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G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 ·
…helton fails to state any independent efforts he made to determine whether the relevant limitations period began to run.
at p. 1314
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jon Thomas Wallis v. State of Alabama
equitable tolling can be applied ... when "extraordinary circumstances" have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
White v. Matteson
the 'extraordinary circumstances' standard 21 applied in this circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas 22 petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
(HC) Chavez v. Matteson
the 'extraordinary circumstances' standard applied in this 13 circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, s 14 rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Roy v. Lampert
helton fails to state any independent efforts he made to determine whether the relevant limitations period began to run.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Albert Roy v. Robert O. Lampert, Phillip L. Kephart v. Stan Czerniak, Superintendent, Osp
helton fails to state any independent efforts he made to determine whether the relevant limitations period began to run.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Roy v. Lampert
helton fails to state any independent efforts he made to determine whether the relevant limitations period began to run.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Johnson v. Warden Calhoun State Prison
the 'extraordinary circumstances' standard applied in this circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Clifford Friend v. Ricky Dixon, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reinhardt v. United States
His claim lacks “the necessary specificity to show when he found out about the [prison] library’s alleged deficiency and what—if anything—he did to remedy the defect.” Helton v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
LE BOSS v. DIXON
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See also, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of § 2254 petition as untimely and explaining, among other things, “ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing”); Helton, 259 F.3d at 1313-14 (rejecting petitioner’s equitable tolling argument that he “was prevented from obtaining accurate information due to deficiencies in the prison library where he was being held”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moore v. Oliver
However, “[i]t is well established that attorney error [even assuming that there was error here] is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Wainwright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 537 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); and Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Weber v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Sarasota County)
But the “‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard . . . focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Caraballo-Rodriguez, Ramon A. v. United States
Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling[.] (quoting Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000))); Faircloth v. Raemisch, 692 F. App’x 513, 523 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[The petitioner]’s attorney’s incorrect advice regarding AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not amount to the type of extraordinary circumstances entitling him to equitable tolling.”).4 C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hanfield v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Equitable Tolling is Not Warranted “Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lutgen v. United States
Equitable tolling “‘can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA’s statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances’ have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.’” Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bivens v. Florida Department of Corrections
Equitable Tolling “Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillips v. Ivey
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“Absent such evidence, the connection between the petitioner’s untimely filing and any alleged inadequacies in the library 11 is insufficient.” Id. (citing Helton, 259 F.3d at 1314).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCloud v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)
“Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cook v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)
“Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
JONES v. PERRY
Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (attorney’s reliance on standard mail resulted in a habeas petition being dismissed as untimely because it was filed one day late); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (attorney miscalculated limitations period, resulting in untimely petition); Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (attorney’s erroneous advice to client resulted in untimely petition).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Parra-Reyes v. United States
See Howell Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (Mere “attorney negligence □□□ nota basis for equitable tolling, especially when the movant cannot establish his own diligence.”); see also Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 1999) (movant was not entitled to equitable tolling when his habeas motion was untimely due to his lawyer sending the motion via ordinary mail); Steed, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (movant was not entitled to equitable tolling when his motion was untimely due to counsel miscalculating the filing deadline); Helton v. Sec’y…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grubbs v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Seminole County)
“Equitable tolling may apply ‘when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1252 (11th Cir. 2006)) (citing Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331 , 1333 (11th Cir. 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Howard v. Stewart
Moreover, as a general rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in this circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080 (2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harris v. Stewart
Moreover, as a general rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in this circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Secretary of Dep’t of Corrs., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080 (2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dees v. Gordy
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dees v. Gordy
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11thCir. 2001); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11thCir. 2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Baker v. Bolling
See Cole v. Warden, Georgia State Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to equitable tolling; his supporting allegations must be specific and not conclusory.”); Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Helton’s declaration lacks the necessary specificity to show when he found out about the library's alleged deficiency and what—if anything—he did to remedy the defect.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Kraft v. Stewart
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11thCir. 2001); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11thCir. 2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Patrick v. Thomas
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11thCir. 2001); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11thCir. 2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jesus Aureoles v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sallie v. Chatman
Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wallace v. United States
See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that limitations period was not equitably tolled during period when prisoner was transferred to another facility and did not have access to his papers); Diaz v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 362 F.3d 698 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that lapse of 532 days, 258 days before filing first federal petition and 274 days before filing second federal petition, constitutes lack of due diligence); Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that petitioner’s inaction during the year after his conviction wa…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. United States
Holland v. Florida, — U.S. —, —, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (“[W]e hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.”). 7 See also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 , 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (holding that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing); Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that “[e]quit…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Westmoreland v. Hetzell
It is clear that equitable tolling is available only where “extraordinary circumstances” have prevented the timely filing and the movant has been “otherwise diligent.” Helton v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Alicia Marie Ramos v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dillon v. Conway
As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that while “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline, does not warrant equitable tolling,” id. at 2564 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that “ ‘pure professional negligence’ on the part of a petitioner’s attorney ... can never constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ ” sufficient to justify equitable tolling, id. at 2559 (quoting Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
San Martin v. McNeil
See id. at 1292-93 ; Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (11th Cir.2006); Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. United States
“To show diligence, a petitioner claiming deficiencies in the prison law library” must show “when he found out about the library’s alleged deficiency, must ‘state any independent efforts he made to determine when the relevant limitations period began to run’ and must demonstrate how the prison ‘thwarted his efforts.’ ” Id. at 1253 (citing Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Holland v. Florida
AEDPA’s statutory deadline.’ ” 539 F.3d, at 1338 (quoting Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (CA11 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Holland v. Florida
(2×)
AEDPA’s statutory deadline.’ ” 539 F. 3d, at 1338 (quoting Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 259 F. 3d 1310, 1312 (CA11 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sherwin S. Perkins v. Thomas Ammons
In rare circumstances, “[ejquitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of the AEDPA’s statutory deadline.... ” Hunter v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Stewart v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hunter v. Ferrell
However, “[equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of the AEDPA’s statutory deadline ....” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Griffin v. McNeil
Helton v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McCloud v. Hooks
Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Holland v. State
“Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA’s statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances’ have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Holland v. Florida
"Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when `extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition." Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Downs v. McNeil
Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bell v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation....” 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2). *104 “Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the application of AEDPA’s statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances’ have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Melendez v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
We have held that “an attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling.” Steed v. Head,, 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir.2000); Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.2001).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bernie HARRY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa Normil, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Wayne MARCHANT, M.D., Ali Bazzi, M.D., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
v.
Wayne MARCHANT, M.D., Ali Bazzi, M.D., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
99-13205.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jul 31, 2001.
Peter Loblack, Law Office of Peter Lob-lack, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Miles Ambrose McGrane, McGrane & Nosich, P.A., William G. Edwards, Marlow, Connell, Valerius, Abrams & Adler, Miami, FL, Esther Elisa Galicia, George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer, Vanessa Reynolds, Conrad & Scherer, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Anderson, Tjoflat, Edmondson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus, Wilson.
Published
Citer courts: N.D. Georgia (1)
BY THE COURT:
A member of this court in active service having requested a poll on the suggestion of rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in this court in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the above cause shall be reheard by this court en banc. The previous panel’s opinion is hereby VACATED.