Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
122 citation events (108 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cargill, Incorporated v. Vantage Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (ded, 2023-06-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cargill, Incorporated v. Vantage Specialty Chemicals, Inc.
D. Del. · 2023 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) 802 Systems Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
E.D. Tex. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) ASK Chemicals LLC v. Novis Works, LLC
N.D. Ohio · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construction within the scope of the claim.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC
E.D. Tex. · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Tex. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus N.V. (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the, claim.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the transitional term 'comprising' ... is inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scale Biosciences, Inc. v. Parse Biosciences, Inc.
D. Del. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Tr. at 99-100; D.I. 325 at 5) This understanding comports with the reality that, in patent law, “‘[c]omprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added[.]” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Acufloor, LLC v. Eventile, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kids2, LLC v. Tomy International, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cir. 2012) (noting “joined,” in context of upper and lower deck walls in rotary cutter, does “not necessitate direct contact”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SUPERNUS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. RICONPHARMA LLC
D.N.J. · 2022 · confidence medium
Supernus’s proposed construction is more directly aligned with the claim language. “‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) VIFOR (INTERNATIONAL) AG v. MYLAN LABORATORIES LTD.
D.N.J. · 2021 · confidence medium
Opening Br. at 15-16) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keynetik, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Fed. Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Claims 1 and 12 use the signal “comprising,” ’106 patent, col. 12 l. 31, col. 13 l. 26, “which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Truinject Corp. v. Galderma S.A.
D. Del. · 2020 · confidence medium
As the Federal Circuit has recognized, the term “comprising” is a term of art which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim. [See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Waters Corporation v. Agilent Technologies Inc.
D. Del. · 2019 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs disagree and argue that the language of the claim – i.e., “contains” – “signifies that the recited ‘substituent’ may contain additional unrecited elements.” (D.I. 23 at 3 (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 499 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu
Fed. Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Realtime does not contest that O’Brien discloses these steps, but instead argues that because the claim recites the word “comprising,” it does not foreclose the possibility of additional unstated limitations in the interpretation of “maintaining a dictionary.” Realtime notes that “‘[c]omprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Raytheon Company v. Sony Corporation
Fed. Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
Cir. 2001); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Indeed, interference proceedings are also in some sense adjudicatory, see Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867-68 (Fed.Cir.2007) (characterizing interference proceedings as adjudicatory and holding that the Board’s decision be reviewed on the record), yet interference proceedings use a variant of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, see Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental that the language of a count should be given the broadest reasonable interpretation it will support....” (quoting In re Baxter, 65…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Interference proceedings are also in some sense adjudicatory, see Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867-68 (Fed.Cir.2007) (characterizing interference proceedings as adjudicatory and holding that the Board’s decision be reviewed on the record), yet the broadest reasonable interpretation standard applies, see Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental that the language of a count should be given the broadest reasonable interpretation it will support....” (quoting In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686 (CCPA 1981))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lexington Luminance LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc.
D. Mass. · 2014 · confidence medium
Cl. 51, 74 (Fed.Cl.2007) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nutech Ventures v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc.
D. Neb. · 2013 · confidence medium
May 9, 2008) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loftex USA LLC v. Trident Ltd.
S.D.N.Y. · 2013 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2000); see also MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2012) (“Open claim language, such as the word ‘comprising’ ... signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.” (citation omitted)); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” (citation omit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2012 · confidence medium
It is well established that the transitional term “comprising” is a “term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Sp Controls, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Moreover, claim 1 claims “[a] device control apparatus ... comprising” enumerated components. '794 patent col.9, 11.13-15. “ ‘Comprising1 is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (quoting In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686 (CCPA 1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boesen v. Garmin International, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Both independent claims 1 and 10 are open ended “comprising” claims. “ ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wireless Ink Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“ ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”) Because plaintiffs claims satisfy the pleading standard and defendants have not shown that the facts set forth in t…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance MacHine Systems International LLC
Fed. Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abbott Laboratories v. LUPIN LTD.
D. Del. · 2010 · confidence medium
That passage states that the '428 invention “comprises” nicotinic acid and hydroxypropyl methyl-cellulose. ('428 patent, col. 3 lines 8-12) “Comprising is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements *398 may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); see also Mars, Inc. v. H.J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Suitco Surface, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Although the PTO emphasizes that it was required to give all “claims their broadest reasonable construction” particularly with respect to claim 4’s use of the open-ended term “comprising,” see Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“the open-ended term comprising ... means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added”), this court has instructed that any such construction be “consistent with the specification, ... and that claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordina…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dow Chemical Co. v. NOVA CHEMICALS CORP.(CANADA)
D. Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
