United States v. Brennan Thomas, Also Known as \Snaps, 198 F.3d 1063 (1999). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Brennan Thomas, Also Known as \Snaps, 198 F.3d 1063 (1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“thomas will not be subject to the condition for nearly a decade, during which time any number of events may occur that would make the condition irrelevant.”
14 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Ford (ca10, 2018-02-23)
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Ford
10th Cir. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
thomas will not be subject to the condition for nearly a decade, during which time any number of events may occur that would make the condition irrelevant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edgar Mejia
8th Cir. · 2026 · confidence medium
Here, by contrast, any injury is speculative and decades away.4 See United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that a challenge to a condition prohibiting a defendant from associating with a gang was unripe because 4 On occasion, we have considered challenges to the conditions of supervised release on direct appeal, even when defendants still have years left on their sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Daniel Lockridge
6th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cf. Shultz, 733 F.3d at 623 (declining to consider the propriety of a condition because the condition might not apply by the time the defendant’s supervised release begins); United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Lantz, 443 F. App’x 135, 139 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the propriety of a condition because that condition will certainly apply when the defendant’s supervised release begins); see also, e.g., United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624 , 628–29 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Thom…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joshua Rideout
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
City, 432 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir.2005) (ripeness doctrine is grounded in both Article III jurisdictional limits and policy considerations of effective court administration; ripeness requires court to evaluate both fitness of issues for judicial decision and hardship to parties of withholding consideration); United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999) (declining to address due process challenge to supervised-release condition where defendant would not be subject to condition for “nearly a decade”; reasoning that dispute was abstract “[u]ntil such time as the condition’s …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pearson v. Holder
5th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 360-61 (holding that the claim was unripe because the prisoner would not be released for at least ten years, but also holding that the prisoner need not wait until after his release to bring his claim); United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that a remaining sentence of over a decade was too long to grant ripeness, but noting that the prisoner may petition for relief before his supervised release begins).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Insaulgarat
5th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
See United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 761-62 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ray Donald Loy
3rd Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Relying on United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that a prisoner’s challenge to a condition of supervised release was premature because he would “not be subject to the condition for nearly a decade, during which time any number of events may occur that would make the condition irrelevant”), the government explains that, inter alia, an incarcerated prisoner may no longer have the same interest in engaging in the prohibited activity upon release from prison, and further, that vagueness challenges to conditions of supervised release are premature until those c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Loy
3rd Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Relying on United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a prisoner's challenge to a condition of supervised release was premature because he would "not be subject to the condition for nearly a decade, during which time any number of events may occur that would make the condition irrelevant"), the government explains that, inter alia, an incarcerated prisoner may no longer have the same interest in engaging in the prohibited activity upon r elease from prison, and further, that vagueness challenges to conditions of supervised release are prematur e until those cond…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) also entered an appearance for this petitioner.
unknown court · 90- · confidence medium
Thus, in United States v. Thomas, the Eighth Circuit observed that a defendant “may petition for modification of his supervised release conditions before his supervised release begins.” 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Noel Perez-Plascencia
8th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063 , *710 1064-65 (8th Cir.1999) (appellate court will decline to determine constitutional question if it is so premature that court would have to speculate as to presence of real injury).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Forde
8th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Should Toliver desire to enter an establishment his probation officer says violates the condition, “he may apply to the district court for an appropriate modification.” Henkel, 358 F.3d at 1015 ; see also United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999) (declining to determine a premature over-breadth and vagueness challenge to a sentencing condition and noting the defendant could “petition for modification of his supervised release conditions” under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Keith B. Crenshaw
8th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.1999).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
\""
Dec 30, 1999.
198 F.3d 1063
Wollman, Heaney, Loken.
12  |  Virginia G. Villa, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for Appellant., Jeffrey S. Paulsen, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Minneapolis, MN (B. Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney, on the brief), for Appellee.
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 59%
Citer courts: Tenth Circuit (1)
WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

Having entered a plea of guilty to one count of intentionally aiding and abetting the distribution of approximately seventy grams of cocaine base (crack), Brennan W. Thomas appeals from one of the conditions of the supervised release portion of his sentence imposed by the district court. [1] We affirm.

I.

The presentence report (PSR) indicates that Thomas has a substantial criminal record and a history of criminal street gang involvement. He had been a member of a criminal gang known as the Gangster Disciples and later either started or joined another gang, known as XXVI.

The district court imposed a prison sentence of 121 months and a term of supervised release of five years. Thomas appeals from the condition of his supervised release that requires that:

The defendant shall not associate with any member, prospect, or associate member of the XXVI gang, the Gangster Disciples gang, or any other gang. If the defendant is found to be in the company of such individuals while wearing the clothing, colors, or insignia of the XXVI gang, the Gangster Disciples gang or any other gang, the Court will presume that this association was for the purpose of participating in gang activities.

At the sentencing hearing, Thomas objected to this provision as being overly broad. He expressed concern that he did not know precisely what conduct would cause his release to be revoked, a particular problem for him because of the composition of his home neighborhood, which evidently includes a significant number of gang members and thus increases the likelihood of inadvertent interaction with such[*1065] persons. The court replied that the issue would be taken up at a later time, presumably when the conditions have taken effect upon Thomas’s release from prison. On appeal, Thomas contends that the condition is vague and fundamentally unfair and thus violates the Due Process Clause.

II.

It is a well-established, self-imposed judicial policy that a court will decline to determine a constitutional question if the issue is “so premature that the court would have to speculate as to the presence of a real injury.” Meadows of West Memphis v. City of West Memphis, 800 F.2d 212, 214 (8th Cir.1986); cf. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 1332, 1337 (8th Cir.1997) (“When ... considering free speech issues of fundamental and far-reaching import, it is particularly inappropriate to attempt to decide a case on an amorphous and ill-defined factual record.”) (internal quotations omitted). The precise line between ripe actions and premature actions is not an easy one to draw, see Cuffley, 112 F.3d at 1338, but we believe that because Thomas has not shown a current, substantial controversy relating to the challenged provision, his due process vagueness claim is premature. Thomas will not be subject to the condition for nearly a decade, during which time any number of events may occur that would make the condition irrelevant. Until such time as the condition’s enforcement is imminent, the dispute is only abstract. Thus, we decline to address Thomas’s constitutional challenges to the condition.

We note that Thomas may petition for modification of his supervised release conditions before his supervised release begins. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (Supp.1999); United States v. Gray, 175 F.3d 617, 618 (8th Cir.1999). Thomas also is assured of both a prompt probable cause hearing and a more extensive revocation hearing if proceedings are begun to revoke his release, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972) (parole revocation implicates due process), and the opportunity for appellate review at that time. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 49 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d 906, 908-09 (8th Cir.1994).

The sentence is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.