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People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534 Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Caption RONNIE CARRASQUILLO, Defendant-Appellant. District & No. First District, Fourth Division No. 1-18-0534 Filed March 31, 2020 Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 76-CR-05807; the Review Hon. Alfredo Maldonado, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Counsel on Michael E. Deutsch and Shubra Ohri, of People’s Law Office, of Appeal Chicago, for appellant. Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon Walters, and Hareena Meghani-Wakely, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lampkin and Burke * concurred in the judgment and opinion. * Justice Burke was added to the panel after oral argument to replace Justice Reyes, and she has listened to the recording of oral argument. OPINION ¶1 After a bench trial before Cook County Circuit Court Judge Frank Wilson, defendant Ronnie Carrasquillo was convicted of the October 10, 1976, murder of Chicago police officer Terrence Loftus. On January 17, 1978, Judge Wilson sentenced defendant to an indeterminate sentence of 200 to 600 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). 1 ¶2 This appeal concerns the denial by a different trial judge of (1) defendant’s petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)) after an evidentiary hearing and (2) defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. ¶3 In his section 2-1401 petition, defendant claims that his conviction and sentence are void because the judge who tried and sentenced him was corrupt. Defendant argues that the judge took a bribe in another case and then sought to deflect attention from the other case by rendering a harsh judgment and sentence in defendant’s case. This type of theory is known as “compensatory bias.” E.g., People v. Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 21; see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997). 2 ¶4 In his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, defendant claims that his sentence is a de facto life sentence imposed on an 18-year-old, first-time offender that violates both the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). ¶5 For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition but reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition. ¶6 BACKGROUND ¶7 This court set forth the facts of this case in our order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. July 1, 1975), affirming defendant’s murder conviction and sentence. We incorporate that order by reference and repeat here only the facts needed to determine the issues before us. People v. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621 (1979) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶8 In sum, the State’s evidence at trial established that, in the early morning hours of October 10, 1976, Edward Roman, who was a member of the Imperial Gangsters street gang, was being chased by members of the rival Gaylords gang when Officer Terrence Loftus, who was passing by in plain clothes and an unmarked vehicle, stopped Roman. The stop occurred at the intersection of Fullerton Avenue and Central Park Avenue in Chicago. Members of the Imperial Gangsters, including defendant, left a nearby party and converged on the intersection where a gang fight ensued. At trial, defendant testified in his own defense and admitted that he

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was at the intersection, that he fired a gun between three and five times, and that he brought the gun to Francisco Gonzalez’s home after the shooting. Witnesses testified that shots were fired from the south side of Fullerton Avenue and four cartridge casings 3 were recovered from that area. A firearms examiner testified that all four cartridge casings were fired from the .32- caliber pistol later found in Gonzalez’s apartment. However, other bullet fragments found near the scene were not suitable for comparison. The assistant medical examiner, who performed the autopsy on Officer Loftus, testified that he observed one entry wound and one exit wound from one bullet, that Officer Loftus was shot in the head, and that these bullet wounds were the cause of death. ^[4] ¶9 On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, rejecting defendant’s claims. Defendant claimed, first, that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had fired the shot that killed Officer Loftus. We rejected this claim, finding that “a review of the evidence at trial *** establishe[d] that defendant was the only one to fire shots at the time Officer Loftus was struck and killed.” Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 7. Further, we observed that, although bullet fragments found on the scene could not be traced directly to the .32-caliber gun that defendant fired, they were “consistent with the type of bullet” fired from a .32-caliber gun. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 7. In addition, Francisco Gonzalez testified that defendant told him that he thought he had shot a police officer. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 4. ¶ 10 Second, defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence of intent to sustain a conviction for murder and that his conviction should be for involuntary manslaughter instead. Defendant relied on his own testimony that he was aiming up, at the second floor of the YMCA building located at the intersection, and on other testimony that there was a bullet hole in the second floor window of the YMCA and a bullet fragment found on the second floor. However, Officer Louis Bergmann, who arrived at the scene prior to the shooting, testified that he heard someone shout “Gangster Love” before four or five shots were fired in rapid succession from the south side of Fullerton Avenue and Officer Loftus crumpled to the ground. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 1. As noted above, the four shell casings recovered from the south side of Fullerton Avenue matched the gun that defendant fired. David Gonzalez, 5 who was at both the party and the intersection, testified that he observed defendant run to a parked vehicle, point the gun with both hands, and shoot the gun four times toward the crowd at the intersection. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 2. David Gonzalez testified that defendant was pointing the gun level, rather than pointing it up. Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 2. Thus, we rejected defendant’s claim that the evidence could sustain only a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

