Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2007). · Go Syfert
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
119 citation events (119 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Texas Health Harris Methodist Hospital Fort Worth v. Stephen Featherly (txctapp2, 2025-12-23) · Strongest negative: In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co.
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 46 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co.
unknown court · 2018 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter , 226 S.W.3d 409 , 411 (Tex. 2007) (stating that "[t]he lien amount cannot be more than 'a reasonable and regular rate' " (quoting § 55.004(d)(1) ) ); Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Texas Health Harris Methodist Hospital Fort Worth v. Stephen Featherly (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
txctapp2 · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a lien is part and parcel of the underlying claim, the former existing only because of the latter.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) CL III Funding Holding Company, LLC v. Steelhead Midstream Partners, LLC Strategic Energy Income Fund III, LP Eagleridge Energy II, LLC And Eagleridge Midstream, LLC
Tex. App. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a lien is part and parcel of the underlying claim, the former existing only because of the latter.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Texas Health Harris Methodist Hospital Fort Worth v. Stephen Featherly (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
once the lien is filed, a tortfeasor cannot obtain a release by judgment or settlement unless the hospital's charges are paid in full.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Regina Nachael Howell Foster v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2005-HE1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HE 1
Tex. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
To that end, she quotes Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter, stating that “a lien against such property is necessarily a claim against its owner.” 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in Re Fraudulent Hospital Lien Litigation
Tex. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
See McAllen Hosps., L.P., 433 S.W.3d at 537 ; Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007); Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karen Sanders, Theodore Chase, Keven Pever, Hassan Gebara, Lindsey Villanueva, Tamisha Shelton, Kenneth Williams, Timisha Kimble and Rosemary Ejiofor v. Kanti Bansal D/B/A Signaturecare Emergency Center, Round Table Physicians Group, PLLC and Chyna Corallino and Lisa Snyder
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Because a hospital has “neither tort nor contract rights against a tortfeasor who has injured a patient, the only support for a hospital lien is its claim for reimbursement from the patient.” Norvil, 580 S.W.3d at 286 (quoting Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosemary Ejiofor as Next Friend of Destiny Ejiofor v. Kanti Bansal D/B/A Signaturecare Emergency Center, Round Table Physicians Group, PLLC and Chyna Corallino
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Because a hospital has “neither tort nor contract rights against a tortfeasor who has injured a patient, the only support for a hospital lien is its claim for reimbursement from the patient.” Norvil, 580 S.W.3d at 286 (quoting Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) North Cypress Medical Operating Company GP, LLC and North Cypress Medical Center Operating Company, Ltd. v. Angeline Norvil
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Keantae Berry v. ETX Successor Tyler, F/K/A East Texas Medical Center (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ETX Successor Tyler F/K/A East Texas Medical Center v. Terrie Pridgeon (As Guardian of the Person and the Estate of Jason C. Dubose) (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Precision Roofing Inc. v. David Zavelson and Tracy Zavelson
Tex. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Precision argues that there must be a way for derivative claimants to hold the owners personally liable for the retainage, or the failure to retain, because Subchapter E (Sections 53.103 and .105) only creates a lien on the owner’s property rather than making the owners “personally liable.” However, “[a] lien is part and parcel of the underlying claim, the former existing only because of the latter.” Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Jerry Perez D/B/A Lighthouse Investments
Tex. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
For another, a “lien is part and parcel of the underlying claim, the former existing only because of the latter.” Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) East Texas Medical Center Athens v. Esther Hernandez (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Workforce Commission
Tex. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Tex Gov’t Code § 311.026(b)); Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (holding that although the Property Code grants hospitals a lien to secure their fees, the more specific provision in the Labor Code restricts hospital liens involving workers compensation patients to amounts due under the worker’s compensation system).
examined Cited as authority (rule) McALLEN HOSPITALS, L. P., D/B/A McALLEN MEDICAL CENTER v. Arturo Gomez (3×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In fact, a hospital lien is “a claim against the patient as if it were filed against the patient’s house, car, or bank account.” Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Judith M. Henderson v. Timothy Wayne Spann & Amanda Spann (2×)
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
The Texas Supreme Court explains that it, too, had previously held as such in Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex.2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Tex. Att'y Gen. · 2011 · confidence medium
Because the United States Supreme Court has said that governmental bodies may not bring defamation lawsuits, the governmental body's employee may not attempt to circumvent that prohibition by bringing a personal lawsuit with funding from the governmental body because doing so would necessarily be limited to the employee's personal interests.' The district's use of its resources to advance an employee's personal interests fails the test for financial support or reimbursement articulated in Attorney General Opinion GA-0104 (2003).4 Thus, we conclude that an independent school district may not de…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Aaron Glenn Haygood v. Margarita Garza De Escabedo (6×)