However, all “homogenously branched linear ethylene/ a-olefin interpolymer(s)” must satisfy the requirements of element (A) and all “heterogeneously branched linear ethylene polymer(s)” must satisfy the requirement of element (B). “ ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); see also Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed.Cir.200…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Solvay, S.A. v. Honeywell Specialty Materials LLC
D. Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
(D.I. 169 at 2) Solvay argues that the “isolating” limitation of claim 1 should not be so narrowly construed, because “(1) the gas stream in claim 12 comprises HFC-245fa and HC1; (2) the term ‘comprising’ is an open-ended, non-exclusionary term ...; and (3) the ‘isolating’ [limitation] of claims 1 and 12 are ‘nearly identical’ and ‘should be consistently construed.’ ” (D.I. 169 at 3, citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997)) (emphasis in original) Consistent with the claim construction order issued this same date, the court concludes that…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. v. ProMOS Technologies, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Tex. · 2008 · confidence medium
Such a process, Freescale argues, would still fall within the proper scope of the “comprising” claim yet would be improperly excluded under ProMOS’s proposed construction. *757 See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“ ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Toro Co. v. INGERSOLL-RAND CO., LTD.
D. Minnesota · 2008 · confidence medium
Dedicated Tracks First, Bobcat notes that claim 3 recites a walk-behind loader that “comprises ... left and right endless tracks carried on the frame for propelling the frame in forward and reverse directions.” Because the word “comprise” in a patent claim “means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim,” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997), Bobcat claims that endless tracks are not limited to dedicated tracks.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baran v. MEDICAL DEVICE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
N.D. Ohio · 2007 · confidence medium
Because the Court believes that "manually” does not require a definition, it includes "manually” and not “by means of the hand” in its construction of this term. 9 . " 'Comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PROBATTER SPORTS, LLC v. Joyner Technologies, Inc.
N.D. Iowa · 2007 · confidence medium
Because Joyner did not brief this argument, however, the court considers Joyner’s ever-shifting claim constructions to be waived. 15 . " ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.
W.D. Wis. · 2007 · confidence medium
Cir.2003) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2007 · confidence medium
Specifically, “comprising” is a “term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chi-ron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) General Electric Co. v. SONOSITE, INC.
W.D. Wis. · 2007 · confidence medium
Heinz Co., L.P., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2004), and Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michilin Prosperity Co. v. Fellowes Manufacturing Co.
D.D.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Brief at 9-10; Fellowes’s Opening Brief at 13-14.) The '701 patent uses the term of art “comprising” to claim all of the elements, including the “two inports,” of the invention, meaning that the claimed elements are essential, “but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); '701 patent, col. 4:54.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goff Ex Rel. Estate of Torango v. Harrah's Operating Co.
D. Nev. · 2005 · confidence medium
Heinz Co., L.P., 377 F.3d 1369, 1375-76 (2004) (“The transitional term ‘comprising’ ... is open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.” (quoting Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 8th ed., rev. 1 § 2111.03 (2003))); Genentech v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“ ‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”) Thus, we adopt Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of “comprising,�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Honeywell International, Inc. v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2005 · confidence medium
In the parlance of patent law, use of[the] transitional phrase ‘comprising’ creates a presumption that the recited elements are only a part of the device, and that the claim does not exclude additional, unreeited elements.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re James F. Crish and Richard L. Eckert (Serial No. 08/822,509)
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Moreover, it is well-éstablished that “ ‘[Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Crish
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Moreover, it is well-established that “‘[c]omprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oxford Gene Technology Ltd. v. Mergen Ltd.
D. Del. · 2004 · confidence medium
Heinz Co., L.P., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting MPEP, 8th ed., rev. 1 § 2111.03 (2003)); citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“Comprising is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Technology, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 2004 · confidence medium
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amgen Inc., Plaintiff-Cross v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (Now Known as Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) and Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Amgen’s argument is based upon a misconstruction of the term “including” that evinces a misunderstanding of the plain meaning of that term, as well as the term “comprise,” which appears in the '080 patent claims. 14 “Comprising is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 , 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1633 (Fed.Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baychar, Inc. v. Frisby Technologies, Inc.
D. Me. · 2002 · confidence medium
“Comprising” In the context of patent interpretation, “comprising ” is a term of art used in claim language to mean that “the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); Applera Corp. v. Micromass UK Ltd., 186 F.Supp.2d 487, 504 (D.Del.2002) (collecting cases).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Michael J. Adang and John D. Kemp v. David A. Fischhoff and Stephen G. Rogers (3×)
Fed. Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 , 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1612 (Fed.Cir.1997); DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1321 , 226 USPQ 758, 760 (Fed.Cir.1985).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Applera Corp. v. Micromass UK Ltd. (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Del. · 2002 · confidence medium
It is well-established that “ ‘comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 874 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“The use of ‘comprising’ and ‘which comprises’ in the composition and process claims generally would mean that the claims require the presence of [the listed element], but that additional elements…
cited Cited as authority (rule) SuperGuide Corp. v. DIRECTV ENTERPRISES, INC.
W.D.N.C. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GENENTECH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHIRON CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
95-1505.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Apr 25, 1997.
112 F.3d 495
R. Danny Huntington, Bums, Doane, Swecker & Mathis, L.L.P., Alexandria, VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Eric H. Weisblatt., Harold J. McElhinny, Morrison & Foerster L.L.P., San Francisco, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief was Matthew I. Kreeger. Also with him on the brief were Michael M. Carlson and Debra A. Shetka, Morrison & Foerster L.L.P;, Palo Alto, CA, and Robert P. Blackburn and Amy L. Collins, Chiron Corporation, Emeryville, CA
Rich, Plager, Clevenger.
Cited by 91 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 74%
Citer courts: Federal Circuit (1)
RICH, Circuit Judge.