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¶ 11 Third, defendant claimed that his sentence was excessive in light of the fact that he had no prior record and was 18 years old at the time of the offense. ^[6] Rejecting this claim, we found: “Although defendant had not been convicted of any previous crime, his own testimony was that fights involving knives and guns were a frequent occurrence, and he had been involved in two such fights in the two weeks prior to the occurrence.” Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 9. In addition, we found that defendant was a member of a street gang. In conclusion, we found “that the sentence imposed of 200 to 600 years clearly suggests to the parole board that the trial judge did not believe defendant should be paroled after the minimum period of incarceration.” Carrasquillo, No. 1-78-621, slip order at 9. We rejected all three claims and affirmed his conviction and sentence. ¶ 12 In 1987, defendant filed his first postconviction petition, which advanced to an evidentiary hearing. This first petition, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied after the hearing, and we affirmed the denial on appeal. People v. Carrasquillo, No. 1-88-2139 (1990) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 13 On June 24, 2015, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition, and on August 11, 2017, he filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. As we noted above, his section 2-1401 petition claimed that his conviction and sentence were void because his original trial judge was corrupt, and his motion claimed that his sentence violated both the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment. On January 7, 2016, the trial court 7 denied the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s section 2-1401 petition and granted defendant’s requests for discovery. On September 5, 2017, and October 31, 2017, an evidentiary hearing was held concerning the section 2-1401 petition. On January 24, 2018, the trial court denied defendant’s section 2-1401 petition in a 47-page memorandum order, in which it made findings of fact. ¶ 14 The trial court found that the evidence at the hearing established that Judge Wilson accepted a bribeto acquit Harry Aleman, a defendant in a prior murder case and an alleged hit- man for “ ‘the Syndicate.’ ” People v. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 11 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Jan. 24, 2018). We provide here a summary of those factual findings: In 1976, Aleman was indicted for the 1972 murder of Billy Logan, a Teamsters union steward and truck dispatcher. Robert Cooley, an attorney, approached Judge Wilson to offer a $10,000 bribe in exchange for an acquittal. After Wilson agreed, the Aleman case was transferred to Wilson, and Wilson found Aleman not guilty on May 24, 1977, after a bench trial. The acquittal drew a swift reaction in the press, with “every major newspaper in Chicago” running articles about “how the mob ‘hit man’ beat the charge.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 17. In 1980, Wilson retired and later moved to Arizona. In 1986, almost a decade after the verdict in the case at bar, Cooley began cooperating with federal investigators in what came to be known as “ ‘Operation Greylord,’ ” an investigation of corrupt judges in Cook County. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 18. Working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

