2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U No. 2-22-0137 Order filed April 28, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re I.M., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 21-MH-34 ) ) Honorable (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) John A. Noverini, Appellee, v. I.M., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)), which establishes the procedures by which one can file a petition for a certificate of innocence, is inapplicable to respondent’s wrongful confinement claim because he was involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital and not convicted of a felony and imprisoned which is required by statute to seek a certificate of innocence; therefore, the trial court’s decision to strike respondent’s petition was proper.
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to strike the petition of respondent, I.M., for a certificate of innocence which was filed pursuant to section
2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)) as respondent’s effort to pursue his claim of “wrongful confinement” in a mental institution. For the following reasons, we affirm.
2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 4, 2021, respondent’s mother filed a petition seeking respondent’s involuntary admission to a mental health facility in the circuit court of Lake County. See 405 ILCS 5/3-700
(West 2020) (involuntary inpatient admission by court order). The petition alleged that respondent
is a person with a mental illness who, (1) because of his mental illness is reasonably expected, unless treated on an inpatient basis, to engage in conduct causing him or another physical harm or placing him or another in reasonable expectation of physical harm; (2) because of his mental illness, is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm without the assistance of others unless treated on an inpatient basis; (3) refuses treatment or is not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment, is unable to understand his need for treatment, and is
reasonably expected, based on his behavioral history, to suffer mental or emotional deterioration, and after such deterioration, is reasonably expected to meet either of the first two criteria; and (4) is in need of immediate hospitalization to prevent harm. On that day, the court entered an order for respondent’s detention, examination, and diagnostic evaluation at the Elgin Mental Health
Center (EMHC). Respondent was taken to the emergency room at a hospital in Elgin for medical clearance prior to being transported to the EMHC. Respondent was admitted to the EMHC on
March 5, 2021.
¶5 On March 8, 2021, a second petition for involuntary admission was filed. See 405 ILCS
5/3-600 (West 2020) (involuntary inpatient admission by certification). This petition was filed in the circuit court of Kane County. It was prepared by Deb Prichard, a social worker who had
observed respondent at the hospital. The petition sought emergency inpatient admission of respondent based on the same allegations as the petition filed in Lake County. This petition was
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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U supported by a written statement from Prichard and inpatient certificates completed by two psychiatrists who had examined respondent.
¶6 According to Prichard’s statement, respondent had been admitted to the EMHC on March
5, 2021. Respondent, a 30-year-old college graduate and former accountant, had been living in the basement of his parents’ home in Round Lake Heights. His mother reported that he began having mental health issues at the age of 22 and that his symptoms had worsened. Over several
months, respondent had become aggressive, including slamming doors and breaking furniture in the home. He began turning off the furnace and water supply to the home. The petition described the altercation between respondent and his mother that led to his admission; his mother told respondent to stop destroying things and respondent threw a chair at her, hitting her leg. The police were called, and they took respondent to the emergency room. Prichard attempted to talk with respondent at the hospital, but he pulled the bed covers over his head and refused to speak. She asked him what brought him into the hospital, if he felt he was a danger to himself or others, if he had a place to live, and whether he wished to leave the hospital. Respondent replied by repeatedly saying, “I decline to answer” and “I’m waiting for my CPAP.” Prichard stated that because of his
“guardedness” and refusal to answer questions, she recommended respondent remain hospitalized for evaluation to assess whether he was a danger to himself or others or whether he was able to care for his basic needs.
¶7 Dr. Christopher Sullivan and Dr. Eva Kurilo both stated in their inpatient certificates that they examined respondent and it was their opinion that respondent was a person with a mental illness who, (1) because of his mental illness was reasonably expected, unless treated on an inpatient basis, to engage in conduct placing him or another in physical harm or in reasonable expectation of physical harm; (2) because of his mental illness is unable to provide for his basic
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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm without assistance, unless treated on an inpatient basis; (3) refuses treatment or is not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment, is unable to understand his need for treatment, and is reasonably expected based on his behavioral history, to suffer mental or emotional deterioration and after such deterioration, is reasonably expected to meet either of the first two criteria; and (4) is in need of immediate hospitalization to prevent harm. Dr. Sullivan explained that respondent appeared “guarded” and demonstrated
“illogical and disorganized thought.” He stated that respondent’s presentation was consistent with psychotic illness and being a danger to himself or others and that he was in need of hospitalization.
