Ghidey Gebrengus Tesfu v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., 322 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2003). · Go Syfert
Ghidey Gebrengus Tesfu v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., 322 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Emil Mekhtiev v. Eric Holder, Jr. (ca7, 2009-03-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emil Mekhtiev v. Eric Holder, Jr.
7th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
We have recognized that persecution “means more than plain harass- ment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, ar- rest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’ ” Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mekhtiev v. Holder
7th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
We have recognized that persecution “means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’ ” Tesfu *730 v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Date A. Ahodikpe v. Michael B. Mukasey
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 525, 535 (7th Cir. 2007); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ahodikpe v. Mukasey
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 525, 535 (7th Cir.2007); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Khan, Muhammad S. v. Mukasey, Michael B.
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A); INS v. Elias‐Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Khan v. Mukasey
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 , 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Alvarez-Guardia, How v. Mukasey, Michael B.
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Guardia v. Mukasey
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Haxhiu v. Mukasey
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Haxhiu, Shkelqim v. Mukasey, Michael B.
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dzelili, Adil v. Gonzales, Alberto
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Natasa Djedovic v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
All Slakovic faced was military conscription, which is not a form of persecution, see Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.2003); Mojsilovic v. INS, 156 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir.1998), and comments by other soldiers not directed against him personally.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Djedovic, Natasa v. Gonzales, Alberto
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
All Slakoviƒ faced was military conscription, which is not No. 05-1754 3 a form of persecution, see Tesafu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 2003); Mojsilovic v. INS, 156 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 1998), and comments by other soldiers not directed against him personally.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Selemawit F. Giday v. Alberto R. Gonzales
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Although it might be true that sovereign governments do not engage in persecution when they draft citizens in order to raise armies or when they punish citizens for avoiding conscription (See Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.2003)), they are not given a free pass to torture and kill citizens as a form of such punishment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giday, Selemawit v. Gonzales, Alberto R.
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Although it might be true that sovereign governments do not engage in persecution when they draft citizens in order to raise armies or when they punish citizens for avoiding conscrip- tion (See Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 2003)), they are not given a free pass to torture and kill citizens as a form of such punishment.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Li, Xi L. v. Gonzales, Alberto R.
7th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Liu, Mei D. v. Ashcroft, John
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mei Dan Liu v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 *313 U.S. 421, 430-31, 107 S.Ct. 1207 , 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shengherghi v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yetunde Balogun v. John D. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
The Agency does not dispute, at least with any force, that the type of FGM which Ms. Balogun has alleged is “persecution.” 8 See Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 480-81 (7th Cir.2003) (defining “persecution”); see also In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 , 1996 WL 379826 (BIA 1996) (en banc) (holding that FGM may constitute “persecution”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cobb v. Pozzi
2d Cir. · 2004 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Stefanoff v. Hays County, Texas, 154 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir.1998) (finding that a policy was not objectively reasonable after determining that the policy was not rational for equal protection purposes); cf. also Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that, in the context of asylum determinations, a fear of persecution must be "objectively reasonable" and therefore may not be "irrational"); Perinpanathan v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 594, 597-98 (8th Cir. 2002) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Singh v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 , 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Khachaturyan v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Although “persecution” is not statutorily defined, we have said it “means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’ ” Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Niam, Nourain B. v. Ashcroft, John
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nourain B. Niam, and Peter Blagoev, Iordanka Kissiova, and Iana Kissiova v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States
7th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 , 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984); Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doris C. Oforji v. John D. Ashcroft, United States Attorney General (2×)
7th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Although “persecution” is not statutorily defined, we have said that it “means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’” Te sfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oforji, Doris C. v. Ashcroft, John
7th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Although “persecution” is not statutorily defined, we have said that it “means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, arrest, interroga- tion, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confisca- No. 02-3861 5 tion of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’ ” Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cobb v. Pozzi
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Stefanoff v. Hays County, Texas, 154 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir.1998) (finding that a policy was not objectively reasonable after determining that the policy was not rational for equal protection purposes); cf. also Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that, in the context of asylum determinations, a fear of persecution must be “objectively reasonable” and therefore may not be “irrational”); Perinpanathan v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 594, 597-98 (8th Cir.2002) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M. Ramirez-Barrios v. John Ashcroft
8th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
To the extent army officials attempted to draft Ramirez-Barrios between 1987 and 1989, he was not persecuted based upon a protected characteristic, see Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.2003), and the two threats he received after expressing his opposition to the army were discrete incidents that did not result in detention, injury, or harm, cf. Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.1997) (isolated acts of violence do not establish well-founded fear of persecution).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Malki v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Although “persecution” is not statutorily defined, we have said that it “means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as ‘detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’ ” Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1995)).
discussed Cited "see" Balogun, Yetunde v. Ashcroft, John
7th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (a). 12 No. 02-4248 The Agency does not dispute, at least with any force, that the type of FGM which Ms. Balogun has alleged is “perse- cution.”8 See Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (defining “persecution”); see also In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 , 1996 WL 379826 (BIA 1996) (en banc) (holding that FGM may constitute “persecution”).
cited Cited "see" Torres-Tejada v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 , 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984); see Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567 , 575 n. 7 (7th Cir.2003).
cited Cited "see" Singh v. Ashcroft
7th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yacouba Berte v. John Ashcroft
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Zakirov v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that “persecution means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yacouba Berte v. John Ashcroft
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Zakirov v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir.2004); see also Tesfu v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that “persecution means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ghidey Gebrengus TESFU, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent-Appellee
02-2333.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Mar 14, 2003.
322 F.3d 477
Godfrey Y. Muwonge (submitted), Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner., George P. Katsivalis (submitted), INS, Chicago, IL, for Respondent INS., Paul Fiorino (submitted), DOJ, Civ. Div., Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent John D. Ashcroft.
Flaum, Manton, Williams.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
FLAUM, Chief Judge.