I.

Background

Genentech, Inc. (Genentech) appeals from the grant, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in No. C-94-3334 CW, 1995 WL 450846 (N.D.Cal.1995), of summary judgment in favor of Chiron Corporation (Chiron) in an interference between Genentech and Chiron involving a DNA construct on the ground that Genentech’s claimed invention is not within the scope of the sole interference[*497] count as properly interpreted. We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. [1]

II.

Discussion

This case arises from Patent Interference No. 102,208 in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) between two co-pending applications: United States Patent Application No. 06/506,078, entitled “Preparation of Human IGF and EGF Via Recombinant DNA Technology,” (Lee application) by inventors James M. Lee, Axel Ullrich, and Arjun Singh (collectively Lee) and United States Patent Application No. 06/922,199, entitled “Hybrid DNA Synthesis of Mature Insulin-Like Growth Factors,” (Barr application) by inventors Philip J. Barr, James P. Merryweather, Guy Mullenbaeh, and Mickey S. Urdea (collectively Barr). The Lee application was filed on June 20, 1988 and the Barr application was filed on October 23, 1986 and accorded the benefit of United States Application 06/487,950, which was filed on April 25, 1983. Therefore, Lee, whose application was assigned to Genentech, was the junior party and Barr, whose application was assigned to Chiron, was the senior party.

The sole count of the interference is identical to claim 22 of Barr’s application, and reads:

A DNA construct comprising a sequence coding for human insulin-like growth factor — I joined in proper reading frame with Saccharomyces alpha-factor séeretory leader and processing signal sequence. [2]

Saccharomyces, commonly known as baker’s yeast, naturally secretes a small, thirteen amino acid pheromone known as alpha factor during its reproductive cycle. As a first step in this process, the yeast cell produces a precursor protein from the DNA sequence encoding alpha factor that consists of a secretory leader, which serves to signal the cell to process the precursor protein, followed by four copies of the alpha-factor protein separated by processing sequences of six or eight amino acids each. Each processing sequence is recognized and excised by an enzyme in the yeast cell to release the four copies of the alpha factor outside of the yeast cell. As a result of this process, four copies of mature alpha-factor protein are secreted from the yeast cell for each precursor protein.