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Cooley wore a wire while meeting Wilson for dinner in Arizona in May of 1989. In November 1989, FBI agents visited Wilson’s Arizona home, disclosed that Cooley had worn a wire during the prior dinner, and asked Wilson if he would cooperate against Aleman. Wilson denied that he had accepted money and failed to appear a week later when summoned to appear before a grand jury in Chicago. On February 5, 1990, Wilson committed suicide with a self-inflicted gunshot wound. ¶ 15 At the evidentiary hearing on September 5, 2017, Glenn Seiden, defendant’s attorney at the 1977 trial, testified that he had recommended a bench trial because the defense theory of the case was more legal than factual, in that the defense would argue that the evidence showed manslaughter, not murder. In his testimony, Seiden explained that since the courtroom was likely to be filled with police officers, a jury might feel the pressure more and reject the distinction between manslaughter and murder. Lastly, Seiden testified that Wilson had “ ‘a reputation for being honest.’ ” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 20. With respect to the sentence, Seiden testified that defendant’s sentence was the longest that he had observed in his experience. ¶ 16 Brad Thompson, an investigator working with defendant’s attorneys, testified that he had searched for all the published appellate opinions concerning murder convictions and sentences imposed by Judge Wilson from 1970 to 1981 and found 40 cases. Only one defendant received a sentence as long as defendant: Ronald McClellan, who was sentenced to 200 to 600 years for the robbery and murder of a mail carrier. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 22 (citing People v. McClellan, 62 Ill. App. 3d 590 (1978)). ¶ 17 Rob Warden, a Chicago newspaper reporter, 8 testified on October 31, 2017, about the media coverage of the Aleman acquittal. Warden testified that a number of columnists wrote that the verdict was flawed and that some published articles called for an inquiry and asked the voters to hold Judge Wilson accountable. The Cook County State’s Attorney called a press conference to denounce the verdict. ¶ 18 In denying defendant’s section 2-1401 petition, the trial court rejected defendant’s claim of compensatory bias, finding that “the fact that a judge was bribed in one case does not, in itself, establish that he was not impartial in others.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 31 (citing Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 20). 9 Defendant had argued that his case and Aleman’s case were connected because both were high profile trials in the same year. The courtroom during defendant’s trial was filled with uniformed officers. Defendant argued that defendant’s trial offered Wilson a chance to rehabilitate himself and show that he was tough on crime by convicting and sentencing harshly a gang member who had allegedly killed a police officer. ¶ 19 The trial court rejected this argument, finding that defendant had “not made a legally sufficient showing of a nexus between his trial and Aleman’s.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR- 05807, slip op. at 31. The trial court found that the prior bribe and the proximity in time were not, by themselves, sufficient to create a nexus. Defendant did not allege any trial errors or anything suspicious about Judge Wilson’s conduct of the trial, except for the conviction and sentence. The trial court found that defendant had failed to show a connection, particularly

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where Judge Wilson did not appoint the defense counsel, the trial was not rushed, and “nothing in the evidence that brought the Aleman bribe to light *** discussed any effect on or relation to any of Wilson’s other cases.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 33. ¶ 20 In addition, the trial court rejected defendant’s argument that Judge Wilson had “a personal interest in the outcome” of defendant’s trial—the personal interest being a need to deflect attention. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 33. The trial court found that there was no evidence that Wilson was laboring under a need in December 1977 to deflect attention from an acquittal that had occurred seven months earlier. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR- 05807, slip op. at 35. In the case at bar, Judge Wilson found defendant guilty on Monday, December 19, 1977, seven months after he found Aleman not guilty on May 24, 1977, and Wilson sentenced defendant on Monday, January 17, 1978, eight months after the verdict in the Aleman trial. ¶ 21 The trial court also found that defendant had failed to prove actual bias, observing that defendant’s evidence of actual bias were his claims that he was guilty only of manslaughter and that his sentence was excessive—both claims that we had already rejected on direct appeal. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 38-39 (discussing the appellate court’s Rule 23 order). ¶ 22 In its order denying defendant’s section 2-1401 petition, the trial court also addressed defendant’s claim that his sentence was excessive. The trial court observed that “[a]n indeterminate sentence *** sounds foreign” to our ears after “four decades of determinate sentencing.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 43. The trial court noted that “the real effect of his sentence was that [defendant] would serve 20 years to life with eligibility for parole beginning at 20 years less time for good behavior credit, with a recommendation *** that he serve more than the minimum 20 years.” The trial court explained how this works: “A person serving an indeterminate sentence is eligible for parole upon serving the minimum term or 20 years, whichever is less, less time for good behavior credit.” Carrasquillo, No. 76-C- 05807, slip op. at 43 (citing 730 ILCS 5/3-3-3(a)(1) (West 2016)). 10 ¶ 23 Finding that “there is no evidence Wilson solicited or accepted a bribe in any other case” and, thus, corruption did not permeate his judicial actions, the trial judge denied defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. ¶ 24 On February 21, 2018, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Before the court issued its order, defendant supplemented his motion with the affidavit of Jorge Montes, who averred that he had been a member of the Prisoner Review Board for 16 years; that he was its chairman from 2004 until 2010; that, during his tenure, defendant’s case was considered by the board on numerous occasions; that, “[d]espite his excellent prison record and his strong family and community support,” defendant was repeatedly denied parole “because the victim *** was a Chicago Police Officer”; and that, in his opinion, “[t]here are several members of the Board, then and now, who will never vote for parole when the victim is a police officer.”

