green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
53.8 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2001 ·
…we evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief
at p. 514
✓
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Mukasey v. Diouf
we evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for prelimi- nary injunctive relief.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dan Marius Andreiu v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
(8×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
we evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dan Marius Andreiu v. Janet Reno, Attorney General
(8×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
we evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Nuiqsut Trilateral, Inc. v. Doug Burgum, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior, et al.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)). 45 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 , 434–35 (2009) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Oklahoma ex rel. Gentner Drummond, in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and Oklahoma Secretary of Energy and Environment Jeff Starling in his capacity as the Trustee for Natural Resources for the State of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Poultry, Inc., Tyson Chicken, Inc., Cobb-Vantress, Inc., Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., Cargill, Inc., Cargill Turkey Production, LLC, George’s, Inc., George’s Farms, Inc., Peterson Farms, Inc., and Simmons Foods, Inc.
Id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[S]peculative harm does not amount to irreparable injury.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Golden v. Firstmark Services LLC
In particular, as the Supreme Court explains, “it is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than negligible’ . . . ‘[m]ore than a mere “possibility” of relief is required.’ By the same token, simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35 (citations omitted) (quoting Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999); Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dotson v. District of Columbia
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zayre-Brown v. North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections
(2×)
By the same token, simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,’ Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (C.A.9 1998), fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Farley v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co.
A party can also show likelihood of success by showing “serious legal 21 questions are raised.” Id. (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Florida v. United States of America
Indeed, “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (citation omitted) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Perez v. Discover Bank
Thus, a movant may 8 obtain a stay if it shows “either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of 9 irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips 10 sharply in [the movant’s] favor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) 11 (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)). 12 Discover points out that courts within the Ninth Circuit have frequently granted stays 13 pending appeal of orders denying motions to compel arbitration.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
KADEL v. FOLWELL
Whether Defendants Will Suffer Irreparable Harm The second factor used when considering motions to stay an injunction pending appeal is the likelihood that the moving parties will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted. “[S]imply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ . . . fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Vitol Inc
Cal. May 1, 2013) (quoting Leiva–Perez, 640 F.3d at 965 ), or raises “serious legal issues,” 26 id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United Food & Commercial Workers v. OSHA
To merit a stay, Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate an irreparable injury; “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SUNBELT RENTALS, INC. v. LOVE
“By the same token, simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor” because it is “too lenient.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (first quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998); then quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wit v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company
In Leiva-Perez, the court noted that there are 2 “many ways to articulate the minimum quantum of likely success necessary to justify a stay—be it 3 a ‘reasonable probability’ or ‘fair prospect,’ as [Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)] 4 suggests; ‘a substantial case on the merits,’ in [the words of Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 , 5 778 (1987)]; or, as articulated in [Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)] that 6 ‘serious legal questions are raised.’” Id. at 967-968.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hansen v. Rock Holdings, Inc.
Id. (quoting, respectively, Leiva-Perez, 1 640 F.3d at 965 ; Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Eaton v. Stroman
Additionally, the second factor requires a showing of more than “possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. at 433 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Weaver v. Stroman
Additionally, the second factor requires a showing of more than “possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. at 433 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rhoten v. Stroman
Additionally, the second factor requires a showing of more than “possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. at 433 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. Stroman
Additionally, the second factor requires a showing of more than “possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. at 433 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Terwilliger v. Stroman
Additionally, the second factor requires a showing of more than “possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. at 433 (quoting Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). 1.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, for an Order Authorizing the Release of Certain Grand Jury Materials
Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring))). 2 As to the requisite irreparable injury showing, “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35 (citation omitted) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
David A Stewart and Terry P Stewart
Likewise, “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,’ Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998), fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Waid v. Mission Coal Company, LLC
As noted by the Supreme Court, “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy th[is] factor.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 , 434–35 (2009) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Maranda ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas, e
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Winter v. Nat.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Gardens Regional Hospital & Medical Center, Inc.
By the same token, simply showing some “possibility of irreparable injury,” Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998), fails to satisfy the second factor.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico
(3×)
Likewise, “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,’ Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998), fails to satisfy the second factor.’’ Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. at 434-35 , 129 S.Ct. 1749 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Salix v. United States Forest Service
With regard to the threshold showing of irreparable harm, the United States Supreme Court has rejected an approach whereby a stay can issue by “simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 , 129 S.Ct. 1749 (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (C.A.9 1998)). “[T]he possibility standard,” the Supreme Court has said, “is too lenient.” Id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 , 129 S.Ct. 365, 375 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re the Extradition of Mathison
A showing of a “ ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35 , 129 S.Ct. 1749 , quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Abebe
In addressing the second factor, that of “whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay,” the Supreme Court stated that “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken at 566, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Broncheau
Lastly, showing some “possibility of irreparable injury,” Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998), fails to satisfy the second factor.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Nken v. Holder
By the same token, simply showing some “possibility of irreparable injury,” Abbassi v. INS, 143 F. 3d 513, 514 (CA9 1998), fails to satisfy the *435 second factor.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Diouf v. Mukasey
The entry of the stay signifies that, at the very least, the petitions have presented a “serious legal questionf ]” or have some “probability of success on the merits.” See Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998) (“We evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martinez v. Gonzales
See Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 484-484 (9th Cir.2001)(en banc); Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998). [See Answer, Ex. 25 (Order Staying Removal) ].