Petitioner Ghidey Gebrengus Tesfu seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her petitions for asylum and withholding of deportation and ordering her removal from the United States to Eritrea, where she is a citizen. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Tesfu’s claims of religious discrimination in Eritrea based on her Jehovah’s Witness beliefs did not amount to past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and thus found that she did not qualify for either asylum or withholding of deportation. The BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ, and for the following reasons we affirm the BIA’s order.

I. Background

Ghidey Tesfu was born in Ethiopia in 1952 and is a citizen of Eritrea. She entered the United States in March 1998 on a valid visitor’s visa and has remained here since. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) issued her a Notice to Appear in January 1999, charging her under § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), with overstaying her visa. Tesfu conceded deportability at her initial appearance and now seeks asylum under INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, and withholding of deportation under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), due to a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted for her religious beliefs if forced to return to Eritrea. [1]

Tesfu bases her asylum and withholding of deportation claims on her fear that she will be persecuted in Eritrea for resisting military service on account of her religious beliefs. As a Jehovah’s Witness Tesfu cannot participate in active military service or government politics without violating a fundamental tenet of her faith. Although Tesfu has never been arrested, interrogated, imprisoned, tortured, or forcibly conscripted, she testified before the IJ that members of her immediate family had been persecuted in the past by the Eritrean government for being Jehovah’s Witnesses. Specifically, three of her sons had been arrested and jailed for resisting conscription, and her husband had been fired from his job as an accountant and subsequently arrested and jailed. Tesfu also presented as evidence before the IJ the State Department’s 1996 country report on Eritrea, which confirmed her claims that Jehovah’s Witnesses faced various forms of discrimination by the Eritrean government.

The IJ credited Tesfu’s testimony but found that her claims of persecution, both past and future, were insufficient to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal. In particular, the IJ found that Tesfu had suffered no incidents of past persecution and that her fear of future persecution was based almost entirely on her fear that she would be conscripted into military service if deported to Eritrea. Tesfu testified at[*480] the hearing that, although the State Department report indicated that women between the ages of 18 and 40 are eligible for military service in Eritrea, the maximum age had lately risen to 50 because Eritrea needs more of its citizens in active service to fight its war with Ethiopia. The IJ found this contention incredible because it was not corroborated by any other evidence; he also noted that even when Tesfu was younger she had never been recruited for military service while living in Eritrea. The IJ further reasoned that the 1999 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea promised a reduction, not an escalation, in armed conflict in the region. Given this evidence the IJ determined that Tesfu’s fear of conscription was unlikely, and therefore her fear of persecution was unreasonable.

In making his decision to deny Tesfu asylum and withholding of deportation, the IJ took into account, from Tesfu’s own testimony and the State Department’s report, the various forms of discrimination suffered by Jehovah’s Witnesses under the Eritrean government, such as dismissals from civil service, revocation of trading licenses, and denials of passports, government housing, and identification cards. The IJ then concluded that this discrimination, without more evidence that the Eritrean government maliciously mistreated Tesfu or other Jehovah’s Witnesses, did not rise to the level of systematic, state-sponsored persecution or torture that the INA requires a petitioner for asylum or withholding of deportation to establish.