Tex. · 2011 · confidence medium
Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Tex.2007) (citing Nation, supra note 15, at 104 ("[A] hospital’s 'regular rates,’ 'full charges,' or 'list prices’ ... are generally at least double and may be up to eight times what the hospital would accept as payment in full for the same services from Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, or private insurers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Memorial Hermann Hospital System v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co.
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1985), quoted in Daughters of Chanty Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007); Members Mut.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Memorial Hermann Hospital System v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Sys. , 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1985), quoted in Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linndstaedter , 226 S.W. 3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007); Members Mut.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Samuel T. Jackson v. State
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See id. § 311.026 (West 2005); State Farm Lloyds v. Geeslin , 267 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, no pet.) (citing Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter , 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Department of State Health Services and David L. Lakey, M.D., Commissioner v. Nancy Holmes, CLHRP, CME
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See id. § 311.026 (West 2005); State Farm Lloyds v. Geeslin, 267 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (citing Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See id. § 311.026 (West 2005); State Farm Lloyds v. Geeslin, 267 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex.App.Austin 2008, no pet.) (citing Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Limistaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gailia Tate v. Miguel Hernandez
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In discussing the extent to which a hospital could file a lien against its patient’s tort chose in action, the Court said, “[w]e agree that a recovery of medical expenses in [the full undiscounted amount] would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for these amounts against the patients, they in turn had no claim for them against [the wrongdoer].” Id. at 412.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matbon, Inc. v. Gries
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
As noted recently by the supreme court, “Few patients today ever pay a hospital’s full charges, due to the prevalence of Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, and private insurers who pay discounted rates.” Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Tex.2007) (citing George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 Ky. L.J. 101 ,104 (2005-06), for the proposition that hospital charges labeled as “ ‘regular,’ ‘full,’ or ‘list,’ are misleading, because in fact they are actually paid …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Irving Holdings, Inc. v. Brown (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In Daughters of Charity Health Seruices of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex.2007), a hospital provided medical care for a patient covered by workers’ compensation insurance and was paid the amount due to it from the carrier under the (discounted) reimbursement guidelines mandated by the Texas Labor Code.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC and Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities, Texas Industrial Energy Consumers, the State of Texas and Occidental Power Marketing, L.P.
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
As for PURA section 36.061(b)(2), TIEC argues that “[t]hese two provisions can be easily reconciled.” Specifically, it urges that “[t]he general language of PURA § 36.061(b) allows CenterPoint to recover the expenses associated with its participation in the true-up proceeding from ratepayers,” while “[t]he specific language of PURA § 39.262(h) . . . excludes the costs associated with the control premium valuation panel from that recovery,” such that the former “cannot reach so far as to allow recovery of the valuation panel’s fee because that amount is specifically governed b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC and Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities, Texas Industrial Energy Consumers, the State of Texas and Occidental Power Marketing, L.P.
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
As for PURA section 36.061(b)(2), TIEC argues that "[t]hese two provisions can be easily reconciled." Specifically, it urges that "[t]he general language of PURA § 36.061(b) allows CenterPoint to recover the expenses associated with its participation in the true-up proceeding from ratepayers," while "[t]he specific language of PURA § 39.262(h) . . . excludes the costs associated with the control premium valuation panel from that recovery," such that the former "cannot reach so far as to allow recovery of the valuation panel's fee because that amount is specifically governed by PURA § 39.262…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC v. Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
As for PURA section 36.061(b)(2), TIEC argues that “[t]hese two provisions can be easily reconciled.” Specifically, it urges that “[t]he general language of PURA § 36.061(b) allows CenterPoint to recover the expenses associated with its participation in the true-up proceeding from ratepayers,” while “[t]he specific language of PURA § 39.262(h) ... excludes the costs associated with the control premium valuation panel from that recovery,” such that the former “cannot reach so far as to allow recovery of the valuation panel’s fee because that amount is specifically governed by …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ledbetter
Tex. · 2008 · confidence medium
Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex.2007) (stating that "Texas workers' compensation law specifically embraces an insurer’s first-money right of subrogation”); Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex.2007) ("If a worker obtains a tort recovery, the compensation carrier is reimbursed first....”); Argonaut Ins.
examined Cited "see" Rio Grande Regional Hospital, Inc., HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., and Resource Corporation of America & Recovery of Texas, LLC v. Esther Akindayomi (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco, 226 S.W.3d at 411 . 11 The lien notices merely state that the Hospital seeks “the reasonable value” of its “services which were rendered necessary.” And although the account numbers appear on the lien notices, the Patients’ bills are not mentioned or incorporated by reference, and there is no evidence that the bills were attached to the lien notices.