Dr. Kurilo stated respondent had “mood problems” with an onset of eight years ago. She indicated that respondent had been physically aggressive towards his mother and described the interactions between respondent and his mother that led to respondent’s admission.
¶8 The petition was set for hearing on March 12, 2021. The hearing was continued numerous times, over respondent’s objections, and rescheduled for April 9, 2021. Respondent was
subsequently discharged from the EMHC on April 7, 2021. Because respondent was discharged, the petition was withdrawn on April 9, 2021.1
¶9 On January 27, 2022, respondent filed a pro se petition for a certificate of innocence pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)). Respondent used a
standard legal form entitled “Petition for Certificate of Innocence” provided by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. However, respondent changed the language in the form in 220140
2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U numerous ways. He changed the caption from “In the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois” to
“In the Circuit Court of Kane County, Illinois.” He struck out the standard language which stated, “I was convicted of one or more felonies in the above captioned cause by the State of Illinois in the County of Cook,” and typed in the following language directly above it, “I believe I was wrongfully confined by Lake County Circuit Court Court Ordered Petition and Confined in Kane
County DHS Center.” He also added the following language to the petition by typing between lines of standard language in the form: “I am requesting a Certificate of Innocence for my wrongful confinement in a DHS Mental Health Institution;” “Wrongful confinement in a mental institution
should be similar to a prisoner wrongfully imprisoned in a State Institution;” and “Discharge in Kane County to serve to Kane County State’s Attorney Office.”
¶ 10 In a six-page affidavit filed in support of his petition, respondent stated that he believed he was wrongfully confined during his time as an involuntary patient at the EMHC. He stated that
he was innocent prior to being “arrested” in Lake County “with the Court Order provided by the Illinois Lake County Circuit Court.” He claimed that the petition filed in Lake County was not a
“true medical emergency and did not have any appropriate medical certificates attached to hold
[him] against his will.” He stated that he was wrongfully confined for longer than 30 days to
“await trial for the requirement of medication and confinement but did not have any proper evidence to actually convict or confine a person as to required medication or confine to a longer stay that the discharge was allowed by the Kane County Judge and [he] should be viewed as innocent.” He further contended that he:
“successfully defended against the confinement in a mental institution and defended against the requirement of medication when I was discharged from the Circuit
Court of Kane County on April 9th 2021 that I believe this confinement should be seen as
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wrongful confinement as similar to a prisoner’s innocence to be awarded a Certificate of Innocence to be recognized with the Illinois Court of Claims but for a mental health case.”
Pointing to the fact that he was assigned a public defender to represent him in the involuntary admission proceedings, he asserted that this matter should be seen as a “quasi-criminal” proceeding. Respondent stated that the public defender’s office and the EMHC do not have “a proper review board as similar to a prisoner’s review board” and do not “recognize the need to prove innocence for the defendant when the defendant defeats a petition for involuntary
confinement [by being] discharged from confinement.” Citing section 2-702 of the Code, respondent states that he is filing a petition for a certificate of innocence due to the “wrongful confinement in a mental health institution although it does not match perfectly as to be imprisoned in a [sic] Illinois prison institution that the wrongful confinement should be noted for being wrongfully confined in a mental health institution for longer than 30 days due to the court ordered arrest and confinement.”
¶ 11 On March 14, 2022, respondent filed a motion in support of his petition for a certificate of innocence asking the trial court judge to hold a hearing to “recognize a need for a [sic] innocent discharged subject to reclaim innocence after a wrongful confinement” so the court of claims can
“process the Circuit Court Judge approved Petition for a Certificate of Innocence as similar to a prisoners [sic] innocence.” On March 21, 2022, respondent filed a 22-page document entitled
“Second Affidavit for – Petition for a Certificate of Innocence.” The document contains discussion of and references to numerous amendments to the United States Constitution, case law from federal
and state jurisdictions, and numerous federal and Illinois statutes. The document states, inter alia, that wrongful confinement in a mental health institution should be treated the same as a criminal conviction for the purpose of seeking a certificate of innocence.
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¶ 12 At a hearing held on April 1, 2022, the trial judge asked respondent for clarification as to what he was seeking, asking respondent if he was “trying to get monetary damages for being wrongfully detained” and commenting “which if you were, I can understand that, but I’m saying maybe you ought to bring a civil suit.” Respondent stated that he wanted a certificate of innocence.
