green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
68.4 score
“the supreme court . . . has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent... to leave to th court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Torres v. Fauver
But see Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 300-01 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (holding that Heck barred a former prisoner from alleging under § 1983 that he was improperly made to serve two sentences for the same offense because he was not given credit for his initial prison stay); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that Heck barred the heirs of a prisoner who died in custody from challenging his conviction and imprisonment under § 1983).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Torres v. Fauver
But see Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 300-01 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (holding that Heck barred a former prisoner from alleging under § 1983 that he was improperly made to serve two sentences for the same offense because he was not given credit for his initial prison stay); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that Heck barred the heirs of a prisoner who died in custody from challenging his conviction and imprisonment under § 1983).
cited
Cited "but see"
Davis v. Schifone
But see Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000) (“[W]e decline to *100 announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions."). 30 . 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.1998). 31 .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Canada Hockey LLC v. Texas A&M University Athletic Department
the supreme court . . . has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent... to leave to th court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillip Velazquez v. M. Ogari, et al
If the plaintiff hasn’t satisfied the favorable-termination requirement, “he is barred from any recovery.” Randell v Johnson, 227 F3d 300, 301 (5th Cir 2000, per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. City of Lexington
Leadership Found., 77 F.4th 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Midland County
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
With boundless respect for my eminent colleagues, the plurality21 has disfigured Heck to impose a favorable-termination requirement as an “element” for “all § 1983 claims by all civil plaintiffs who seek civil remedies against defective criminal process.”22 This holding is doubly violative: _____________________ 16 Id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 17 523 U.S. 1 (1998). 18 Id. at 21–22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 503 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)). 19 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 , 752 n.2 (2004). 20 Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Welsh v. Abbott
See id.; Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Collins v. Dallas Leadership Foundation, 77 F.4th 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2023).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hurd, Jr. v. District of Columbia
See Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 , 209–10 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 , 421–22, 428 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Midland County
(5×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Indeed, in 2012, eight years after Muhammad, we reaffirmed Randell’s core holding: “The fact that Morris is no longer a prisoner ‘in custody’ for his offense and thus may not seek habeas relief does not excuse him from the ‘favorable termination’ rule of Heck . . . .”43 Our rule of orderliness means “a panel of the court cannot overturn a prior panel decision ‘absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court or by our en banc court.’”44 Our “precedent is implicitly overruled if a subsequent Supreme Court opinion establishes…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Olivier v. City of Brandon, MS
But in this circuit, Heck applies even if a § 1983 plaintiff is “no longer in custody” and “thus [cannot] file a habeas petition.” See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gilbert v. Newman
A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the magistrate judge’s recommendation. 1 See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Heck-barred claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding Heck-barred claims are “legally frivolous”). 2
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Havard v. Rankin County, MS
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Because success on Havard’s claims related to his sentence would call into question the validity of that sentence, including the fact or duration of probation, and because Havard has not established that this sentence has met the favorable- termination rule of Heck, he cannot maintain this claim against any Defendant, and it must be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim “until the Heck conditions are met.” See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Heck-barred claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Johnson …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garig v. Travis
(See Doc. 45 at 34–38.) This Court specifically stated: [U]nder Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 486–87 . . . (1994), a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if the alleged violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves “that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dunn v. Collier
Doss v. McAlpin, 115 F. App’x 221 , 222, 2004 WL 2913930 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000)); Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 1996)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCall v. Walker
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Heck-barred claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding Heck-barred claims are “legally frivolous”); Colvin v. LeBlanc, No. 19-30888, 2021 WL 2562449 , *3 (5th Cir. 2021) (reiterating that Heck does not pose a jurisdictional bar, and explaining that “[w]e have routinely characterized a Heck dismissal as one for failure to state a claim”); Davis v. Whyce, 763 F. App’x 348 , 349 (5th Cir. 2019) …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mann v. Hall
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Heck-barred claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding Heck-barred claims are “legally frivolous”).3 III.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Terrell v. O'Neil
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Ramos
Asa result, any plaintiff “seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment [who] has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck” is “barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (Sth Cir. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Terrell v. Anthony
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garig v. Travis
Ed. 2d 383 (1994), a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if the alleged violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves “that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Colvin v. LeBlanc
See Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537 , 539–40 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that a Heck dismissal is final and appealable when “the issue was whether . . . the plaintiff’s pleadings implicated Heck,” or “whether Heck even applies”). 14 Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004). 15 See, e.g., Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 2001); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996). 16 See, e.g., Walker v. Munsell, No. 3:06-CV-867, 2007 WL 3377202 , at *2 (M.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garcia v. Harlingen Cty
Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Torres Garcia’s complaint as frivolous, see Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996), and for failure to state a claim, see Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vasquez v. Bunin
Id. at 488-89; Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1601 (2001) (“Because [plaintiff] is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and he has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery. . . .”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gates v. Kathy
