PER CURIAM: The Commandos Compensation Act (Act), Pub. L. No. 104-201 § 657, 110 Stat. 2422, 2584 (1996)1, was enacted by Congress as a special compensation program for certain Vietnamese nationals (commandos) and their survivors.^[2] Although § 657 (I)3 of the Act limits attorneys’ fees to ten percent (10%), and § 657 (f)4 of the Act directs that the government5 disburse compensation payments directly to the commando, appellee John C. Mattes brought this action for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to recover a twenty-three percent (23%) attorneys’ fee, to be paid directly to him and not to his clients.^[6] The district court granted the relief sought by Mattes. Asserting that the district court erred by failing to disabuse itself of subject matter jurisdiction under § 657(j), the government appeals. Section 657(j) of the Act reads:

(j) NO RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. - - All determinations by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to this section are final and conclusive, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Claimants under this section have no right to judicial review, and such review is specifically precluded. Pub.L. No. 104-201§ 657(j) (emphasis added). The government contends that the statute expressly provides that there will be no judicial review of any Department of Defense (DOD) determination under the Act and that § 657(j) plainly bars judicial review in this case. Arguing that he is not a “claimant” under the statute, Mattes contends that § 657(j) applies only to a DOD substantive determination relating to a commando’s eligibility for compensation and not to administrative details such as where the checks are to be mailed, etc.

Any statutory interpretation of the Commandos Compensation Act is a question of law that we review de novo. Ala. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 84 F.3d 410, 412 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996). “Congress may be free to establish a compensation scheme that operates without court participation.” Gutierrez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 430 (1995)(citing 21 U.S.C. § 904 which authorizes executive settlement of tort claims that arise in a foreign country in connection with DEA operations abroad). This includes administrative decisions in implementing the compensation scheme. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985)(statute precludes judicial review of Veterans’ Administration administrative decisions as to service-connected death or disability benefits to veterans); Rhodes v. United States, 760 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir. 1985)(no judicial review of administrative decisions by the Secretary of the Army under the National Guard Claims Act); Hamby v. Janer, 808 F.2d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1987)(judicial review of the Secretary of Labor’s decision regarding attorneys’ fees under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act is precluded in clear and unmistakable terms). First, we find no merit to Mattes’ contention that he is not a “claimant” for purposes of the Commandos Compensation Act. He claims to have a legal right to receive directly the commandos’ checks; to extract his fee in a manner that the Secretary of Defense has determined would frustrate the Congressional limitation on attorneys’ fees; and to account to the commandos for the net proceeds. One claiming such a right to participate in the distribution of funds under the Act can be described only as a “claimant” under § 657(j) of the Act. Second, the clear import of the Act mandates our conclusion that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Defense’s decisions. See Hamby, 808 F.2d at 1434. Under a de novo review, we conclude that we have no subject matter jurisdiction of this appeal and that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction, as § 657(j) clearly and specifically proscribes judicial review. This appeal is DISMISSED and the case is REMANDED to the district court with INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS the entire case and all orders entered in it. DISMISSED and REMANDED with INSTRUCTIONS.