He stated further “I understand that this petition is not necessarily recognized, because – in a sense, you know I am coming from the understanding that the petition for Certificate of Innocence is understood for criminal cases, and I understand that this case is a quasi criminal, which is why I was assigned a Public Defender [for the involuntary admission proceedings].”
¶ 13 The State argued that a petition for a certificate of innocence filed pursuant to section 2-
702 of the Code only applies to criminal cases and specifically to someone who has been convicted of a felony and subsequently imprisoned for one year or more. The State noted that respondent had struck out portions of the standard form petition referring to these requirements and added his own language about applying the statute to a mental health case. The State argued that there may be “different pathways” that respondent could pursue to seek redress in this case but that a
certificate of innocence is not one of them. After allowing extensive arguments from both sides, the court ruled “I agree with the State. I don’t think this is the proper remedy, so the Petition for Certificate of Innocence will be denied. The motion to Strike will be granted.” The trial court ruled that it was a final and appealable order.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we must first address the State’s renewal of its motion to strike respondent’s brief for his failure to comply with multiple provisions of our supreme court rules. We note that respondent is self represented. However, it is well established
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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U that “pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures and must comply with the same rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented
by attorneys.” JB Morgan Chase Bank, National Associates v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 181909, ¶ 29; In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009).
¶ 17 Throughout the pendency of this appeal, respondent filed numerous motions, many of which were related to the preparation of his brief (including motions for extensions of time to file his opening brief, motions for leave to file an opening brief in excess of the page limitation, a motion to file a supplemental brief, motions to stay the appeal to obtain additional time, a motion
to “relax” the rules regarding brief requirements, and a motion to file a reply brief in excess of the page limitation). Notably, respondent also filed no less than five motions seeking the appointment of counsel on appeal which this court denied because respondent has no right to appointed counsel
on a petition for a certificate of innocence. In several of these motions, respondent requested, in the alternative, that the rules regarding briefs be “relaxed” for him if counsel were not appointed.
In these instances, we further admonished respondent that he, like any pro se litigant, must substantially comply with the supreme court rules pertaining to briefs.
¶ 18 Once respondent’s brief was filed, the State filed a motion to strike his brief, to compel him to file a brief in compliance with the supreme court rules, and to set a new briefing schedule.
The State pointed to respondent’s numerous violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff.
Oct. [1], 2020) regarding the form and content of briefs (misrepresentation of the length of his brief
due to misleading pagination and a substantial use of single spacing; omission of a “Points and Authorities” section; lack of a proper issue statement or statement of jurisdiction; improper
“Statement of Facts” containing argument and no citations to the record; an argument section comprised largely of discussion of issues not before the court and with no citations to the record
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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U on appeal; and an argument section that is “basically incoherent, nonsensical and based on a flawed supposition, that this appeal is from a mental health code matter.”). The State also argued that
respondent “ignore[d] multiple orders of this Court indicating that this appeal was solely from the Kane County court’s denial of appellant’s Petition for a Certificate of Innocence and was not an
appeal from the dismissed Lake County mental health matter.” The State explained “the deficiencies in [respondent’s] brief make it difficult to respond to [his] confusing and often nonsensical claims.” 2
¶ 19 In denying the State’s motion to strike respondent’s brief, we ruled that our denial was subject to reconsideration, and we further clarified the matter by instructing the State to “file a response brief addressing whether Kane County circuit court properly struck appellant’s petition for a certificate of innocence as a vehicle for appellant’s ‘wrongful confinement’ claim.” In its brief, the State renewed its objection and again asked this court to strike respondent’s brief.
¶ 20 We are mindful of the challenges respondent faces in representing himself on appeal.
Nevertheless, failure to comply with Rule 341 which governs the form and contents of briefs is not an inconsequential matter. The rules of our supreme court “are not aspirational. They are not
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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).
¶ 21 This court has the authority to strike a brief that lacks substantial conformity to our supreme court rules. Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. Still, striking a brief is a harsh sanction that is only appropriate where violations of the procedural rules hinder our
review. Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15. In this case, we have the benefit of a clear and cogent brief submitted by the State. Based on the State’s brief and our own review of respondent’s briefs, we have been provided with the facts necessary for an understanding of the case and can
discern, generally, respondent’s assignment of error. Thus, despite the egregious deficiencies and violations in respondent’s brief and even though respondent was admonished numerous times that substantial compliance with the rules was expected, we will address the merits of the trial court’s decision to strike respondent’s petition for a certificate of innocence. This is the only issue properly before the court in this appeal.[3]