Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). · Go Syfert
Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County (fladistctapp, 1987-12-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coral Gables Federal Savs. & Loan v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So.2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Graham v. Talton, 192 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); compare Graham, (writ of certiorari improper method of challenging re-zoning ordinance on the basis that it was unreasonable; proper method is a direct challenge in circuit court) with Albright v. Hensley, 492 So.2d 852, 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (writ of certiorari proper remedy to challenge county's grant of variance where record in the circuit court limited solely to the record of proceedings before the board) and Eastside Properties, Inc. v…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Lewis v. City of Atlantic Beach
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So.2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CORAL GABLES FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
v.
The CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida
No. 83-498.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb 1, 1984.
444 So. 2d 92
James A. Lanier, II, of Padgett, Teasley, Niles & Shaw, Coral Gables, for appellant., Richard H. Roth, P.A., Pompano Beach, for appellee.
Charles, Glickstein, Hurley, Smith.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment, denying declaratory relief. We reverse and remand. One of the best kept secrets by the parties in this case is the existence of Section 86.071, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in part:

When an action under this chapter concerns the determination of an issue of fact, the issue may be tried as issues of fact are tried in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.

Neither called it to the trial court’s attention nor to ours. As a result the trial court erroneously refused to consider any evidence other than the record of zoning proceedings that took place in the appellee city, notwithstanding that this was an action for declaratory judgment, not a petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court was persuaded by appellee’s reliance upon Eastside Properties, Inc. v. Dade County, 358 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). That, of course, was a petition for certiorari to review the decision of a zoning application in accordance with the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. The present action for declaratory judgment was the type of proceeding expressly specified by appellee’s code of ordinances for such review.

We are, reluctant to visit upon the trial court what may become a can of worms; particularly when the record before us reflects that the proceedings go back to 1974; and the action was brought in 1977, remained unattended from 1978 through 1980 and was not tried until late 1982. The children whose photographs show them[*93] playing football in the street may now be in the NFL.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HURLEY, J., and SMITH, CHARLES E., Associate Judge, concur.