discussed Cited "see" In re M & O Homebuilders, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (observing that lien against property “is necessarily a claim against its owner”); McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Gomez, No. 13-12-00421-CV, 2013 WL 784688 -, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that hospital lien is claim against patient).
cited Cited "see" McAllen Hospitals, L.P. D/B/A McAllen Medical Center v. State Farm County Mutual Insurance Company of Texas
Tex. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007).
discussed Cited "see" Garcia v. Gomez (2×)
Tex. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex.2007) (indicating that the Court favored a theory of jurisprudence that avoided a "windfall" to the injured party).
cited Cited "see" Larry Dean Speegle v. Harris Methodist Health System and Harris Methodist Fort Worth
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
Code Ann. § 55.002 (a) (Vernon 2007); see Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007).
cited Cited "see" Larry Dean Speegle v. Harris Methodist Health System and Harris Methodist Fort Worth
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 55.002(a) (Vernon 2007); see Daughters of Charity Health Setvs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007).
discussed Cited "see" State Farm Lloyds v. Geeslin
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception to more general one); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005) (if a specific and general provision cannot be harmonized, the “special ... provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail”).
discussed Cited "see" State Farm Lloyds v. Mike Geeslin (Successor to Jose' Montemayor) in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Insurance and Texas Department of Insurance
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaeder, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception to more general one); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005) (if a specific and general provision cannot be harmonized, the “special . . . provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail”).
discussed Cited "see" State Farm Lloyds v. Mike Geeslin (Successor to Jose' Montemayor) in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Insurance and Texas Department of Insurance
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaeder , 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception to more general one); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005) (if a specific and general provision cannot be harmonized, the "special . . . provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail").
discussed Cited "see" Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen (2×)
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception to more general one); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005)(if specific and general provision cannot be harmonized, the "special . . . provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail").
discussed Cited "see" Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen, Stone Street Capital, Inc. and Cletius L. Irvan
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter , 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception to more general one); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005) (if specific and general provision cannot be harmonized, the "special . . . provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail").
discussed Cited "see" Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen, Stone Street Capital, Inc. and Cletius L. Irvan
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (giving both statutes effect by treating more specific one as limited exception 8 Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Perez v. Boecken
W.D. Tex. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1985)); see also Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (noting that the amount of a hospital lien may not exceed “a reasonable and regular rate”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." in Re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co., Ltd.
Tex. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1985); see also Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (noting that the amount of a hospital lien may not exceed “a reasonable and regular rate”).3 North Cypress challenges the trial court’s order requiring production of (1) its contracts with private insurers regarding the negotiated reimbursement rates it accepts from those insurers for the services provided to Roberts, (2) the reimbursement rates for those services from Medicare 3 Notwithstanding these statements in Bashara and Linnstaedter, amici curiae Chri…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michael W. Schuetz and Jamie K. Schuetz v. Source One Mortgage Services Corporation Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Citimortgage, Inc. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engle Robert Ferguson, and Barbara Ferguson
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
As such, attorneys acquire mortgage loans. 24 , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7506 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014). 25 See Duty v. Graham, 12 Tex. 427, 434 (Tex. 1854) (“The assignment of the interest of the mortgagee in the land, without an assignment of the debt, is considered to be without meaning or use.”); see also Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409 , 411 n.10 (Tex. 2007) (lien is incident to debt); University Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Texas Lumber, 423 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex. 1967) (assignment is a nullity); West v. First Baptist Church, 71 S.W.2d 1090, 1098-11…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY HEALTH SERVICES OF WACO, a Texas Corporation D/B/A Providence Health Center, Petitioner,
v.
Donald LINNSTAEDTER and Kenneth Bolen, Respondents
05-0108.
Texas Supreme Court.
Jun 1, 2007.
226 S.W.3d 409
Andy McSwain, Colin H. O’Neill, Daniel Nesbitt MacLemore IV, Fulbright Winni-ford, P.C., Waco, for Petitioner., Rod S. Squires, Derek Tod Gilliland, Fadra L. Day, Williams Squires Wren Brown & Gilliland, L.L.P., Waco, for Respondents., Thomas B. Hudson Jr., P.M. Sehenkkan, Graves Dougherty Hearon & Moody, P.C., Austin, for Amicus Curiae.
Brister, Willett.
Cited by 57 opinions  |  Published
Justice BRISTER