Tesfu argued to the BIA on appeal that the IJ had applied the incorrect legal standards to her claims and had erred in evaluating her evidence of religious persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding no error in either the IJ’s legal analysis or his factual determinations. In particular, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Tesfu was unlikely to suffer forced military conscription because she is past the official draft age as reported by the State Department. Moreover, the BIA noted that even if Tes-fu was drafted and subsequently jailed for resisting military service, such incarceration would not by itself constitute persecution or torture for the purpose of granting asylum or withholding of deportation. See Nenadovic v. INS, 108 F.3d 124, 127 (7th Cir.1997).

II. ANALYSIS

We review the BIA’s decision to deny petitions for asylum and withholding of deportation for substantial evidence, Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir.2000), and we must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Useinovic v. INS, 313 F.3d 1025, 1029 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Karapetian v. INS, 162 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir.1998)). Only where the evidence in support of the application is “so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution” will we reverse the Board’s decision for lack of evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to any alien who qualifies as a “refugee.” INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir.2002). A “refugee” is defined as a person outside her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail herself of the protection of, her country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Though “persecution” is not statutorily defined, we have[*481] repeatedly described it as “punishment or the infliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate.” Begzatowski v. INS, 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir.2002). We have also said that persecution means more than plain harassment and may arise from actions such as “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.” Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1995).

To qualify as a refugee, the asylum applicant must establish by either of two ways that she possesses a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of the statutorily protected categories. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir.2002); see also Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir.1997). First, she may prove that she endured past persecution in her native country. See Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 601. If the applicant establishes past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution .and therefore should be granted asylum. See Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir.1998). Second, the asylum applicant may present evidence showing that she will endure future persecution if returned to her country of origin. See Marquez, 105 F.3d at 379. In either case the applicant must also show that her fear is “well-founded,” which means both genuine and objectively reasonable. Mitev, 67 F.3d at 1331. Fear of persecution without a valid justification is irrational and therefore insufficient to form the basis of an asylum claim. See Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir.1999).

Under § 241(b)(3)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), the Attorney General is required to withhold an alien’s deportation if her “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of her “race, religion nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Compared to asylum, the criteria for withholding of deportation are more stringent: the applicant must show not only a well-founded fear, but a “clear probability” of persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). This means the applicant must prove “that it is more likely than not that ... she will be subjected to persecution upon deportation.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). It follows that an asylum applicant who has not established a “well-founded fear” of persecution necessarily has not shown that she faces a “clear probability” of persecution such that she is entitled to withholding of deportation. See Toptchev, 295 F.3d at 720.

Since Tesfu seeks asylum due to a well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show both a subjective and an objective fear of persecution by the Eritrean government on account of her status' as a Jehovah’s Witness. See, e.g., Mousa v. INS, 223 F.3d 425, 429-30 (7th Cir.2000). As noted above, in the context of asylum petitions we have defined persecution as “punishment” or “infliction of harm” for political, religious, or other illegitimate reasons “that rises above the level of mere harassment.” Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir.2000). Despite evidence that Jehovah’s Witnesses are targeted for discrimination and treated rather badly in Eritrea, the evidence in the record is not so compelling that we must find Tesfu holds a reasonable fear of persecution upon her return. Tesfu testified that her three sons suffered mistreatment for resisting military service due to their Jehovah’s Witness beliefs and that her husband lost his job and was subsequently arrested and jailed for being a Jehovah’s[*482] Witness. Tesfu admitted that she personally never suffered any mistreatment due to being a Jehovah’s Witness, although she claims to fear forced military conscription and possible punishment for resisting conscription if she is deported to Eritrea.

The law is well-settled that sovereign governments do not engage in persecution either when they draft citizens in order to raise armies or when they punish citizens for avoiding conscription. Mojsilovic v. INS, 156 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir.1998). That Tesfu’s desire to avoid serving in her country’s military on the basis of her religious beliefs might subject her to punishment is not the same as if Eritrea sought to draft only Jehovah’s Witnesses or to punish only Jehovah’s Witnesses for resisting conscription. Moreover, the only evidence in the record to suggest that Eritrea drafts 50-year old women is Tesfu’s own uncoiToborated testimony which failed to persuade the IJ and BIA. But even if we assume she is correct, Tesfu was born on March 15, 1952, and will be past the age of conscription upon her return to Eritrea.

III. Conclusion

We find that Tesfu has not established a well-founded fear of religious persecution in Eritrea due to her Jehovah’s Witness beliefs, and we therefore Affirm the BIA’s final order denying her asylum and withholding of deportation.

1

. Tesfu also asked for voluntary departure, but she is statutorily ineligible because she had not been in the United States for longer than one year when she received the Notice to Appear. INA § 240B(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)( 1)(A).