Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 2000). · Go Syfert
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Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
46 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jeffrey Weekley v. Michael W. Moore, Department of Corrections (ca11, 2001-03-27) · Strongest negative: Daniel Siebert v. Donal Campbell (ca11, 2003-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Daniel Siebert v. Donal Campbell (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2003 · signal: but see · confidence high
See Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1086 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that failure to comply with “procedural requirement forbidding successive motions” rendered petition improperly filed because “we are persuaded by the reasoning” of Dictado and Tinker); but see id. at 1086 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s interpretation as “in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the phrase ‘properly filed’ ” as used in AEDPA’s tolling provision).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey Weekley v. Michael W. Moore, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge: In our previous Opinion in this case, we noted that “[t]he resolution of this appeal ... turns on whether a successive petition such as Weekley’s is nonetheless a ‘properly filed application’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).” Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1085 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodwell v. Singletary
M.D. Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir.2000) (“For prisoners whose convictions became final prior to April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, a one-year grace period extends the deadline for filing such petitions to April 23, 1997.”); Wilcox v. Florida Department of Corrections, 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir.1998) (petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of the AEDPA must be provided a reasonable time to file their § 2254 petitions, and one year from the effective date is a reasonable period); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir.1998) (ha…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rouse v. Iowa (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Iowa · 2000 · confidence medium
See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1258-60 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that a state motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as untimely); Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1086 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that a state *1132 motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as successive).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nyland v. Moore
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1258-60 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that a state motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as untimely); Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1086 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that a state motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as successive).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nyland v. Moore
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1258-60 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a state motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as untimely); Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1086 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a state motion was not properly filed if the state dismissed it as successive).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weekley v. Moore
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge: In our previous Opinion in this case, we noted that "[t]he resolution of this appeal ... turns on whether a successive petition such as Weekley's is nonetheless a 'properly filed application' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)." Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1085 (11th Cir.2000).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Weekley v. Moore (3×)
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
The majority of this Court was persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits1 and concluded that successive state court filings do not constitute properly filed applications for purposes of tolling 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)’s statute of limitations period.2 Weekly, 204 F.3d at 1086.
discussed Cited "see" Drew v. Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 2000).
discussed Cited "see" Michael Alan Hurley v. Michael W. Moore, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of the State of Florida (2×)
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 2000).
examined Cited "see" Michael Alan Hurley v. Michael W. Moore (3×)
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir.2000).
cited Cited "see" Habteselassie v. Novak
10th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1086 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that state post-conviction motions dismissed by the state court as successive were not “properly filed”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jones v. Florida Parole Commission
Fla. · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1083 (11th Cir.2000) (“The AEDPA added a one year statute of limitations to federal habeas corpus actions.”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Allen v. Butterworth
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1083 (11th Cir.2000) ("The AEDPA added a one year statute of limitations to federal habeas corpus actions.").
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Weekley
v.
Moore
98-4218.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Feb 24, 2000.
204 F.3d 1083
Published

Jeffrey WEEKLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael W. MOORE, Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 98-4218.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 15, 2001. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 97-01978-CV-ASG), Alas Stephen Gold, Judge. ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and MILLS*, District Judge. RICHARD MILLS, District Judge:

In our previous Opinion in this case, we noted that "[t]he resolution of this appeal ... turns on whether a successive petition such as Weekley's is nonetheless a 'properly filed application' under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2)." Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1085 (11th Cir.2000). The majority of this Court was

persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits1 and concluded that successive state court filings do not constitute properly filed applications for purposes of tolling 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)'s statute of limitations period.2 Weekley, 204 F.3d at 1086. Accordingly, we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Weekley's habeas corpus petition as being untimely filed. Id.

However, on January 8, 2001, the United State Supreme Court reversed this Court pursuant to that

Court's holding in Artuz v. Bennett, --- U.S. ----, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000). In Bennett, the Supreme Court decided the circuit split and held that

* Honorable Richard Mills, U.S. District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 1 See Tinker v. Hanks, 172 F.3d 990 (7th Cir.1999) and Dictado v. Ducharme, 189 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.1999). 2 Judge Barkett explained in her dissent that she was more persuaded by the reasoning of the opinions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Third Circuits (see Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.1999); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.1999); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d Cir.1998)), noting that "[t]o import consideration of the merits of the petition into this determination seems to me to be in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the phrase 'properly filed' as it is used in the statute." Weekley, 204 F.3d at 1086.

an application is "properly filed" when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.... [T]he question whether an application has been "properly filed" is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.

Id. at 364.

In light of Bennett, we must reverse the district court's decision and remand for further proceedings.

As we previously noted, "since Weekley filed his federal petition on June 25, 1997, if either the second or third Rule 3.850 motions w[ere] properly filed, his federal habeas petition would be timely." Weekley, 204

F.3d at 1085. Bennett teaches that Weekley's habeas corpus petition was timely filed because his second and third Rule 3.850 motions were properly filed, thereby tolling 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)'s statute of limitations period.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's Order holding that Weekley's habeas corpus petition

was untimely filed and REMAND with directions to the district court that it allow Weekley to file and proceed on his habeas corpus petition.