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¶ 25 In its order denying defendant’s motion, the trial court found that defendant had established cause for not including his current claim in his earlier petition, since the line of cases concerning the sentences of juveniles and young adults was decided long after defendant was sentenced. ¶ 26 However, the trial court found that defendant had failed to establish prejudice. Defendant argued that his sentence was a de facto life-without-parole sentence, even though he has been eligible and has been considered for parole numerous times. Defendant argued, based on the Montes affidavit, that his eligibility for parole is illusory because some parole board members will not vote to grant parole where the victim was a police officer. The trial court rejected his arguments, finding that defendant’s sentence was not a de facto life sentence where he had been eligible for parole after 20 years and that any allegation that the parole board acted improperly was better adjudicated in a direct action against the board, such as in a writ of mandamus action in state court or a habeas petition in federal court. ¶ 27 On February 21, 2018, defendant filed two notices of appeal on the same day. One notice challenged the trial court’s denial on January 24, 2018, of his section 2-1401 petition, and a second notice challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. On March 27, 2018, this court assigned the same appellate case number to both notices, and this appeal followed.

¶ 28 ANALYSIS ¶ 29 I. Section 2-1401 ¶ 30 A. Standard of Review ¶ 31 Defendant’s first claim on this appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of his section 2- 1401 petition. Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes a comprehensive statutory procedure for obtaining relief from final orders or judgments older than 30 days. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31; People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2018). 11 A petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment was entered, but the petition is not a continuation of the original proceeding. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7; 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2018). Instead, the petition marks the start of “an independent and separate action,” which must be supported by an affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not already of record. Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31; 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2018) (“The petition must be supported by affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of record.”). ¶ 32 Relief under section 2-1401 is predicated upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of (1) a defense or claim that would have precluded entry of the judgment in the original action and (2) diligence in both discovering the defense or claim and presenting the petition. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7-8; see also Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 37 (“the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a section 2-1401 petition is a preponderance of the evidence”). Although section 2- 1401 is a civil remedy with “its roots in common law equity,” it extends to criminal cases as well. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7-8.

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¶ 33 Since section 2-1401 is a civil remedy, it is “subject to the usual rules of civil practice.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8. “Where a material issue of fact exists, summary judgment is inappropriate and an evidentiary hearing—a trial in effect—is required in ruling on the petition.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 9. In the case at bar, the trial court determined that a material issue of fact existed, and an evidentiary hearing was held. ¶ 34 “[A] section 2-1401 petition can present either a factual or legal challenge to a final judgment or order.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. “[T]he nature of the challenge presented in a section 2-1401 petition is critical because it dictates the proper standard of review on appeal.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. ¶ 35 Our supreme “court has held that a section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate a void judgment, a purely legal issue, does not need to establish a meritorious defense or satisfy due diligence requirements.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 48. The court found that this exception applied only to “a specific niche of section 2-1401 petitions, those presenting a purely legal claim challenging a final judgment or order as void.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 49. For this niche of petitions, the standard of review is de novo. Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶¶ 46-47. 12 “Under the de novo standard, the reviewing court performs the same analysis that the trial court would perform.” People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 32. ¶ 36 “In stark contrast ***, a section 2-1401 petition that raises a fact-dependent challenge to a final judgment or order must be resolved by considering the particular facts, circumstances, and equities of the underlying case.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 50. When a section 2-1401 petition presents a fact-dependent challenge to a final judgment or order, it must set forth specific factual allegations, showing (1) the existence of a meritorious defense and (2) due diligence in presenting the defense and filing the petition. Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 51. While the quantum of proof necessary to sustain the action is a preponderance, the trial court’s ultimate decision on the petition is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 51. “[T]he trial court may also consider equitable considerations to relax the applicable due diligence standards ***.” Warren, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 51. ¶ 37 In the case at bar, defendant argues that his sentence and conviction are void due to extrinsic fraud perpetuated by Judge Wilson due to his personal interest in the outcome of defendant’s case. Whether defendant frames the legal issue as either “extrinsic fraud” or the judge’s “personal interest in the outcome,” the alleged fraud or interest is still the judge’s alleged compensatory bias. What the likelihood is that the judge was actually and subjectively motivated by compensatory bias when he convicted and sentenced defendant is a purely factual question, and there was no direct evidence presented. Since the judge has died, the judge’s state of mind is a factual issue that a factfinder must determine from inferences from the circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., In re Donald R., 343 Ill. App. 3d 237, 246 (2003) (inferring the existence of a requisite state of mind from circumstantial evidence is typically the job of a factfinder). For this purely factual determination, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. ¶ 38 A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Donoho,