Fifth Circuit authority is likewise clear as to the result: “Because [plaintiff] is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery . . .” Randell v Johnson, 227 F3d 300, 301 (5th Cir 2000), cert denied, 532 US 971 (2001).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Ortiz Villagran v. United States of America
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Finally, “the fact that [a plaintiff] is no longer a prisoner ‘in custody’ for his offense and thus may not seek habeas relief does not excuse him from the ‘favorable termination’ rule of Heck, which instead relies on the dismissal of the indictment.” Morris v. McAllester, 702 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McNeal v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
(Doc. 36 at 2, (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005)).) Defendants point the Court to Randell v. Johnson in which the Fifth Circuit held, “Because Randell is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery.” (Doc. 36 at 2 (citing Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000)).) Defendants maintain that courts in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi apply Heck to claims of illegal imprisonment.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wiley v. Stephens
The district court cited Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000), for the proposition that the Heck dismissal was appropriate notwithstanding that Wiley was no longer in custody.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harold Black v. Don Hathaway
Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 599-603 (6th Cir. 2007); Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65 , 73- 75 (2d Cir. 2001); Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999). 21 Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 5 Case: 14-30831 Document: 00513001375 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-30831 dissenting opinions in Spencer” but “decline[d] to announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.” 22 Black acknowledges that we r…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Black v. Hathaway
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam). .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Edgar Patton v. Phillip Bryant
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Teichmann v. New York
See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 , 209 n. 8, 211 (3d Cir.2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 80-81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Teichmann v. State of New York
See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 , 209 n.8, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 80‐81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998). 4 The animating rationale of this result was stated to be that “some federal remedy—either habeas corpus or § 1983—must be available” to redress constitutional violations.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tony Newmy, Sr. v. Trey Johnson
(2×)
Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1003 ; Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208-12 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-82 (1st Cir. 1998).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
James Deemer v. Jeffrey Beard
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Williams, 453 F.3d at 177-78; Gilíes v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 , 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005); Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000) (per cu-riam); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 80-81 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1998); see also Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1315 (finding our Court has aligned itself with the First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits on this question); Powers, 501 F.3d at 602 (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marcos Poventud v. City of New York
(2×)
See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 , 209‐10 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Poventud v. City of New York
(2×)
See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998 , 1003 4 (8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d 5 Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 6 2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1998). 7 These opinions heed the Supreme Court’s admonition 8 that, even if binding precedent “appears to rest on reasons 9 rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of 10 Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, 11 leaving to this [Supreme] Court the prerogative of 12 overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 13 203, 237 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Linda Thomas v. State of Louisiana
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Regardless of this uncertainty, Randell remains good law in this circuit, and we share its reluctance to "announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.” Randell, 227 F.3d at 301.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cohen v. Longshore
See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir.2006); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Anthony Morrow v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
Under those facts, I agree that his challenge would not be foreclosed by Heck’s favorable termination requirement. 1 See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998). 2 Cases in other circuits may be to the same effect.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Morrow v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
NOTES [*] We say nothing about potential cases in which ample time was available, although the law might ultimately not turn on that circumstance. [1] See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir.2005); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998). [2] Cases in other circuits may be to the same effect.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
We reasoned that Heck was inapplicable because with respect to the dismissed charge "[t]here [wa]s no related underlying conviction ... that could be invalidated by Mr. Butler's § 1983 action." Id. [6] Compare, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007) (applying Heck to bar petitioner's § 1983 action challenging the length of his imprisonment where habeas relief was no longer available), Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d Cir.2005) (applying Heck to bar § 1983 action challenging on First Amendment grounds his arrest for disorderly conduct although plaintiff had no rec…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rosendahl v. Nixon
"Because [plaintiff, a former prisoner,] is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dep ’t of Corr., 272 F. Supp. 2d 464 (M.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Domotor v. Wennet
See Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 , 81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998) (the First Circuit reasoned that it was bound to apply Supreme Court precedent, “even if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions,” because only the Supreme Court has the authority to overrule its own decisions) Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007) (declining to read Spencer to allow a former prisoner to maintain his § 1983 action on the grounds that Heck did not differentiate between prisoners and habeas-ineligible former prisoners for purposes of applying the favorable-termin…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Johnson
(2×)
See e.g., Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.1998); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007); and Fuchs v. Mercer County, 260 Fed.Appx. 472, 474 (3d Cir.2008) but cf. Mendoza v. Meisel, 270 Fed.Appx. 105, 107 (3d Cir.2008) (holding that "Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff is unable to challenge his conditions of confinement through a petition for federal habeas corpus.”). .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. Munsell
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Abusaid v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BD.