Human insulin-like growth factor-I (IGF-I), is a growth-promoting protein that medi[*498] ates the effect of human growth hormone. It is undisputed that human IGF-I consists of a specific sequence of seventy amino acids that was published in 1978. See Ernst Rinderknecht and René Humbel, The Amino Acid Sequence of Human Insulin-like Growth Factor I and Its Structural Homology with Proinsulin, 253 J.Biol.Chem. 2769 (1978).

Lee and Barr sought to produce mature IGF-I by adapting the Saccharomyces DNA encoding the gene for the precursor protein. Utilizing a DNA construct with only one copy of alpha-factor protein, both Lee and Barr replaced the DNA sequence of the precursor protein encoding alpha factor with a DNA sequence encoding IGF-I. This new DNA construct is then inserted into an expression plasmid, and transformed into a yeast cell. The goal of both Lee and Barr was for such a transformed yeast cell to secrete some form of human IGF-I.

In replacing the DNA sequence encoding alpha factor with that encoding IGF-I, Lee, however, added twenty-seven additional nucleotide bases constituting a collagenase cleavage site between the DNA coding for the alpha-factor processing sequences and human IGF-I. When this construct is inserted into a yeast expression plasmid and transformed into a yeast cell, the cell secretes a “fusion protein” or “modified IGF-I” consisting of a collagenase cleavage site at the carboxy terminal of human IGF-I.

A.

In analyzing Lee’s case for priority, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) rejected Barr’s argument that Lee’s DNA construct fell outside of the scope of the count because when inserted into a plasmid and transformed into a yeast cell, it would cause the yeast cell to produce a fusion protein. The Board held:

The interfering subject matter, as defined by count 1, is directed to a DNA construct comprising two components, i.e., a DNA sequence coding for human IGF-I and a Saccharomyces alpha-factor secretory leader and processing signal sequence. Each of these components are [sic] made up of nucleotides and must be present in Lee’s DNA construct in order to fall within the scope of the count. As long as these two components are present, other materials may also be present because the term “comprising” permits their inclusion. Thus, we view count 1 as being directed to a DNA construct which encodes IGF-I as either a mature protein or a fusion protein. Since the DNA construct made by Lee encodes IGF-I as a fusion protein, the Lee proofs fall within the scope of the count.

Lee v. Barr, Patent Interference No. 102,208, Slip. Op. at 8 (BPAI July 19,1994).

The Board held, however, that Lee had failed to prove any practical, therapeutic utility of its fusion protein including a collagenase cleavage site in addition to 'IGF-I. Therefore, the Board awarded priority to the senior party, Barr.

B.

Genentech, the assignee of the junior party Lee, filed a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 146 in the United States District Court for the_ Northern District of California to challenge the Board’s award of priority to Barr. Chiron, the assignee of the senior party Barr, moved for summary judgment, again alleging, as it had before the Board that Genentech’s claimed invention of a DNA construct encoding modified IGF-I was not within the scope of the interference count as properly interpreted. The district court granted Chiron’s motion for two reasons. [3]

First, the district court found that the count was directed to a DNA construct that codes for authentic or mature, human IGF-I. The district court found that the term “coding” in the field of biology connotes the protein that results from expression of a particular DNA. Therefore, the court concluded that “[s]ince Genentech’s DNA construct codes for a sequence of 79 amino acids, consisting of human IGF-I plus nine additional amino acids, rather than for human IGF-I[*499] alone, it is outside the plain meaning of the language of the count.” Genentech Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 1995 WL 450846, at *4 (N.D.Cal.1995).