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204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003); People v. Beverly, 364 Ill. App. 3d 361, 367 (2006).

¶ 39 B. Two-Year Limit ¶ 40 Before considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the facts of defendant’s claim, we must consider whether his section 2-1401 petition is time-barred. ¶ 41 A section 2-1401 petition must be filed “after 30 days from the entry” of the judgment attacked, which defendant’s petition certainly was. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2018). However, a section 2-1401 petition must also be filed “not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment,” which his petition certainly was not. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018); People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. ¶ 42 Section 2-1401 provides that “[n]othing” contained within it “affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment.” See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2018). In the case at bar, defendant seeks to escape the two-year limit by asserting that his conviction and sentence were void from its entry due to extrinsic fraud. ¶ 43 Our supreme court “recognizes an exception to the ordinary two-year deadline when the petition challenges a void judgment.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 29; Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. However, this exemption “from the ordinary procedural bars is available only for specific types of claims.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 31; Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. Whether defendant’s claim qualifies as one of these specific types of claims “presents a question of law that we review de novo.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 25; Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. ¶ 44 The first type of claim recognized by the supreme court in Thompson is a claim that the judgment was “void because the court that entered the final judgment lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 31; Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12. Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12. In the case at bar, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal offense and personal jurisdiction over defendant. ¶ 45 Next, the Thompson court observed that “[a] second type of voidness challenge” that may be raised at any time is “a challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32; Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13. However, “the void ab initio doctrine does not apply to an as-applied constitutional challenge.” (Emphasis in original.) Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32. In the case at bar, defendant does not raise claims about an unconstitutional statute. ¶ 46 “A third type of voidness challenge” that was previously recognized by the supreme court was “a challenge to a sentence that does not conform to the applicable sentencing statute.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33. Since the supreme court abolished the void sentence rule in Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19, “that type of challenge is no longer valid.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33. ¶ 47 Although the Thompson defendant’s claim did not fit within one of the two recognized types of exceptions, he argued, as does defendant in the case at bar, that the supreme court recognizes “that a sentence that violates the constitution is void and subject to challenge at any time.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. However, our supreme court rejected this argument

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in Thompson, stating “we do not find our general statements on voidness in those decisions to be controlling on the narrow issue presented in this appeal.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. Although the Thompson defendant’s claim involved an allegedly void sentence, our supreme court still found that it was procedurally barred. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. ¶ 48 Thus, alleging that a judgment is void is not the end of the inquiry but the beginning. As Thompson establishes, not all allegedly void judgments are excused from section 2-1401’s procedural requirements; only certain types are. See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. The type of voidness challenge alleged by defendant is not one of the two types recognized by our supreme court as bypassing section 2-1401’s procedural requirements. ¶ 49 Defendant argues that “a biased judge is a structural defect” and cites in support a different case, also named Thompson: People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 609 (2010). In that case, our supreme court observed that there were certain errors, deemed “structural” errors, that required automatic reversal of a criminal conviction: (1) a complete denial of counsel, (2) a trial before a biased judge, (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, (4) the denial of self- representation at trial, (5) the denial of a public trial, and (6) a defective reasonable doubt instruction. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 609. Defendant does not cite a case where our supreme court found that a structural error was yet a third type of voidness challenge that bypassed section 2-1401’s procedural requirements, nor can we find any. ¶ 50 However, we need not rest our affirmance on this ground alone since we find, as we discuss below, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, as a factual matter, that there was a lack of evidence of compensatory bias in this case.

