v.
Ahmad Rashad Davis
RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0296-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JULIE M. GOODMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 13-CR-01190
AHMAD RASHAD DAVIS APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: JONES, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON,1 JUDGES. THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the Fayette Circuit Court’s decision to expunge Ahmad Rashad Davis’s theft by deception charge. As the circuit court appropriately found the judgment contains 431.076(1)(b) generally provides that upon request, dismissed charges which were not dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges shall be expunged.
[*2]Davis checked a box denoting that the theft charge was not dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense. The Commonwealth disagreed with Davis’s assertion and filed a response opposing Davis’s expungement petition, arguing that the theft charge could not be expunged because it had been dismissed in exchange for Davis pleading guilty to Medicaid fraud. The circuit court granted the expungement.[2]
The Commonwealth filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, again arguing that the theft charge was statutorily ineligible for expungement. The circuit court held a short videoconference hearing on the motion, at which it opined that the written judgment did not explicitly state that the theft charge had been dismissed in return for a guilty plea to the Medicaid fraud charge. Believing itself to be bound solely by the plain language of the judgment (and stressing that the Commonwealth had not ever sought to amend that judgment), the circuit court thus denied the Commonwealth’s motion. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal. Davis failed to file a responsive brief.[3]
[*3]The Commonwealth argues that the plain language of KRS 431.076(1)(b) resolves this matter and the circuit court’s findings otherwise are directly contradicted by the record. Answering whether the theft charge was eligible for expungement requires us to analyze KRS 431.076, and since “statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo; and the conclusions reached by the lower court[] are entitled to no deference.” Commonwealth v. Love, 334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011). We “interpret statutes in accordance with their plain meanings, generally construing non-technical words according to their common meanings.” Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
KRS 431.076 provides in relevant part:
(1) (a) . . .
(b) A person who has been charged with a criminal offense . . . against whom charges have been dismissed and not in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge . . . may petition the court in which the disposition of the charges was made to expunge all charges.
[*4]...
(3) (a) If the court finds that the petition under subsection (1)(b) of this section is properly brought, the court shall grant the petition and order the expunging of the records. KRS 431.076(3)(a) states that upon a showing that a petition meets the statutory requirements for an expungement under (1)(b), the records “shall” be expunged. This does not grant circuit courts any discretion to deny a petitioner who meets the criteria in KRS 431.076(1)(b) from receiving an expungement.
We agree with the circuit court that “[t]he Judgment is the Record in the case,” and that it was appropriate for the circuit court to decline to “look to extraneous matters to interpret a document that is clear on its face.” Whatever discussions or agreements were memorialized between the parties, “a court speaks through the language of its orders and judgments.” Glogower v. Crawford, 2 S.W.3d 784, 785 (Ky. 1999). It is the judgment that is the final word as to what has taken place in Davis’s case.
While the Commonwealth repeatedly states that the theft by deception charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in exchange for Davis pleading guilty to Medicaid fraud, essentially arguing that this condition was obvious, the judgment contains no conditions for such dismissal. Instead, this is just one possible interpretation that is not clearly stated in the judgment. Furthermore, none of the documents in the record explicitly condition the dismissal of the theft charge to the guilty plea on the Medicaid fraud charge.
[*5]The circuit court’s factual finding as to the nature of the plea agreement reflected in the judgment, that the dismissal of the theft charge was not conditioned on the guilty plea on the Medicaid fraud charge, is supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. This constitutes a valid interpretation of the circuit court’s judgment within its discretion.[4]
To look outside the judgment and infer, assume, or guess that the Commonwealth’s agreement meant more or less than what the judgment reflects most certainly runs afoul of both the letter and spirit of our expungement statutes. In this analysis, we are further persuaded by fact that the evolution of our expungement laws evince the legislature’s intent to both favor and broaden the availability of expungements to the citizenry with regard to non-violent crimes.
We also agree with the circuit court that if the Commonwealth disagreed with the representation of why the charge was dismissed as recited in the judgment, it should have filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion within a reasonable time after the judgment was entered, seeking to correct it, rather than waiting until Davis filed his motion for expungement, nearly eight years after the judgment was entered.
[*6]Therefore, Davis’s petition met the statutory requirements for expungement under KRS 431.076(1)(b) and there was, and remains, no lawful basis in the record for its denial. The circuit court acted appropriately in carrying out its duty and expunging the theft charge.
Accordingly, the Fayette Circuit Court’s order of expungement is affirmed.
JONES, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE OPINION.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE. Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Matthew H. Kleinert Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
[*7]