United States v. Kelly Jo Thornell, 128 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
United States v. Kelly Jo Thornell, 128 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Molignaro (ca1, 2011-07-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Molignaro
1st Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
See United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir.2010); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880-81 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir.2004); United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir.2006); United States v. Abeita, 409 Fed.Appx. 2, 4 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Doe
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
We now have an opportunity to resolve this question left open by Manzella , and, in doing so, to join our sister circuits who have held that “district courts may give weight to a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when revoking a term of supervised release and then subsequently requiring a defendant to serve part or all of his new and potentially extended term of supervised release in prison.” United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997); United S…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Textron Inc.
1st Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
In MIT, we found work-product privilege waived when MIT disclosed documents to a Defense Department auditing agency. 128 F.3d at 687.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Trent L. Williams
8th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
The district court gave appropriate weight to Williams’s rehabilitative needs, see United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997) (finding 500-hour drug program to be carefully tailored to offender’s needs).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tsosie (4×)
10th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Brown, 224 F.3d at 1242 (affirming imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release to allow defendant to complete a comprehensive substance abuse treatment); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming district court's consideration of defendant's rehabilitative needs when imposing imprisonment in excess of sentencing guidelines policy statement range after revocation of supervised release); Jackson, 70 F.3d at 879-80 (affirming district court's consideration of defendant's rehabilitative needs after mandatory revocation of supervised release); United States v…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Sutton
4th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rickey Jean Brown
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See United States v. Wiggins, 220 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.2000) (no abuse of discretion in considering drug treatment availability when imposing sentence upon revocation of supervised release); United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.2000) (no plain error in considering rehabilitative treatment to determine length of sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688-89 (8th Cir.1997) (upholding sentence of imprisonment following revocation of probation where court considered defendant’s need for treatment); United States v. Jackson…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Brown
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6)— (1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release ...; (2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release ...; (3) revoke a term of supervised release…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Brown
11th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
However, based on the express language of relevant statutes, we hold that a court may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing a specific incarcerative term following revocation of supervised release.1 1 See United States v. Wiggins, 11th Cir. 2000, ___F.3d___ (No. 99-14884, August 2, 2000) (no abuse of discretion in considering drug treatment availability when imposing sentence upon revocation of supervised release); United States v. Aguillard, 11th Cir. 2000 ___F.3d___ (No. 99-13358, July 5, 2000) (no plain error in considering rehabilitative treatment to determine length …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shannon Shaw
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See also Kaniss, 150 F.3d at 968 (district court's sentence above recommended range was not abuse of discretion where district court considered statutory factors); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997) (reasonable for district court to base higher sentence on defendant's need for drug rehabilitation); Hensley, 36 F.3d at 41 (no abuse of discretion for similar sentence with similar release violations). 4 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shannon Shaw
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See also Kaniss, 150 F.3d at 968 (district court’s sentence above recommended range was not abuse of discretion where district court considered statutory factors); United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997) (reasonable for district court to base higher sentence on defendant’s need for drug rehabilitation); Hensley, 36 F.3d at 41 (no abuse of discretion for similar sentence with similar release violations).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert S. Hermanson
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e) (requiring consideration of factors set forth in, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1) and (a)(2)(D)); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1) (court shall consider history and characteristics of defendant); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(D) (need to provide defendant with necessary medical care or other correctional treatment in most effective manner is factor for consideration); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review); United States v. Thornell, No. 97-1534, 1997 WL 693050, at *1-2 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 1997) (14-month sentence imposed upon revocation …
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Bidon
8th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997) (concluding it was not unreasonable for a district court to impose a sentence above the Guidelines so that the defendant would be eligible for the 500-hour drug treatment program).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Bidon
8th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1997) (concluding it was not unreasonable for a district court to impose a sentence above the Guidelines so that the defendant would be eligible for the 500-hour drug treatment program).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Suzula Rose Bidon (2×)
8th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding it was not unreasonable for a district court to impose a sentence above the Guidelines so that the defendant would be eligible for the 500-hour drug treatment program).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Dominick Daniel Nace (2×)
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 687-89 (8th Cir.1997). 12 For all of the above reasons, we conclude that it is far from "clear under current law" that the district court violated Mr. Nace's privilege against self-incrimination. 13 We also reject Mr. Nace's contention that his sentence must be reversed because the Sentencing Reform Act as a whole is unconstitutional.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Dominick Nace
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 687-89 (8th Cir. 1997).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Williams
4th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 699 (8th Cir.1997).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Michael James Vore
8th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1997) (14-month sentence imposed upon revocation of defendant’s supervised release was neither unreasonable nor abuse of discretion, because district court properly determined other forms of supervision were insufficient for defendant who needed intensive and continuous drug treatment).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Joseph Devon Barrett
4th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); Jackson, 70 F.3d at 880 ; United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson , 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Holman
4th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Breland
5th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 771-74 (3d Cir.2010); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1214-17 (10th Cir.2004); United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1241-42 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 879-81 (6th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688-89 (8th Cir.1997) (holding, without citing to § 3582(a), that a district court may consider § 3553(a)(2)(D) when fashioning a post-revocation sentence). 4 *290 Lastly, we note that in its recent decision in Tapia , the Supreme Court justified its interpretation of § 3582(a) by highlighting…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Kelly Jo THORNELL, Appellant
97-1534MN.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Nov 6, 1997.
128 F.3d 687
Virginia G. Villa, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant., Andrew Dunne, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, MN (David L. Lillehaug, on the brief), for Appellee.
Arnold, 'Chief, Loken, Hansen.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Kelly Jo Thornell appeals .the fourteen-month sentence imposed .by the District Court [1] on revocation of her supervised release. Ms. Thornell claims that it was unreasonable for the District Court to sentence her to a term in excess of the range indicated by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements on account of the need, perceived by the District Court, for intensive and continuous drug treatment. We hold that the action of the sentencing court was neither unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion, and we therefore affirm.