¶ 51 C. Extrinsic Fraud ¶ 52 A judgment entered by a court, otherwise exercising proper jurisdiction, is open to collateral attack where fraud existed in its procurement. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1043 (2001). Only fraud that is extrinsic, as opposed to intrinsic, will render a judgment unenforceable. Doctor’s Associates, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. Extrinsic fraud is said to prevent the court from acquiring true jurisdiction or merely gives it colorable jurisdiction over the matter. Doctor’s Associates, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1043; see also Taylor v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 172652, ¶ 15. It is conduct that is collateral to the issues in the case and prevents the unsuccessful party from having a fair opportunity to participate and defend in the action. Doctor’s Associates, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. By contrast, intrinsic fraud is fraud that occurs after the court acquires jurisdiction, such as false testimony, and goes to the merits of the case. Doctor’s Associates, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1043; see also Taylor, 2019 IL App (1st) 172652, ¶ 15. The party attacking the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud carries the burden of supporting his claim with adequate evidentiary support; thus, it is a factual determination given deference on review. Doctor’s Associates, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. ¶ 53 Our supreme court has repeatedly found that the “mere fact” that a judge was “implicated in accepting bribes in other nonrelated cases” does not “serve to taint all other decisions with which” that judge was involved. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 261 (2000) (citing People v. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d 19, 29 (1992)). In Fair, for example, our supreme court found that the trial judge who presided over defendant’s trial and sentencing had “engaged in extensive criminal conduct while on the bench,” eventually pleading guilty to 159 separate crimes. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 259. On appeal, defendant argued that, since the trial court’s corruption was pervasive,

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there was no basis for presuming he was impartial at defendant’s trial. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 260. Although our supreme court found the judge’s corruption extensive, it “disagree[d]” and did not find this argument persuasive. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 260. Thus, the fact, by itself, that a judge took a bribe in another case does not render a defendant’s conviction invalid. See Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 20 (“The fact that [a codefendant] bribed [the trial judge] does not in and of itself establish [the judge’s] lack of impartiality in the defendant’s trial.”). ¶ 54 In Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 30, our supreme court found that a defendant alleging compensatory bias had to establish (1) “a nexus between the activities being investigated and the trial judge’s conduct at trial” and (2) “actual bias resulting from the trial judge’s extrajudicial conduct.” ¶ 55 After Titone, our supreme court in People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41, 50 (1998), observed that “[f]airness at trial requires not only the absence of actual bias but also the absence of the probability of bias. [Citation.] To this end, no person is permitted to judge cases in which he or she has an interest in the outcome.” Based on Hawkins and the cases Hawkins cites, defendant in our case argues that he does not have to show “actual bias,” as stated in Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 30, but only “the probability of bias,” as stated in Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d at 50. ¶ 56 However, in Fair, our supreme court explained: “Hawkins simply clarified the second prong of the test by adding that a [defendant] need not prove actual bias if he can prove that the trial judge had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial.” Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 263. The Fair court “reaffirm[ed]” its “holding in Titone that in order to secure relief on a claim of judicial bias, [a defendant] must establish a nexus between a judge’s corruption and the judge’s conduct at [the defendant’s] trial.” Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 263. ¶ 57 Thus, in the case at bar, defendant had the burden of establishing before the trial court (1) a nexus between Judge Wilson’s bribe and Judge Wilson’s conduct at defendant’s trial and (2) actual bias by Judge Wilson or that he had a personal interest in the outcome of the case. See Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 21 (defendant must establish a nexus and either actual bias or “a direct, personal, and substantial” interest, such as “a pecuniary interest in the outcome”). ¶ 58 Defendant argues that Fair and Gacho are distinguishable because they involved a jury verdict rather than a bench trial. See Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 259 (jury trial); Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 2 (“the defendant elect[ed] a jury trial”). However, both Titone and Hawkins involved bench trials, as defendant’s case did. See Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 23 (“[d]efendant waived his right to a jury trial and received a bench trial”); Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d at 45 n.1 (citing People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 27-28 (1990) (“[f]ollowing a bench trial,” Hawkins was convicted)). Thus, we cannot find this argument persuasive.

