green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 4×
13.6 score
“because the contracting par 1274 ty is the grant-receiving local school district, a title ix claim can only be brought against a grant recipient ... and not an individual.”
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 48 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Vacated
Rachael DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama
(2×)
We first addressed the “appropriate person” issue in Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 , 789–93 (11th Cir. 1998) (Floyd I), vacated by 525 U.S. 802 (1998), reinstated in 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
discussed
Vacated
James Hill v. Jeanne Dunaway
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 788 , 38 Case: 14-12481 Date Filed: 08/12/2015 Page: 39 of 75 793 & n.15 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated by 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998), reinstated in 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
mentioned
Vacated
James Hill v. Madison County School Board
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 788 , 793 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1998), vacated by 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated in 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
mentioned
Vacated
Doe v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla.
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 , 793 & n. 15 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated by 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated in 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Vacated
Lothes v. Butler County Juvenile Rehabilitation Center
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Lothes cites only Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 791 (11th Cir.1998), a case later vacated by the Supreme Court, for the proposition that state law defines the scope of the covered entity for purposes of Title IX.
examined
Vacated
Samedi v. Miami-Dade County
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
a pattern of known misconduct, however, may be sufficient to change reasonable reliance' into deliberate indifference.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Nelson v. Miller
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
because the contracting party is the grant-receiving local school district, a title ix claim can only be brought against the grant-recipient ... and not.an individual
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Smith v. Allen
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
because the contracting par 1274 ty is the grant-receiving local school district, a title ix claim can only be brought against a grant recipient ... and not an individual.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Davis v. Dekalb County School District
a 'custom' requires that policymaking officials knew about the widespread practice but failed to stop it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Love v. Lee Memorial Health System
Ala. 2011) (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d at 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998))(quotations omitted); see, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("While it is reasonable for city policymakers to assume their employees possess common sense, where there is a history of conduct rendering this assumption untenable, city policymakers may display deliberate indifference by doing so."); Williams v. Enders, No. 5:08-cv- 335(HL), 2010 U.S. Dist.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Doe v. Fulton County School District
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin
Nos. 18-1498, et al. 95 Eleventh Circuit: Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 802 (1998), rein- stated by 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (board of education was “entitled to rely on the common sense of its” security guards not to sexually harass and rape underage girls.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin
Nos. 18-1498, et al. 95 Eleventh Circuit: Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 802 (1998), rein- stated by 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (board of education was “entitled to rely on the common sense of its” security guards not to sexually harass and rape underage girls.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin
Nos. 18-1498, et al. 95 Eleventh Circuit: Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 802 (1998), rein- stated by 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (board of education was “entitled to rely on the common sense of its” security guards not to sexually harass and rape underage girls.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin
Nos. 18-1498, et al. 95 Eleventh Circuit: Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 802 (1998), rein- stated by 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (board of education was “entitled to rely on the common sense of its” security guards not to sexually harass and rape underage girls.).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Madison County School Board
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. City of Demopolis
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
So a city may “rely on the common sense of its [police officers] not to engage in ... criminal conduct,” but “a pattern of known misconduct ... may be sufficient to change reasonable reliance [on common sense] into deliberate indifference.” Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated by 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brian Nelson v. Carl Miller
(2×)
See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , reinstated at 171 F.3d 1264 No. 08-2044 39 (11th Cir. 1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville
Other courts have chosen to take a narrower approach, holding that “a custom requires that policymakers knew about the widespread practice but failed to stop it” or that “actual or constructive knowledge of such a custom was attributable to a governing body.” Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 795 (11th Cir.1998); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir.1984) Plaintiff asserts that Yorkville has a custom of tolerating police retaliation against citizens who criticize their actions.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daker v. Ferrero
Addressing one such claim under Title IX, the Eleventh Circuit, in Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999), ruled that state officials could not be held individually liable under Title IX “because the contracting party is the grant-receiving local school district ... and not an individual.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Metro.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Tiffany Williams v. Board of Regents