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gamez v. Ashcroft
The court “retains equitable jurisdiction to stay the voluntary departure period,” but for this power to be exercised, petitioner must show “a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury” or “that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [petitioners’] favor.” El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hensworth Douglas v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States of America
The Ninth Circuit applies a two-pronged standard of review that provides that a stay of removal should be granted when an alien shows “either (1) a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.” Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 483 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Douglas v. Atty Gen USA
Most courts of appeals, however, favor.” Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477 , have applied the standard for granting a 483 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th 4 Cir. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Josadac Mariscal-Sandoval v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
(2×)
Under the injunction standard, an alien is entitled to a stay only so long as the petitioner can demonstrate that "either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioners's favor." Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (internal quotations omitted). 38 Once we carefully consider the administrative agency record and the parties' briefs on appeal and after oral argument or submission without argument and when an opinion is filed which denies an alien's petition for review, ther…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tilahun Fantaye Desta v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
That is, “a petitioner must show (1) ‘a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,’ or (2) ‘that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.’ ” Id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Villanueva v. Ashcroft
A petitioner must show “either (1) ‘a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,’ or (2) ‘that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.’ ” Id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Villanueva v. Ashcroft
A petitioner must show “either (1) ‘a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,’ or (2) ‘that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.’ ” Id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Liang v. Ashcroft
For a stay to be granted, Petitioners “must show either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [P]etitionersf] favor.” Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998) (test approved in El Himri, 344 F.3d at 1261-62 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Haifa Saleh El Himri Musab El Himri v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
We hold that the standards for obtaining a stay of removal shall also apply to stays of voluntary departure. 1 Accordingly, a petitioner must show either (1) “a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,” or (2) “that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.” Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Arevalo v. Ashcroft
See, e.g., Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.1999); Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bin Weng v. U.S. Attorney General, Immigration & Naturalization Service
See, for example, Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.1999) (applying injunc-tive relief standard, which it called "the general criteria developed for stays or injunctions pending appeal,” in transitional rule case); Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998) (applying "same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for pre-liminaiy injunctive relief” to merits of motion to stay). 7 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Pierrot Bejjani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States
In Andreiu , the Ninth Circuit adopted the standard from Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Maldonado v. Fasano
In pre-IIRIRA cases, an alien seeking a stay of deportation must, like any other litigant seeking temporary injunctive relief, show (1) “either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,” or (2) “that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s favor.” Abbassi v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998); National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S., 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
DESHMUKH v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE OFFICE
See Revel, 802 F.3d at 571 (explaining that where a movant fails to make the requisite showings on either of the first two factors, “the [] inquiry into the balance of harms [and the public interest] is unnecessary, and the stay should be denied without further analysis”). 2 Irreparable Harm Although the Court need not address the remaining factors, the Court briefly notes that even if Appellant were able to demonstrate likelihood of success on appeal, Appellant fails to demonstrate irreparable harm absent a stay. “[S]imply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury,” fails to s…
discussed
Cited "see"
Belyea v. GreenSky, Inc.
See 16 Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998). “[A] party satisfying this lower threshold under 17 the first Nken factor must [also] demonstrate that the balance of hardships under the second and 18 third factors tilts sharply in its favor.” Jimenez v. Menzies Aviation Inc., No. 15-CV-02392-WHO, 19 2015 WL 5591722 , at *2 (N.D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Fereshteh ABBASSI, Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
98-70375.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
May 1, 1998.
David L. Ross, Beverly Hills, California, for petitioner., Karen Ann Hunold, Office of Immigration Litigation, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Brunetti, Rymer, Nelson.
Cited by 74 opinions | Published
Petitioner Fereshteh Abbassi moves for a stay of deportation pending disposition of her petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1253(h). Upon her motion, Abbassi’s deportation was stayed temporarily pursuant to De Leon v. INS, 115 F.3d 643 (9th Cir.1997). The Immigration and Naturalization Service opposes Abbassi’s stay request, and we now decide whether she warrants a discretionary stay of deportation during the pendency of this petition for review.
We evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief. See Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.), rev’d in part on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1328, 104 S.Ct. 10, 77 L.Ed.2d 1431 (1983). Petitioner must show either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s favor. See Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986); see also Arthurs v. INS, 959 F.2d 142, 143-44 (9th Cir.1992). These standards represent the outer extremes of a continuum, with the relative hardships to the parties providing the critical element in determining at what point on the continuum a stay pending review is justified. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435.
Abbassi’s stay request, submitted by counsel, states in full: “[petitioner respectfully requests a stay of deportation as she has demonstrated a prima facie case for the granting of asylum.” Abbassi’s perfunctory request for a stay is wholly insufficient to meet the requirements for a stay. See Artukovic, 784 F.2d at 1355. Counsel failed to discuss the merits of Abbassi’s petition for review, and identified no potential hardships Abbassi would face if deported prior to disposition of this petition.
Finding no basis upon which to grant the relief requested, we deny Abbassi’s request for a stay of deportation without prejudice to renewal accompanied by a showing that a discretionary stay of deportation is warranted. See id.
The briefing schedule will be set by separate order.