Second, the district court agreed with Chiron that the only interpretation of the word “joined” required that the two elements to be joined must be directly connected with no intervening material. Id. at *5. The district court explained that this interpretation does no violence to the open ended nature of the claim resulting from the use of the term “comprising” or the phrase “in proper reading frame.” The district court interpreted “comprising” to permit additional material before and after the two required elements, but not in between the two elements that are joined. Id. The district court found that the phrase “in proper reading frame” was not rendered superfluous by requiring the elements to be joined directly because the second element when directly connected is not necessarily in proper reading frame with the first element. For instance, if the second element were connected in reverse orientation or the two elements had overlapping codons, the district court asserts that the two elements would be directly connected, but not in proper reading frame. Id. Based on this reasoning, the district court affirmed the award of priority to Chiron without reaching the utility issue. Genentech appeals this decision of the district court. We reverse.

C.

Genentech asserts on appeal that the district court gave an improperly narrow interpretation to the count; the district court improperly determined a factual issue in dispute, i.e. whether, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, Chiron had enabled the invention of the count as defined by the district court requiring secretion from the yeast cell of mature human IGF-I; and the district court implicitly, but erroneously, upheld the Board’s determination that Genentech had provided insufficient proof of the practical utility of its modified IGF-I because Genentech had failed to provide in vivo test results. Because we agree with Genentech that the district court did not give the count its broadest, reasonable interpretation and that Genentech’s DNA construct is encompassed by the count, we need not reach the second issue concerning Chiron’s enablement of the construct of the count. We also will not reach the utility issue because it was not decided by the district court and is therefore not before us. The sole issue before us is whether the proper construction of the count includes fusion proteins, such as modified IGF-I, or mature human IGF-I.

As Genentech points out, the count calls for a DNA construct which encodes certain proteins, but does not encompass the proteins expressed by the construct. The district court viewed the protein produced by the construct and the DNA construct as equal. As the district court stated, the issue of the DNA construct itself and the protein it produces are “inextricably intertwined since the DNA construct codes for and is defined by the protein it produces.” Chiron, 1995 WL 450846, at *5.

Genentech asserts that against the backdrop of this erroneous equation of the DNA construct and the protein it produces, the district court improperly narrowed the count in the following manner. First, the district court interpreted the DNA sequence coding for human IGF-I as defined by the count to mean that mature IGF-I, or the specific seventy amino acid protein, must be ultimately secreted from the transformed yeast cell containing the DNA construct of the count. Second, the district court improperly limited the transitional phrase “comprising,” which allows additional elements to be present as long as the named- elements are present, to exclude additional DNA between the alpha-factor processing sequences and the human IGF-I sequence. Third, Genentech asserts that the district court improperly gave a narrow meaning to “joined” by taking it out of the context of the phrase “joined in proper reading frame” and using a common dictionary definition of “joined” instead of one tailored to the biotechnical discipline.

By requiring a direct connection between the elements of the count “joined in proper reading frame,” Genentech asserts that the clause “in proper reading frame” is rendered superfluous because, if the two DNA sequences coding for human IGF-I and the[*500] processing signal sequences are directly joined, they are necessarily in proper reading frame. Because the count must be interpreted so that every element of the count has meaning, Genenteeh asserts this interpretation is improper.

Genenteeh points out that the two examples provided by the district court to establish that a DNA construct can be directly joined, but not be in proper reading frame, are improper examples because such constructs would not meet the additional limitations of the count. For instance, the district court asserts that two DNA sequences can be directly connected, but not in proper reading frame because they overlap or one of the sequences is in reverse orientation. Genenteeh asserts that if the two sequences overlap, however, one of the DNA sequences will not be complete because the nucleotides in the section of DNA that overlaps will only be read once. Therefore, because the count calls for the DNA sequence for IGF-I and the alpha-factor processing sequences, such a construct would not meet all the elements of the count and the phrase “in proper reading frame” would be unnecessary to exclude such a construct from the count. Also, if one of the DNA sequences for one of the required elements is in reverse orientation, it would not encode that particular protein and would not meet the additional elements of the count. Again, the phrase “in proper reading frame” would be rendered superfluous.