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Few patients today ever pay a hospital’s full charges, due to the prevalence of Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, and private insurers who pay discounted rates. [1] The question presented here is whether a hospital paid by a workers’ compensation carrier can recover the discount from its full charges by filing a lien against a patient’s tort recovery. Because hospitals cannot sue such patients for the discount, we hold they cannot accomplish indirectly (by filing a lien) what they could not do directly (by filing suit).

Donald Linnstaedter and Kenneth Bolen were injured in an auto collision while riding together in the course of their employment. Both were treated at a hospital owned and operated by the Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco. Their reasonable and necessary hospital charges totaled $22,704.25, of which their workers’ compensation carrier paid only $9,737.54. The hospital does not dispute that this was all that was due from the carrier under reimbursement guidelines mandated by the Texas Labor Code. [2]

Less than a week after the accident, the hospital filed a lien for its charges with the county clerk pursuant to the Texas Property Code. [3] The lien attached to the employees’ causes of action, which they filed almost two years later against the other driver, John Paul Jones. Those claims were eventually settled for $175,000, but Jones’s insurer paid $12,966.71 of that amount to the hospital to discharge its lien.

The employees brought this suit against the hospital for recovery of the $12,966.71. They claim the lien was invalid under the Labor Code, while the hospital claims it was valid under the Property Code. Based on an agreed statement of facts, the trial court entered judgment for the employees, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. [4] We granted the petition to consider the interaction between these two provisions.

[*411] To secure costs a health provider may incur treating accident victims, the Texas Property Code grants hospitals a hen on any cause of action a patient may have against a tortfeasor. [5] The purpose of the hen “is to provide hospitals an additional method of securing payment for medical services, thus encouraging the prompt and adequate treatment of accident victims.” [6] The hen amount cannot be more than “a reasonable and regular rate.” [7] Once the hen is filed, a tortfeasor cannot obtain a release by judgment or settlement unless the hospital’s charges are paid in full. [8]

To ensure full coverage for employees protected by workers’ compensation, the Texas Labor Code provides that hospitals “may not pursue a private claim against a workers’ compensation claimant” for all or part of the costs of treatment. [9] For several reasons, this provision bars not only lawsuits against such patients, but also hens against their assets. A hen is part and parcel of the underlying claim, the former existing only because of the latter. [10] As a chose in action is the intangible personal property of the claimant, [11] a hen against such property is necessarily a claim against its owner. Moreover, as a hospital has neither tort nor contract rights against a tortfeasor who has injured a patient, the only support for a hospital hen is its claim for reimbursement from the patient. Thus, a hen against a patient’s tort recovery is just as much a claim against the patient as if it were filed against the patient’s house, car, or bank account.

So while the Property Code grants hospitals a hen to secure their fees, the Labor Code prohibits hens against compensation patients. We think both can be given effect by limiting hospital hens involving compensation patients to amounts due under the workers’ compensation system. [12]

A hospital that treats workers’ compensation patients is bound by the Labor Code’s provisions. Included among those provisions are caps on reimbursement, [13][*412] and a bar against asking those patients or their compensation carriers for more. [14] Based on statewide data reflecting reimbursements in other health care delivery systems, the workers’ compensation fee guidelines are intended to provide both fair and reasonable reimbursement and effective cost control. [15] A hospital dissatisfied with its reimbursement may contest it administratively. [16] Accordingly, prohibiting hospital liens against compensation patients does not frustrate the lien provisions of the Property Code because reimbursement of “a reasonable and regular rate” (all the Property Code allows) is already guaranteed.