¶ 59 D. Nexus ¶ 60 We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no nexus between Judge Wilson’s acceptance of a bribe in an unrelated case and his conduct in defendant’s trial and sentencing. ¶ 61 Defendant argues that the proximity in time between the bribe and defendant’s trial and the suspicions aroused by accepting a bribe establish the nexus. However, as we discussed above, the acceptance of a bribe, by itself, does not establish compensatory bias in another case; this case was not “sandwiched tightly” between bribed cases, but occurred seven months after the only known bribery case by Judge Wilson. See Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 265.

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¶ 62 In Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 265-66, our supreme court discussed Bracy, 520 U.S. 899, stressing the facts in Bracy that led the United States Supreme Court to conclude that further discovery in that case was warranted. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908. In Bracy, the defendant had alleged that his trial judge had a personal interest in his conviction because his speedy conviction would deflect suspicion from the fact that the trial judge was taking bribes in other murder cases. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 901. Our supreme court observed that supporting the Bracy defendant’s claim were the facts that his murder trial was “sandwiched tightly” between other murder trials in which the judge had accepted bribes, that the judge appointed a former associate from his former private practice to represent defendant, that this attorney announced he was ready for trial only a few weeks after his appointment, and that he did not seek additional time to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial, even after the State announced its decision to seek the death penalty. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 265-66 (discussing Bracy, 520 U.S. at 906-08). 13 These “procedural irregularities” were the facts that warranted further discovery. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 266. ¶ 63 However, none of these facts occurred in the case at bar. Defendant’s case was not sandwiched tightly between other bribery cases but rather occurred seven months after Judge Wilson’s only known bribery case. Judge Wilson did not appoint defendant’s trial counsel. The trial was not rushed, and defendant has not alleged any specific trial errors or procedural irregularities. See Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 265-66 (discussing “procedural irregularities”); Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 133492, ¶ 24 (defendant’s claim of compensatory bias failed where he could not identify one questionable ruling during trial); Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 33 (Wilson did not appoint trial counsel “[n]or does it appear the trial was rushed in any way”). ¶ 64 In addition, the trial court in the case at bar found that, unlike the judges in Fair and Bracy, “there is no evidence Wilson solicited or accepted a bribe in any other case” and, thus, corruption did not permeate his judicial actions. By contrast, the trial judge in Fair had “engaged in extensive criminal conduct while on the bench *** both before and after [the defendant’s] trial and sentencing” (Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 259), and the trial judge in Bracy “fixed serious felony cases regularly,” including cases that defendant’s trial “was sandwiched tightly between” (Bracy, 520 U.S. at 906-07). ¶ 65 The trial court also found that defendant failed to establish that, at the time of defendant’s trial and sentence, Judge Wilson was laboring under a need to engage in compensatory action, either to deflect an investigation or avoid backlash in an election. The trial court observed that Operation Greylord did not begin until three years later, and defendant did not present any “evidence that any law enforcement authority was investigating Wilson in December 1977,” when defendant was convicted, or at “anytime, for that matter,” until over a decade later when the FBI arranged for Cooley to meet with Wilson. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 34. Although there had been newspaper articles calling upon voters to “ ‘cast him out,’ ” defendant did not present evidence that Wilson ever appeared on a ballot again or even intended to run again at any time after this trial. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 34. By the time of defendant’s trial, Aleman was indicted on federal charges, with “no investigation of Wilson” occurring. Carrasquillo, No. 76-CR-05807, slip op. at 34. Thus, the