Appellant was convicted on her plea of guilty to distribution of cocaine • base (“crack”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B). The District Court, departing downward, sentenced her to 30 months in prison. She served the sentence and began a four-year term of supervised release.

In late 1996, the United States Probation Office submitted to the District Court a petition requesting that Ms. Thornell’s supervised release be revoked, and that she be returned to prison. Numerous violations of the terihs of her supervised release were alleged, including testing positive for cocaine on several occasions. Ms. Thornell has admitted these violations. After missing one scheduled appearance before the District Court, she appeared for a revocation hearing. Ms. Thornell asked to be placed in a half-way house for a term of four and one-half months. The non-binding policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission, as applied to this case, would call for a term of three to nine months. The District Court imposed a term of 14 months’ imprisonment, to be served in a federal correctional institution. It recognized that it was departing upward from the policy statements, and that[*688] it was rejecting defendant’s half-way-house proposition, and gave the following reasons’ for this action:

I have already determined that she has violated the terms of her supervised release. I am going to do something here that you are not going to like. I will start out with that so we won’t have any surprises. You don’t have to wait with bated breath. You have got a problem and you have been, as far as I can tell, I will say incapable of dealing with it. I don’t say that in terms of passing judgment that you were a bad person, but until you get this problem solved or under control you won’t be a fit mother and you will be right back here again. We have gone through it from the beginning in this case. You were shipped off to the intensive confinement program. You didn’t survive that. You came back here and you tested positive for cocaine from the outset. You were supposed to be down in my court here a week ago and you didn’t make that appearance. I’m assuming you are not doing this deliberately, trying to .run counter to the Court’s wishes, but that you have a problem that you are unable to control.
And tough as it is, and I think it is tough, I am going to take the position that we have got to get that problem solved or I think the foster parent issue pales by comparison, because they’re not going to give you these children back if you continue to have this problem. The only hope you have of maintaining any relationship with your children is to get yourself into a program which is going to take longer than four or six months and it’s not going to be done around here.
So it is the judgment of this Court that you be sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 14 months, and at the conclusion of the 14 months there will be no further supervised release. The court will terminate further supervised release.
It’s the Court’s recommendation that you be enrolled in what I have had described for me as the 500-hour drug treatment program, which program is available either at the federal facility in Alderson, [West] Virginia or the federal facility at Lexington, Kentucky. And it’s the Court’s recommendation that you be sent to either one of those two facilities.
It’s further the Court’s recommendation that there be an expedited transfer coordinated by the probation office and the U.S. Marshal’s Office so that this program can begin as soon as possible.
As I say, Ms. Thornell, this is not a decision that I take lightly. I recognize it has all kinds of problems with it, but I think that it is time in your life to give it a shot, give it a sufficient amount of time where you’re not going to have any distractions, where you are not going to be 'able to walk away from the program.

Sentencing transcript 7-9.

On appeal, defendant contends' that it was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion for the District Court to consider her need for drug treatment. We see nothing unreasonable about the District Court’s- action, which appears to us to have been judicious and carefully tailored to the needs of this particular case and this particular offender. The District Court is authorized by statute to consider, among other factors, the defendant’s history and characteristics and her need for education, medical care, or other correctional treatment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D). That is what the Court did here. It was not convinced that defendant would receive the treatment she needed at a half-way house, given defendant’s history of failure in both inpatient and outpatient treatment programs after her release from prison. In addition, the Court believed that the best chance that defendant had of retaining her parental rights and being reunited with her children lay in the intensive residential treatment program that would be available from the Bureau of Prisons.

We have previously upheld a sentencing court’s revocation of supervised release, and imposition of a new sentence in excess of the guidelines contained in the policy statements, in virtually identical circumstances. See United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 1229 (8th[*689] Cir.1994) (table), 1994 WL 5163 (per curiam). We note, in addition, that the 14-month sentence imposed was well within the statutory maximum of two years.

Affirmed.

1

. The Hon. Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.