Chiron asserts that the district court properly gave the count its plain meaning by properly interpreting the key phrases “human insulin-like growth faetor-I,” “coding for,” “joined,” and “comprising.” As in the district court’s interpretation of the count, Chiron agrees that the plain meaning of the word “coding” is a protein that results from the expression of the particular DNA that is encoded. Therefore, although the district court properly recognized that the count referred to the DNA construct and not the protein expressed, Chiron agrees with the district court that the two ideas are inextricably linked. To support this assertion, Chiron cites Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 31 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed.Cir.1994) (phrase “human tissue plasminogen activator” includes only natural t-PA). Therefore, Chiron argues that, as the district court found, human IGF-I is a protein consisting of only seventy specific amino acids, and does not include the nine additional amino acids of the collagenase cleavage site; the phrase “joined in proper reading frame” necessitates that the elements of the DNA construct of the count must be joined so as to allow expression of the desired protein; and the term “comprising” is consistent with its interpretation of the word “joined” because DNA can be added before and after the joined elements of the count.

Chiron asserts that even if the count is ambiguous and we must look to the Barr specification to determine the meaning of the count, the district court continues to have the correct interpretation of the count because the Barr application does not disclose a construct that would produce a protein other than naturally occurring human IGF-I.

D.

The pivotal issue on appeal is the proper construction of the count, which is a question of law. DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1321, 226 USPQ 758, 760 (Fed.Cir. 1985). To construe the count we must look at the language as a whole and consider the grammatical structure and syntax. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571, 30 USPQ2d 1911, 1915 (Fed.Cir.1994).

In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental that the language of a count should be given the broadest reasonable interpretation it will support and should not be given a contrived, artificial, or narrow interpretation which fails to apply the language of the count in its most obvious sense. Only when counts are ambiguous may resort be had to the application where the counts originated, and this court does not look to the specification to determine whether there is an ambiguity.

In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 802 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).

We agree with both parties that no ambiguity exists in the count. The district court interpreted the count based on the protein encoded by the DNA construct.[*501] Therefore, the district court concluded that a DNA construct is outside of the scope of the count if, when incorporated into an expression plasmid and transformed into a yeast cell, it secretes a fusion protein instead of mature human IGF-I. The plain language of the count, however, militates against this conclusion.

Although a close relationship exists between a DNA construct and the protein it encodes, the two are not equal. The count specifically defines a DNA construct, not the protein that is produced by expression from the construct. The specific elements enumerated in the count that necessarily must be included in any DNA construct within the count are a DNA sequence coding for the secretory leader, a processing signal sequence, and human IGF-I. No dispute exists that Genentech’s DNA construct as described in the Lee application contains the complete DNA sequences for these three proteins in its DNA construct. The issue arises from the nine additional codons encoding the collagenase cleavage site inserted between the sequences coding for human IGF-I and the alpha-factor processing sequences. Therefore, the issue of claim construction is decided by the meaning of the phrase “joined in proper reading frame.”

The term “reading frame” relates to the way in which a protein is expressed from a DNA construct. DNA is made up of a series of nucleotides. To express the DNA construct to yield a protein, the cell machinery reads nucleotides in sets of three, which are called triplets or codons, to incorporate specific amino acids into the protein. If an extra nucleotide is inserted or deleted from a DNA sequence, the series of triplets is changed and different amino acids are incorporated into the protein. The term “reading frame” describes this phenomenon. To maintain “proper reading frame,” the triplets in the DNA sequence must be read so that the proper amino acids are incorporated into the resulting protein. See Karl Drlica, Understanding DNA and Gene Cloning: A Guide for the Curious, 83-36 (2d ed. 1992).

In the DNA construct of the count at issue here, “in proper reading frame” means that the nucleotides must be read in such a way that the seventy amino acids of human IGF-I are incorporated in the proper sequence in the expressed protein. Nothing exists in the definition of “in proper reading frame” to exclude nucleotides coding for additional amino acids at the beginning of the seventy amino acid IGF-I sequence.

This interpretation of the count is consistent with the open-ended term “comprising.” “Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim. In re Baxter, 656 F.2d at 686, 210 USPQ at 802.

The claim construction issue then becomes whether the term “joined” forecloses the possibility of additional nucleotides being inserted between the two joined elements, the alpha-factor processing sequences and human IGF-I sequence. We find that it does not.

