United States v. Zarrar Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 2006). · Go Syfert
United States v. Zarrar Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Marte Robles (ca2, 2009-04-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Marte Robles
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 2006) (where judge enhanced defendant’s sentence based on a finding that defendant’s fraud “crimes resulted in a loss of more than $400,000 but not more than $1,000,000” there was no constitutional violation because “although 9 the indictment did not allege a specific loss amount . . . that fact did not enhance the maximum sentence to which [the defendant] was exposed”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robles
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906 (2d Cir.2006) (where judge enhanced defendant’s sentence based on a finding that defendant’s fraud “crimes resulted in a loss of more than $400,000 but not more than $1,000,000” there was no constitutional violation because “although the indictment did not allege a specific loss amount ... that fact did not enhance the maximum sentence to which [the defendant] was exposed”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Deandrade
S.D.N.Y. · 2008 · confidence medium
Although the use of the adjudication triggers the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence, it does not change the statutory maximum sentence to which Deandrade is subject. *3 “So long as the facts found by the district court do not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized by the verdict or trigger a mandatory minimum sentence not authorized by the verdict that simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum, the district court does not violate a defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights by imposing a sentence based on facts not alleged in the indictment.” United States v.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Johnson
2d Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
District courts may sentence defendants based on facts “not alleged in the indictment, as long as those facts do not increase the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum sentence or trigger a mandatory minimum sentence that simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum, without violating the Fifth or the Sixth Amendment,” United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 905-06 (2d Cir.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Elliot
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
But district courts may find facts for the purposes of calculating Guideline sentences without running afoul of the Fifth or Sixth Amendment “as long as those facts do not increase the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum sentence or trigger a mandatory minimum sentence that simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum.” U.S. v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 905-06 (2d Cir.2006).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Olmeda
2d Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 2006).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Perez-Morales
2d Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 905-06 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir.2005).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Adu-Ansere Kwame Okai
8th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906-07 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir.2006); see, e.g., United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811-12 (8th Cir.2006) (stating that sentencing facts which do not increase the defendant’s sentence above the maximum may be properly considered by the sentencing court).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Adu-Ansere Okai
8th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906-07 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811-12 (8th Cir. 2006) -3- (stating that sentencing facts which do not increase the defendant’s sentence above the maximum may be properly considered by the sentencing court) .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Edwards
2d Cir. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir.2006); see also United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that a district court may impose a sentence base on facts not alleged in the indictment provided that the fact-finding does not affect the maximum sentence authorized by statute).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Zarrar SHEIKH, Defendant-Appellant
Docket 05-1747-CR.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 13, 2006.
433 F.3d 905
Roberto Finzi (Michael Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Peter G. Neiman, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), New York, NY, for Appellee., Bruno C. Bier, Bajaj & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Meskill, Sotomayor, Kaplan.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Zarrar Sheikh appeals from a judgment entered on March 26, 2005 in the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones, J.) sentencing him principally to a 46-month concurrent sentence, following his plea of guilty without a plea agreement, on three counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The 46-month concurrent sentence on each count is below the statutory maximum for each offense of conviction. In a concurrently filed summary order, we address Sheikh’s challenge to the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) as based on facts that were not proved to a jury or admitted by him in his guilty plea. Here, we reject Sheikh’s remaining contention 'and hold that, after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), district courts may continue to calculate Guidelines sentences and sentence defendants based on facts not alleged in the indictment, as long as those facts do not increase the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum[*906] sentence or trigger a mandatory minimum sentence that simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum, without violating the Fifth or the Sixth Amendment.

BACKGROUND

The indictment in this case charged Sheikh with conspiring to commit securities fraud and mail fraud, and with committing mail fraud, in connection with Opulentica, LLC, a company run by Sheikh that purported to buy and sell stocks on behalf of its investors. The indictment alleged, inter alia, that Sheikh “raised at least approximately $538,000 from approximately 20 investors” in connection with false and misleading statements he made to potential investors about Opulentica. The indictment, however, did not allege a specific loss amount attributable to Sheikh’s conduct.

The district court sentenced Sheikh under advisory Guidelines after the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The district judge adopted the government’s Guidelines calculation, which included a 14-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(1)(H) because Sheikh’s crimes resulted in a loss of more than $400,000 but not more than $1,000,000, stating that she “believe[d] that the guideline sentence is a reasonable sentence.”

DISCUSSION

Sheikh argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that district courts may only sentence defendants based on facts alleged in the indictment. He contends that the district court violated his constitutional rights by enhancing his sentence on the basis of a fact — the loss amount — not alleged in the indictment. We disagree.

The Supreme Court has held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In federal prosecutions, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, such facts must be charged also in the indictment. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), where it considered “whether the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justifies a court of appeals’ vacating the enhanced sentence,” id. at 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781, is inapposite to the resolution of Sheikh’s claim. Here, although the indictment did not allege a specific loss amount attributable to Sheikh’s conduct, that fact did not enhance the maximum sentence to which Sheikh was exposed under either § 371, which provides a statutory sentencing range of 0 to 5 years, or § 1341, which provides a statutory sentencing range of 0 to 20 years. The Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months considered by the district court, and the 46-month concurrent sentence the court imposed, were below the statutory maxima for Sheikh’s offenses of conviction. So long as the facts found by the district court do not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized by the verdict or trigger a mandatory minimum sentence not authorized by the verdict that simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum, the district court does not violate a defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights by imposing a sentence based on facts not alleged in the indictment. Thus, in the instant case, the district court did not violate Sheikh’s constitutional[*907] rights by imposing a sentence based on a loss amount not alleged in the indictment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the summary order previously filed, we Affirm the judgment of the district court.