine to strike the certificates of analysis. We affirm the convictions.

1. Motion to suppress. The defendant contends that we should reverse the decision of the District Court judge denying his motion on the grounds that the magistrate lacked probable cause to issue an anticipatory search warrant, and the motion judge made erroneous findings of fact. The defendant argues that the officer who submitted the affidavit accompanying his application for a search warrant did not establish the veracity or reliability of the confidential informant upon whom he relied for information that the defendant was selling marijuana out of his home. The affiant admitted that the reliability of the confidential informant had not yet been proven, but stated that the informant had supplied detailed information about the defendant, some of which the affiant had verified. While police corroboration of details furnished by an informant can establish his reliability and basis of knowledge, Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994), the affiant did not rely solely on his corroboration of several of the details furnished by the informant. Rather, he outlined a controlled buy to be supervised by him in which the informant would buy marijuana from the defendant at his residence through an intermediary in the same way that the informant claimed he had done in the past.

It is well settled that a controlled buy supervised by police provides probable cause to issue a search warrant. Commonwealth v. Luna, 410 Mass. 131, 134 (1991). Commonwealth [*428] v. Warren, 418 Mass, at 89. The defendant argues, however, that that principle is inapplicable here because the buy was not made by the informant but rather an intermediary, who himself was not subject to search before or after the alleged buy. The defendant overlooks our holding in Commonwealth v. Tshudy, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 955 (1993), in which we held that a controlled buy conducted by an intermediary who was not subject to search before or after the buy but was under police surveillance during the buy provided probable cause to issue a search warrant. Such was the case here. We therefore conclude that the circumstances of the controlled buy were sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.[1]

The defendant claims that the motion judge’s decision should be reversed because of his finding that “[t]he informant’s tip was based on actual knowledge and personal observation of a prior sale to him of marijuana by this Defendant.” We conclude that that finding is erroneous only in so far as it suggests that the confidential informant bought marijuana directly from the defendant rather than through an intermediary as set forth in the affidavit accompanying the search warrant. Notwithstanding this misstatement, his other findings support his conclusion, and in any event, this misstatement is of no consequence because we are in as good a position as the motion judge to examine the four corners of the affidavit. Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 328-330 (1980). As noted, we are of the opinion that the affidavit was sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.

2. Denial of a rehearing of the motion to suppress. The defendant claims that the judge in the jury-of-six session[*429] erred in declining to hear his motion to suppress. There was no error.

The defendant filed his initial motion in the Lynn Division of the District Court where the motion was heard, and denied. Thereafter, the defendant claimed his right to a first instance jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Peabody Division of the District Court jury-of-six session. The defendant refiled his motion to suppress in the jury-of-six session. The judge in the jury session declined to rehear the motion.

At the time the motions were filed, the District Courts in Essex County were governed by the one trial system established by St. 1986, c. 537. In the circumstances described, the judge had the discretion to rehear the motion upon a showing that substantial justice required a rehearing. Id. at § 19. See also Rule 4 of the Special Rules of Criminal Procedure for District Court Criminal Cases in Essex and Hampden Counties, effective July 1, 1987. No such showing was made by the defendant. The defendant raised substantially the same issues in his second motion as previously heard and ruled upon by another judge. Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to grant a rehearing of the motion.

3. Motion for a required finding. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), there was ample evidence to send the case to the jury.

Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence of the mechanics of the controlled buy. The police first searched the informant and his car to assure that he did not then possess drugs; they then gave him marked money for the buy and watched him until he met the intermediary. The police then followed the informant and the intermediary to the defendant’s residence. The police saw the intermediary (with nothing in his hands) enter the defendant’s home and a short time later leave with a package in his hand, which he[*430] secreted in his belt. The police then observed him enter the informant’s car and later exit it. The informant, who was still under surveillance, returned to the police and delivered a bag of marijuana. Upon delivery of the marijuana, the police entered the defendant’s home and discovered bags of marijuana in his basement and the marked money for the buy on his person. The defendant admitted that all the marijuana in the house belonged to him. The police also found $4,750 secreted in the den of the defendant’s home. This evidence was sufficient to withstand the defendant’s motion.

4. Motion to strike the certificates of analysis. The defendant argues that the trial judge should have allowed his motion to strike the certificates of analysis in this case on the grounds that (1) the chemist who performed the analysis had on prior occasions been found to have tampered with evidence or given false analyses, and (2) the Commonwealth’s failure to provide this information constituted a breach of their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Faced only with the defendant’s representation that the chemist in question had been guilty on prior occasions of misfeasance in the performance of his duties, the judge properly denied the motion. Even if the defendant had been able at trial to substantiate this representation with proof and to demonstrate its probative value, the appropriate remedy would not have been to strike the certificates but to allow this evidence to be introduced at trial to rebut the prima facie effect of the certificates of analysis under G. L. c. 22C, § 39. See Commonwealth v. Westerman, 414 Mass. 688, 700 (1993).

We comment further on the defendant’s claim. The defendant has included in his appendix a report of the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety on which he based his representation of the chemist’s misfeasance.[2] This report indicates that the commissioner suspended the chemist in[*431] question for six months because he apparently identified only heroin in a substance which later testing revealed contained additional chemicals and failed to account properly for all evidence submitted for analysis. Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, this is not a case where the chemist was found to have tampered with the evidence or made a misdiagnosis. Accordingly, the report itself was not exculpatory because it did not tend to negate the guilt of the accused. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 & n.9 (1978).

Judgments affirmed.

1

The defendant also argues that the search warrant was invalid because it failed to indicate that it was to be executed only upon the completion of the controlled buy in the manner described in the affidavit. Although it would have been preferable for the magistrate to have defined the conditions for execution of the warrant, we do not find this omission fatal since the affidavit informed the magistrate of the circumstances which were to occur prior to the search. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 155 (1981). In addition, the motion judge indicated in his findings that the conditions for the warrant’s execution were satisfied.

2

This report was not part of the record below, and defense counsel did not request our permission to expand the record. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, we have expanded the record to include it because both parties have addressed its content in arguing the merits of the defendant’s claim of error.