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tiffany Williams v. Board of Regents
(2×)
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sherez v. State of Hawai'i Department of Education
See, e.g., Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 , 854 (6th Cir.1999); Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 171 F.3d 607 (8th Cir.1999); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.1988); Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shotz v. City of Plantation, FL
(2×)
“From what we have already written about the contractual nature of the *1171 liability, we think it follows that, because the contracting party is the grant-receiving [entity], a ‘Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient ... and not an individual.’ ” Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998) (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Oliver v. City of Berkley
Moreover, even if the training was in some manner deficient, the identified deficiency in a city’s training program *885 must be closely related to the ultimate injury sucb that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers’ offending conduct.” See also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School District
Id. at 611 (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCurry v. Moore
See Vineyard v. County of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.1993); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 795-96 (11th Cir.1998) A claim concerning an isolated incident is generally insufficient to sustain a claim for failure to train because those officials who are responsible for creating a policy must be on notice of the constitutional deficiencies.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School District
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Kelly v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 781-82 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing recipient of federal funding can only be held liable under Title IX for its own misconduct); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.1999) (“Individual school officials ... may not be held liable under Title IX.”) (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998), which stated, “[A] Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient — that is, a local school district — and not an individual”) (citations and quotations omitted), cert, granted, judgment vacated by, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
A. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
A. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka
(2×)
Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Powers v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
“A ‘Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient ... and not an individual.’” Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.)(quoting Smith v. Metropolitan School District), vacated, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 215 , 145 L.Ed.2d 181 (1999); accord Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walters v. City of Andalusia
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 , 108 S.Ct. 915 , 99 L.Ed.2d 107 , (1988); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir.), judgment vacated on another ground, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Blalock v. Dale County Board of Education
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir.), judgment vacated on another ground, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sandoval v. Hagan
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The Eleventh Circuit found that assuming the superintendent and school board were not put on notice of the harassment, “the power to bring monetary liability onto the [recipient of federal funds under Title IX did not] extend beyond the superintendent and school board to lower employees.” Id. at 792 (emphasis added) ("If [after being put on notice] the superintendent or school board then does nothing, the school district can be liable”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. Goldsmith
This would show, in effect, that violations of the law were “officially sanctioned or ordered.” See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir.1998).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Godby v. Montgomery County Board of Education
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir.1998). *1404 The School Board can only be held liable, therefore, if the homecoming election was unlawful and was conducted pursuant to its official policy or custom.
discussed
Cited "see"
Hartley v. Washington Cty. School
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 , 789 (11th Cir.) (“[A] Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient--that is, a local school district--and not an individual.”) (citations and quotations omitted) vacated, --- U.S. ---, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-5197).
discussed
Cited "see"
Hartley Ex Rel. Hartley v. Parnell
(2×)
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.) ("[A] Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient—that is, a local school district—and not an individual.") (citations and quotations omitted) vacated, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999) petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-5197).
discussed
Cited "see"
Janet Kinman v. Omaha Public School District Robert Whitehouse, Individually and in His Official Capacity John MacKiel ph.d., Individually and in His Official Capacity, Sheryl McDougall Individually and in Her Official Capacity, Janet Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, Robert Whitehouse, Individually and in His Official Capacity John MacKiel ph.d., Individually and in His Official Capacity, Sheryl McDougall Individually and in Her Official Capacity, Janet Kinman v. Omaha Public School District Robert Whitehouse, Individually and in His Official Capacity John MacKiel ph.d., Individually and in His Official Capacity, Sheryl McDougall Individually and in Her Official Capacity
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Smith, 128 F.3d at 1019; Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.1988); see also Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 , 730 (6th Cir.1996) (Nelson, J., concurring) (stating that only educational institutions may be found liable for Title IX violations).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kinman v. Omaha Public School District
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Smith, 128 F.3d at 1019; Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.1988); see also Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 , 730 (6th Cir.1996) (Nelson, J., concurring) (stating that only educational institutions may be found liable for Title IX violations).