The district court found that “joined” ordinarily means “connected.” From this definition, the district court read into the term a requirement that the alpha-factor processing sequences and human IGF-I sequence should be directly joined with no intervening nucleotides.

We hold, however, that this interpretation of the term “joined” is not the broadest, reasonable interpretation of the count. To be joined or connected does not necessitate a direct joining or connection. Nothing in the count restricts it to direct joining. Therefore, we hold that the count encompasses DNA constructs such as Genentech’s, that have intervening nucleotide sequences between the alpha-factor processing sequences and the human IGF-I sequence, as long as the proper reading frame is maintained between the two joined sequences.

This is not inconsistent with our opinion in Wellcome Foundation, 29 F.3d 1555, 31 USPQ2d 1161. In that case we defined the phrase “human tissue plasminogen activator” in the context of the claims of the patent at issue in that case. Because we found the term ambiguous, we examined the specification for guidance as to the meaning and sought to avoid definitions upon which the[*502] PTO could not have relied when it issued the patent. We found through this method that the phrase “human tissue plaminogen activator” meant t-PA produced through recombinant DNA technology but having the same structure as natural t-PA. We found this definition “most consistent with the limited form in which the claims are drafted and the others were hopelessly overbroad.” 29 F.3d at 1564,31 USPQ2d at 1168.

This definition is not inconsistent with our holding here. Genentech’s DNA construct contains codons for all seventy amino acids of the mature human IGF-I protein. Therefore, Genenteeh’s construct contains the structure of natural IGF-I. Again, we are examining a DNA construct and not a protein. Therefore, the addition of codons at the beginning of the DNA sequence for human IGF-I is irrelevant.

III.

Conclusion

We reverse the district court’s determination that the sole count at issue does not encompass Genentech’s DNA constructs. We remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

1

. Several motions remain pending. The first is Chiron’s motion to supplement the record with two documents that were before the Board, but were not before the district court. Circuit Judge Bryson, in an order dated March 7, 1996, treated the motion as one to take judicial notice of the two documents and deferred any ruling on the motion to the merits panel. The second motion is Chiron’s motion to strike portions of Genentech's appendix and to strike portions of Genentech's reply brief. The third motion is Genentech's motion for leave to respond to Chiron’s motion to strike portions of Genentech's appendix and reply brief. The fourth motion is Chiron’s motion for leave to correct the table of contents of the appendix. The fifth motion is Chiron’s motion for leave to file a clarification of its motion to strike portions of Genentech's appendix and reply brief.

We grant Chiron’s motion for leave to supplement the record, grant Genentech’s motion for leave to respond to Chiron’s motion to strike/ grant Chiron's motion for leave to correct the table of contents of the appendix, and grant Chiron's motion for leave to file a clarification of its motion to strike. We grant-in-part and deny-in-part Chiron's motion to strike portions of Genentech’s reply brief and appendix.

Although the full record before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) was not before the district court, the parties made an agreement to make the papers in the interference proceeding of record in the district court proceeding. Also, the interference record before the Board is a public record, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(e) (1996), and thus capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to unquestionable sources. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n. 3, 13 USPQ2d 2029, 2031 n. 3 (Fed.Cir. 1990); Fed. R.Evid. 201(b)(2). Therefore, we will take judicial notice of such papers in deciding this appeal. Chiron, however, has represented to the Court that the affidavit of William Kohr was not before the Board, and Genentech has not contradicted this statement. Therefore, we will strike the affidavit of William Kohr at pages 6114-32 of the Joint Appendix and the references to the affidavit at page 18 of Genentech’s Reply Brief.

2

. The claims of the Lee application corresponding to the count are claims 5, 16 to 18, 20, 21, 28 and 29; and the claims of the Barr application corresponding to the count are claims 1 to 3, 6, 7, 10 to 12, 15, 17 to 19, and 22 to 24. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences found that the claims stood or fell together.

3

. Genentech filed a cross-motion for summary judgment to restrict Chiron to its filing date for non-compliance with the interference rules, which the district court denied. This issue, however, was not raised on appeal.