Harold Wapnick v. United States of Am. & U.S. Clearing Corp., 112 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Harold Wapnick v. United States of Am. & U.S. Clearing Corp., 112 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sarunas Abraitis v. United States (ca6, 2013-03-04)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sarunas Abraitis v. United States
6th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Galvez v. IRS, 448 Fed.Appx. 880 , 883-84 & n. 5 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam); Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 74 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murghy Ex Rel. Estate of Oayne v. United States
D. Conn. · 2004 · confidence medium
Notably, the Second Circuit has followed the Seventh Circuit's approach to the scope of review available under § 7429(f)— a provision that, unlike the MCA, explicitly bars "review[ ] by any other court." Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 74 (2d Cir.1997) ("Following other circuits, we hold that this limitation applies only to decisions on the merits regarding the jeopardy assessment in question.") (citing Hiley and Schuster).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy ex rel. Estate of Payne v. United States
D. Conn. · 2004 · confidence medium
Notably, the Second Circuit has followed the Seventh Circuit’s approach to the scope of review available under § 7429(f)— a provision that, unlike the MCA, explicitly bars “review! ] by any other court.” Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 74 (2d Cir.1997) (“Following other circuits, we hold that this limitation applies only to decisions on the merits regarding the jeopardy assessment in question.”) (citing Hiley and Schuster).
discussed Cited "see" Gross v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 74-75 (2d Cir.1997) (affirming district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of complaint against Internal Revenue Service and denial of motion for default judgment); see also First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Gov’t of Antigua, 877 F.2d 189 , 196 (2d Cir.1989) (“A decision that a default judgment is void for want of jurisdiction must be accompanied by dismissal of the action.”).
cited Cited "see" Rae v. United States (In Re Rae)
Bankr. D. Conn. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74 (2d.
cited Cited "see" Sheikh v. United States
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Roberts v. IRS Commissioner
W.D. Tex. · 2021 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74 , 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curi- am)(holding the district court was correct in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter juris- diction because Section “7429(b) allows the district court to review an IRS jeopardy assessment only after the taxpayer has filed a request for administrative review”) with Abraitis v. United States, 709 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2013)(holding administrative exhaustion requirement for ju- dicial review of Section 7429 is not jurisdictional, but taxpayer’s failure to exhaust administra- tive remedies precluded j…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Zuckman v. Department of the Treasury
2d Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422 , 7429; see also Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Sherwood v. Department of the Treasury
2d Cir. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422 , 7429; see also Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam); United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-02 , 110 S.Ct. 1361 , 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harold WAPNICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America and U.S. Clearing Corp., Defendants-Appellees
1367, Docket 96-6227.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Apr 23, 1997.
112 F.3d 74
Harold Wapnick, pro se, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC (Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Alice L. Ronk, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice; Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.
Winter, Cabranes, Parker.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Harold Wapnick, pro se, appeals from Judge Amoris order dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying his motions for a default judgment and to vacate the “judgment” of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Wapnick claims that the IRS made an invalid jeopardy assessment against him upon his failure to pay income taxes for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987.

Challenges to jeopardy assessments by the IRS are governed by 26 U.S.C. § 7429. Section 7429 provides for judicial review by the district courts in general, § 7429(b)(2)(A), and by the United States Tax Court in limited circumstances, id. § 7429(b)(2)(B). Section 7429(f) also states that “[a]ny determination made by a court under this section shall be final and conclusive and shall not be reviewed by any other court.” Following other circuits, we hold that this limitation applies only to decisions on the merits regarding the jeopardy assessment in question. See Hiley v. United States, 807 F.2d 623, 626-28 (7th Cir.1986); Schuster v. United States, 765 F.2d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1985); cf. Zuluaga v. United States, 774 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir.1985). A dismissal of a Section 7429 proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is, therefore, appealable.

The district court found that Wapnick failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 7429(b). Section 7429(b) allows the district court to review an IRS jeopardy assessment only after the taxpayer has filed a request for administrative review. See, e.g., Hiley, 807 F.2d at 627; Zuluaga, 774 F.2d at 1489. Such a request must be filed, at the latest, 35 days after the assessment date. § 7429(a). The civil action must be filed within 90 days of the earlier of “(A) the day the Secretary [of the Treasury] noti[*75] fies the taxpayer of the Secretary’s determination ... or (B) the 16th day after the request ____” § 7429(b)(1). The district court found that Wapnick failed to make any request for administrative review, and his claim for judicial review, filed in August 1995, over a year from the September 7, 1993 assessment date, was untimely. We agree. The district court was correct in dismissing Wapnick’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, Wapnick’s motions for a default judgment and to vacate the assessment of the IRS, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed R. Civ. P., were properly denied.

We therefore affirm.