cited
Cited "see"
Gibson v. Hickman
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 , 789-90 and n. 5 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir.1990)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Doe v. City of Demopolis
See, e.g., Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 796 (11th Cir.) (where school security guard raped 14-year old girl, school district held not liable on a § 1983 failure to train or supervise theory, as guard’s conduct was “clearly against the basic norms of human conduct” and the school district “was entitled to rely on the common sense of its employees not to engage in wicked and criminal conduct”), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir.1997) (where police officer sexually molested arres…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Litman v. George Mason University
See also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Thomas v. Clayton County Board of Education
In common parlance, the specific deficiency or deficiencies must be such as to make the specific violation “almost bound to happen, sooner or later,” rather than merely “likely to happen in the long run.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir.1987) (citing Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir.1985)); see also Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F.Supp. 867, 873 (M.D.Ga.1993), aff'd, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bracey v. Buchanan
This Court agrees with the many Courts of Appeals that have held that “because they are not grant recipients, school officials may not be sued in their individual capacity under Title IX.” Id. at 610; see also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.1988); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 , 730 (6th Cir.1996) (Nelson, J., concurring); National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 924 , 142 L.Ed.2d 929 …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Gainor v. Douglas County, Georgia
In common parlance, the specific deficiency or deficiencies must be such as to make the specific violation “almost bound to happen, sooner or later,” rather than merely “likely to happen in the long run.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 , 108 S.Ct. 752 , 98 L.Ed.2d 765 (1988) (citing Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir.1985)); see also Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F.Supp. 867, 873 (M.D.Ga.1993), aff'd, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 ).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Morse v. Regents of the University of Colorado
See, e.g., Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 20, 1998) (No. 97-8906).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Floyd
v.
Waiters
v.
Waiters
94-8667.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 20, 1998.
Cited by 56 opinions | Published
Carol FLOYD, Carla Floyd, Mary Ann Drake, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees,
v.
Iris WAITERS, Security Chief, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, William Decker Booker, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Defendants,
Kenneth Bronson, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, John Nicholson, Head of Operations, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Stephen Massey, President, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Thomas Hagler, Superintendent, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Harry Tinker, Defendants-Appellees, Cross- Appellants.
No. 94-8667
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
April 5, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (No. 91-CV-47-2-MAC (WDO)), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Judge.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Before EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge.
v.
Iris WAITERS, Security Chief, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, William Decker Booker, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Defendants,
Kenneth Bronson, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, John Nicholson, Head of Operations, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Stephen Massey, President, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Thomas Hagler, Superintendent, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Harry Tinker, Defendants-Appellees, Cross- Appellants.
No. 94-8667
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
April 5, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (No. 91-CV-47-2-MAC (WDO)), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Judge.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Before EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
We earlier decided this case in Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and instructed us to reconsider the case in the light of its decision in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). We have done so. We reinstate our prior decision and opinion.
Briefly stated, in Floyd, we wrote that a Title IX plaintiff must establish two things to survive summary judgment in a cause of action against a school district like Bibb County's for the discriminatory acts
of its employees. First, some supervisor with authority to take corrective action was placed on notice of the bad conduct. See id. at 792 & n. 13. Second, the supervisor possessing this authority was a school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct. See id. at 790-792. Given the circumstances of this case, we held that there could be no Title IX liability.
In Gebser, the Supreme Court faced a sexual-harassment-by-a-teacher case under Title IX. The Court pointed out the contractual nature of Title IX and rejected school district liability based on either respondeat superior or constructive notice. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1997. Then the Court tied school district liability to an official decision by the school district not to remedy a known act of misconduct. For school district
liability, the Court stressed that some "appropriate person" in the school district must have actual notice of the misconduct. See id. at 1999.
The Court did not go into detail about who would be an appropriate person; it did not need to do so to decide Gebser: in Gebser no one in the pertinent school district other than the offending teacher himself knew of his misconduct. See id. at 1993. The Court did say, however, that the appropriate person must
necessarily be an "official" of the school district and must have the authority to end the discrimination. See id. at 1999. But these preconditions were set out in the context of "at a minimum"—a minimum which was not met in Gebser—and not set out as a fully developed, complete standard.*
In our view, our decision in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision (and reasoning) in Gebser. The judgment of the district court is again AFFIRMED.
* By the way we, given the record before us, also conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Waiters and Mr. Tinker (the two district employees who have been especially singled-out by plaintiffs) were not school district school officials and that they also lacked authority to end the pertinent discrimination.
[*2]