¹ Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. with prejudice of his consolidated cases. Bowles argues that the district court erred by: consolidating the two cases; dismissing his cases sua sponte; failing to enforce discovery against Joe Reynolds; refusing to allow an attorney to appear on Bowles' behalf at a scheduling conference; dismissing Bowles' case; and by denying his motion for recusal. He also contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state attorney general to appear pro hac vice on behalf of defendant Judge O'Neill; and that the district court's dismissal denied Bowles his right of access to the courts. He finally claims he was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the district court, deny motions and impose sanctions. Consolidation was not an abuse of discretion as the cases involved common questions of law and fact. See Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). The district court may dismiss a complaint upon its own motion for failure to state a claim prior to the filing by the defendant of a motion to dismiss. See Shawnee Int'l, N.V. v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1984). The district court did not err by failing to enforce discovery against Reynolds because Reynolds was never served and was thus not a party in the case. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Tullos- Pierremont, 894 F.2d 1469, 1473-74 (5th Cir. 1990). Allowing the state attorney general to appear pro hac vice on behalf of defendant Judge O'Neill was not an abuse of discretion. See In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1975); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.141 (West 1988).