Dep't of Probation, 168 F.3d 481 (4th Cir.1999) (Table) (Unpublished); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374 , 380 n. 6 (9th Cir.1998). [16] The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are as follows: (1) the commencement or continuance of an original judicial proceeding, (2) legal causation thereof by the present defendant, (3) the bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff, (4) the absence of probable cause for that proceeding, (5) the presence of malice, and (6) damage to the plaintiff.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners
Dep’t of Probation, 168 F.3d 481 (4th Cir.1999) (Table) (Unpublished); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374 , 380 n. 6 (9th Cir.1998). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Powers v. Hamilton Cnty
Id. at 81 n.3 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)); see also Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (declining to read Spencer to allow a former prisoner to maintain his § 1983 action on the grounds that Heck did not differentiate between prisoners and habeas-ineligible former prisoners for purposes of applying the favorable-termination rule and no Supreme Court decision had “explicitly overrule[d]” Heck); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to recognize a Heck exception for a habeas-ineligible plaintiff on the grounds that the court h…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission
(2×)
Id. at 81 n. 3 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)); see also Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007) (declining to read Spencer to allow a former prisoner to maintain his § 1983 action on the grounds that Heck did not differentiate between prisoners and habeas-ineligible former prisoners for purposes of applying the favorable-termination rule and no Supreme Court decision had “explicitly overrule[d]” Heck); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d Cir.2005) (declining to recognize a Heck exception for a habeas-ineligible plainti…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Tommy Randell
v.
Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division Melinda Bozarth, Director, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles John Doe, I John Doe, II
v.
Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division Melinda Bozarth, Director, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles John Doe, I John Doe, II
99-11092.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Sep 26, 2000.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000)
TOMMY RANDELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GARY L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; MELINDA BOZARTH, Director, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; JOHN DOE, I; JOHN DOE, II, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-11092
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
September 26, 2000
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Before WOOD[1], DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[*~300]1
The district court held that Tommy Randell's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for damages was frivolous and therefore dismissed his complaint. Because we determine that the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, we affirm.
I.
2
Randell was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. He alleges that he was incarcerated from September 27, 1996, until June 25, 1997, pursuant to a warrant from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles but was not given credit for this time and therefore had to serve the time over again.
3
By June 18, 1999, the date on which he commenced this litigation, Randell was no longer in custody for the term of confinement in dispute and therefore was ineligible for federal habeas relief.[2] He therefore pursued relief in forma pauperis ("IFP") under § 1983, requesting compensatory damages of $1000 for each day he had "served over his sentence." The district court dismissed Randell's § 1983 complaint as frivolous and Randell appealed. We affirm the district court on the grounds that Randell's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
II.
4
Randell points out, pro se, that he is no longer in custody and thus can not file a habeas petition. Randell therefore asserts that he does not need to prove that the underlying proceedings upon which his conviction was based have been terminated in his favor, since he can no longer seek habeas relief. However, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Court unequivocally stated:
5
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
6
Therefore, the Court unequivocally held that unless an authorized tribunal or executive body has overturned or otherwise invalidated the plaintiff's conviction, his claim "is not cognizable under [section] 1983."[3] Because Randell is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
7
Based on dicta from concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), three circuits[4] have concluded that the Supreme Court - if presented with the question - would relax Heck's universal favorable termination requirement for plaintiffs who have no procedural vehicle to challenge their conviction. Randell has not shown that such a procedural vehicle is lacking; he speaks only of inability to obtain habeas relief.
8
In the alternative, we decline to announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.
9
We agree with the First Circuit,[5] which stated:
10
We are mindful that dicta from concurring and dissenting opinions in a recently decided case, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), may cast doubt upon the universality of Heck's "favorable termination" requirement. See id.at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. at 989 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 21-23, 118 S.Ct. at 990 (Ginsberg, J., concurring); id. at n.8, 118 S.Ct. at 992 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, however, has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2017, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). We obey this admonition.
11
Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998).
III.
[*~301]12
For the above reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
NOTES:
1
Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (stating that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.").
3
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).
4
See Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1999); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); and Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999).
5
The Ninth Circuit also follows this course. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).