Further, granting hospitals a lien in excess of the established guidelines for fair and reasonable rates would frustrate the Legislature’s effort to achieve effective medical cost control through the Labor Code. [17] If a worker obtains a tort recovery, the compensation carrier is reimbursed first, [18] and the remainder paid to the worker discharges the carrier’s obligation to make future medical payments to that extent. [19] If (as the hospital argues) a worker’s recovery can be reduced by a hospital lien, the hospital will be reimbursed more than the compensation guidelines, and the carrier will have to pay more in future medical benefits. [20]

The hospital’s most salient point is that in the suit against Jones, Linnstaedter and Bolen sought the full medical charges billed by the hospital rather than the reduced amount paid by their compensation carrier. [21] We agree that a recovery of medical expenses in that amount would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for these amounts against the patients, they in turn had no claim for them against Jones. [22] But we presume that Jones’s carrier knew as much, and made its settlement offer accordingly. While the settlement here exceeded the full medical bill, there is no evidence it was intended to pay those expenses rather than lost earnings, pain and mental anguish, or physical impairment.

Accordingly, we hold the hospital’s lien violated the Labor Code’s prohibition of private claims against compensation pa[*413] tients. We affirm the judgments of the courts below.

Justice WILLETT did not participate in the decision.
1

. See George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 104 (2005-06) (arguing that hospital charges labeled as " 'regular,' 'full,' or 'list,' are misleading, because in fact they are actually paid by less than five percent of patients nationally”).

2

. See Tex. Lab.Code § 413.011.

3

. See Tex. Prop.Code §§ 55.001-.008.

4

. 151 S.W.3d 667 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004).

5

. Tex. Prop.Code § 55.002(a).

6

. Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1985).

7

. Tex. Prop.Code § 55.004(d)(1).

8

. Id. § 55.007.

9

. Tex. Lab.Code § 413.042(a). The Code makes an exception for noncompensable injuries or treatment by nonapproved physicians, circumstances not involved here. See id.

10

. See Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.1972) ("Generally speaking, a specific debt (an obligation to pay money) is necessary to support a lien; the lien is affixed to land as security for some obligation to pay money.”); Univ. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sec. Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex.1967) (stating that "liens are incidents of and inseparable from the debt”); Cont’l State Bank of Big Sandy v. Pepper, 130 Tex. 71, 106 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1937) (same); Black's Law Dictionary 941 (8th ed.2004) ("lien. A legal right or interest that a creditor has in another’s property, lasting usu. until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.”); see also Tex. Prop.Code §§ 51.0001(6), 53.023.

11

. See Black’s Law Dictionary 258 (8th ed.2004) (defining "chose in action” to include "[p]ersonal property that one person owns but another person possesses, the owner being able to regain possession through a lawsuit”); see, e.g., Tex. Prop.Code § 12.014; TEX. PROB. CODE § 3(z); Red River Nat’l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex.1918); Groesbeck v. Bodman, 73 Tex. 287, 11 S.W. 322, 324 (Tex.1889).

12

. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.026(a); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Strayhom, 209 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex.2006).

13

. See Tex. Lab.Code § 413.011(d); Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm'n v. Patient Advocates of Texas, 136 S.W.3d 643, 652 (Tex.2004).

14

. Tex. Lab.Code §§ 413.016, 413.042(a).

15

. Id. §§ 413.007-.008, 413.011.

16

. Id. § 413.031. There is no indication in the record the hospital has done so here.

17

. See Tex. Lab.Code § 413.011(d).

18

. Tex. Lab.Code § 417.001(b); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex.2002).

19

. Tex. Lab.Code § 417.002.

20

. The hospital is incorrect that the Fifth Court of Appeals reached a contrary result in McCollum v. Baylor University Medical Center, as that court held a hospital lien was enforceable only if its patient’s underlying claim was not governed by the workers' compensation act. 697 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).

21

. The hospital does not invoke judicial estop-pel or assert that these allegation were made under oath. See Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex.1956).

22

. See Allstate Indem. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex.2006) (holding insured who had no exposure for unreimbursed medical expenses had no standing to assert claim against her insurer for underpayment). This rule has since been codified. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 41.0105 (eff. Sept.1, 2003) ("In addition to any other limitation under law, recovery of medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.”).