PER CURIAM:1

Angelo Dewell Branch, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit against Dallas County Police Officer T.L. Little and Dallas County Sheriff Jim Bowles. Branch, a Texas prison inmate, sought a declaratory judgment and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was arrested and detained without probable cause. The court granted summary judgment to Little on the basis of qualified immunity and dismissed the suit against Bowles on the basis of limitations.

prejudice. After Branch exhausted his state and federal habeas remedies, the district court reopened his case on February 9, 1993. The court then allowed Branch to file an amended complaint, in which he named Bowles as a defendant.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court's dismissal of a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 de novo. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots' Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1990).

I.

The district court granted summary judgment to Little on the basis of qualified immunity. The court determined that a material issue of fact existed concerning whether Branch consented to his transportation to the police station for further questioning. Nevertheless, the court held that Little was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to make the arrest.

Because Branch alleges the violation of a clearly established constitutional right))the right to be free from arrest without probable cause))we consider whether Little's arrest of Branch was objectively reasonable as measured by the law existing at the time of the arrest. See Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1993). An officer has probable cause to arrest when he knows of reasonably trustworthy information that would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986). We analyze probable cause under the totality of the circumstances, and the officer's belief need not be correct nor more likely true than false. United States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985).

A reasonable officer in Officer Little's shoes could believe that he was justified in arresting Branch. Little knew of the eyewitness's description of the murder suspect, and Branch closely matched that description. Further, Little spotted Branch walking near the site of the murder, and Branch glared at Little when he drove past. We agree with the district court that Officer Little's arrest of Branch was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.3

II.

The district court dismissed Branch's suit against Bowles on account of limitations. Since no federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 actions, we borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990). The applicable period in Texas is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (West 1986). Both parties agree that the cause of action accrued on the day of the arrest. Without tolling, therefore, the limitations period for suit against Bowles expired on October 31, 1989.

3 Because we agree with the district court on the issue of qualified immunity, we need not consider the court's denial of Branch's motion for partial summary judgment.

Branch first argues that the district court's order holding the case in abeyance tolled the limitations period. The district court's order, however, was entered months after the limitations period had expired. Consequently, the district court's order could not toll the limitations period.

Branch also argues that his amended complaint, because he filed it before Little filed his original answer, relates back to the date the complaint was filed. When a party names a new party in an amended complaint, the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading when the named party "knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have brought against the party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B). Branch named Bowles as a new and additional defendant to the suit. Branch has not pointed to any mistake on his part concerning the identity of the proper party. Consequently, his amended complaint does not relate back to his original pleading, so his claims against Bowles are barred by limitations.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's actions are AFFIRMED.