Wolfe v. Sierra Vista Unified Sch. Dist. No. 68, 722 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Wolfe v. Sierra Vista Unified Sch. Dist. No. 68, 722 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Paczosa v. Cartwright Elementary School District No. 83 (arizctapp, 2009-06-23)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paczosa v. Cartwright Elementary School District No. 83
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
These arguments fail on the facts of this case. ¶ 34 Paezosa and Faulkner base their claim to tenured teaching positions on Wolfe v. Sierra Vista Unified School District No. 68, involving an administrator who had obtained “continuing status” prior to entering administration. 150 Ariz. 221, 222 , 722 P.2d 389, 390 (App.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alaface v. National Investment Co. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Good court quoted from Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 286 (1965), to set forth the situations in which the standard of conduct defined by the legislature may be adopted by the court: The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment ... whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to prot…
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Philip WOLFE
v.
SIERRA VISTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 68
No. 2 CA-CIV 5617.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Jun 18, 1986.
722 P.2d 389
Gonzales and Villarreal, P.C., by Stephen C. Villarreal and Joan Calcagno, Tucson, for plaintiff/appellee., Alan K. Polley, Cochise County Atty., by David S. Hunt, Bisbee, for defendant/appellant.
Birdsall, Lacagnina, Livermore.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

OPINION

LIVERMORE, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, Philip Wolfe, became employed in 1967 as a classroom teacher for defendant, Sierra Vista School District. He achieved “tenure” or “continuing status” under the provisions of A.R.S. §§ 15-501 et seq. in 1971. In 1975 he became an administrator in the District and served in that capacity as an assistant principal until 1984. When he returned to full-time teaching in the fall of 1984, the District, acting on the advice of its counsel, offered him a contract as a “probationary teacher” and claimed that it was powerless to offer a continuing teacher contract. Plaintiff signed the probationary contract and brought an action for declaratory relief that his status was that of a continuing teacher. The District appeals from the judgment granting such relief. We affirm.

A.R.S. § 15-501(A)(3) provides: “‘Continuing teacher’ means a certificated teacher who is employed under contract in a school district as a full-time classroom teacher ... and whose contract has been renewed for his fourth consecutive year of such employment in the district.” Both parties agree that plaintiff meets all conditions of this definition. The District, however, argues that because plaintiff did not teach during the nine years he served as an administrator, any continuing status was lost. Nothing in the statute suggests that interpretation; we are, therefore, powerless to impose it. See Op.Att’y Gen. 178-286 (Dec. 22, 1978). In any event, we would be reluctant to do so. It would not appear to be wise policy to burden the assumption of administrative duties with the loss of the job security previously acquired.

This reading of the statute for those continuously employed by a district is consistent with legislative policy protecting those who become part-time teachers or administrators. See A.R.S. §§ 15-501(A)(3), 502. It is also consistent with Walker v. Sierra Vista Unified School District, 147 Ariz. 604, 712 P.2d 451 (App. 1985). There, employment was not continuous because continuing status had been lost by operation of law.

Affirmed.

BIRDSALL and LACAGNINA, JJ., concur.