Defendant-Appellant Oscar Flores Hernandez appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Hernandez contends that the district court erred in categorizing his prior conviction for first degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. ANN. § 609.342(1)(e)(i) as a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

We AFFIRM.

The Minnesota judgment identifies the statute of conviction as Minn.Stat. Ann. § 609.342(l)(e), and the charging instrument specifies the offense as a violation of[*939] § 609.342(1)(e)(i). See United States v. Carbajal-Diaz, 508 F.3d 804, 807-10 (5th Cir.2007). Section 609.342(1)(e)(i) reads:

A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person ... is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if any of the following circumstances exists:

(...)

(e) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and either of the following circumstances exist:

(i) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration....

Minn.Stat. Ann. § 609.342(1)(e) (West 1995). ^[1] The Guidelines’ notes for § 2L1.2 enumerate types of offense that count as “crime[s] of violence.” ^[2] “[E]ven if an enumerated offense does not include an element of force, it remains a crime of violence precisely because it is enumerated.” United States v. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d

324, 327 (5th Cir.2006). Among the enumerated offenses are “forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced)....” ^[3] Because that language encompasses every realistic way one could violate § 609.342(1)(e)(i), we hold that a § 609.342(1)(e)(i) offense is a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Hernandez-Galvan, 632 F.3d 192, 196-97 (5th Cir.2011).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.