green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
26.0 score
“a state ground is independent only if it is not interwoven with federal 16 law.”
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004
2015
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Blackgold v. Madden
a state ground is independent only if it is not interwoven with federal 16 law.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lux v. Fhuere
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of habeas claims on the ground that they “are procedurally barred by an independent and adequate state ground.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tsetse v. Neuschmid
See Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802 , 1803-04 5 (2016) (Dixon); Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (Lindley). 6 The California Supreme Court’s citations to Dixon and Lindley would ordinarily bar 7 federal habeas review of petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct and actual innocence claims, but 8 petitioner argues — and respondent does not dispute — that two exceptions to the federal 9 procedural default rule apply.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Domenico G Diaz v. Dean Borders
Carter v. Giurbino, 5 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 The order appears ambiguous because the California Supreme Court did not state 7 which citation applied to which claim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniel v. Neuschmid
Carter v. 23 Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Knight v. Diaz
Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Churich v. Hatton
Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jarvell Smart v. A. Hedgpeth
Because California procedural rules would now bar consideration of this new sufficiency of the evidence claim, see Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal.2d *804 709, 177 P.2d 918, 926-27 (1947)), the claim is technically exhausted but deemed procedurally defaulted, Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 558 , 181 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ross v. Felker
“A state ground is independent and adequate only if the last state court to which the petitioner presented the claim ‘actually relied’ on a state rule that was sufficient to justify the decision.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1190 , 125 S.Ct. 1406 , 161 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005); Koemer v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
King v. Giurbino
“A state ground is independent and adequate only if the last state court to which the petitioner presented the claim ‘actually relied’ on a state rule that was sufficient to justify the decision.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.2004), ce rt. denied, 543 U.S. 1190 , 125 S.Ct. 1406 , 161 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Flores v. Hickman
“A state ground is independent and adequate only if the last state court to which the petitioner presented the claim ‘actually relied’ on a state rule that was sufficient to justify -the decision.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1190 , 125 S.Ct. 1406 , 161 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bennett v. Mueller
Therefore, in essence, Respondent’s assertion of the affirmative defense raises a rebuttable presumption that the procedural bar was “adequate.” See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2004) (state “met its burden” where petitioner did not argue or come forward with any evidence that procedural bar was not firmly established and regularly applied).
cited
Cited "see"
De'Anthony Tyquan Govan v. Fidencio N. Guzman
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
cited
Cited "see"
Kevin Bartholomew v. J. Haviland
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir.2004).
discussed
Cited "see"
Clarence Warren v. Derral Adams
(2×)
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.2004).
discussed
Cited "see"
James Dixie v. Robert Horel
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-1197 (9th Cir.2004); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 , 111 S.Ct. 2590 , 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Boyd v. Waymart
(2×)
See *370 Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2004) (California's bar against relitigation in state habeas proceedings of claims already litigated on direct appeal is "neither a ruling of procedural default nor a ruling on the merits"); see also Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411 , 415 n. 1 (4th Cir.2003) (although North Carolina's bar against relitigation of issues decided on appeal was an adequate and independent state procedural rule, it was "not a state procedural bar that prevents federal habeas review"). [31] Even apart from § 9544(a)'s "adequacy" or "independence," it is clear that …
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Harchar
See Dawson v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Dawson), 367 F.3d 1174 (hereinafter, “Dawson I ”) (“We hold that ‘actual damages’ under § 362(h) do not include damages for emotional distress.”), opinion withdrawn, 385 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir.2004).
discussed
Cited "see"
Quintero v. Stewart
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding independence of procedural default because state courts “reject sufficiency of the evidence claims as non-eognizable habeas claims ... solely as a matter of state law”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kaua v. Frank
See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir.2004). 4 .Before the amendments became effective on July 1, 2003, Rule 40(a)(3) provided that an issue was waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted, or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this rule, and the petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Babb v. Bullock
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 , 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); see also Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that the petitioner had “failed to come forward with specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Alley v. Carey
See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir.1997) (defining adequacy, and noting that a rule is not rendered inadequate simply because the application of the rule requires the exercise of judicial discretion); see also Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.2004) (defining independence).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re George E. Dawson and Barbara J. Dawson, Debtors. George Dawson and Barbara J. Dawson
v.
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., Successor to Great Western Bank
v.
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., Successor to Great Western Bank
02-16903.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 4, 2004.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: S.D. California (1)
In re George E. DAWSON and Barbara J. Dawson, Debtors.
George Dawson and Barbara J. Dawson, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., successor to Great Western Bank, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-16903.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed October 4, 2004.
[*~1194]1
A. Charles Dell'Ario, Esq., Law Offices of A. Charles Dell'Ario, APC, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
2
William G. Malcolm, Esq., Malcolm & Cisneros, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
[*~1198]4
The opinion filed on May 18, 2004, and appearing at 367 F.3d 1174, is WITHDRAWN. It may not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit.
Notes:
*
The Honorable Charles R. Weiner, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation