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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EDELSON PC, Case No. 22-cv-03977-JSC Plaintiff, ORDER RE: VENUE MOTIONS v. 9 Re: Dkt. Nos. 41, 43, 47, 54, 55, 61 10 DAVID LIRA, et al., Defendants. 11 tru o C tc irtsiD se ta tS d e fo tc irtsiDa i nn rr eo fila C 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 c S 2 cr o;ea nv Ds seh k in, dt .s eD u E N reeed o dfse e . l n tn 4s hi do en an ; e bn D P D rts ikC e e m t f, f . i et no Nh n gve d o ,e a .l a na t now t ds d ; f f wi Di o sr imr km t hta i . n s a tNs hs a s eofli o l .g be r 5n g e i 5e ne m e d ea p f to s i r tf 7c o oh –f pi fe 1ev m 3r oe

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l l. a y) t1 tin Uh tro N 18 concludes that venue is improper in this District and TRANSFERS this case to the Central District of California. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS Defendants are each connected in some way to Thomas Girardi and his law firm, Girardi Keese (“GK”), which operated in Los Angeles, California until its collapse in late 2020. Edelson PC alleges Defendants conspired to steal settlement funds from GK’s Lion Air clients. Defendant Erika Girardi is Mr. Girardi’s wife and a citizen of California. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25.) Ms. Girardi is the sole member of Defendant EJ Global, LLC, which has its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. (Id. ¶ 26.) Defendants David Lira and Keith Griffin, both Page ID #:1159

citizens of California, were attorneys at GK who represented the Lion Air clients. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28, 50.) Mr. Lira is also Mr. Girardi’s son-in-law. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Christopher Kamon, a citizen of California, was Chief Financial Officer of GK. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 29.) Defendant George Hatcher, a citizen of California, was a non-attorney case runner who brought clients to GK. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 30.) Mr. Hatcher is the founder of Wrongful Death Consultants, Inc. (“WDC”), a California corporation with its principal place of business in Arcadia, California. (Id. ¶ 31.) Defendant Joseph DiNardo, a citizen of New York, funded GK’s work and took a cut of incoming settlement funds. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 32.) Mr. DiNardo is the founder of California Attorney Lending II, Inc. (“CAL II”), a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Buffalo, New York, which “was incorporated specifically for the purpose of doing business in the State of California.” (Id. ¶ 33.) tru o C tc irtsiD se ta tS d e a in ro fila C fo tc irtsiD n re 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 C a c C Cg oh a oa n li di .sc n ep Pa sg i §et ro naP D 4, c al

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sPu)l a n ei ndm ae lrs tin Uh tro N 18 practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law; (8) violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act; and (9) and (10), two counts of deceit. The complaint asserts venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) and (b). Plaintiff “maintains an office and conducts business” here and “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims alleged occurred” here. (Id. ¶ 35.) Mr. Lira traveled here to transact affairs on or about March 19, April 19, May 6, June 13, and August 9, 2019. (Id. ¶ 37.) Mr. Griffin traveled here to transact affairs on or about October 26, 2019, and litigated two cases (filed in 2018 and 2019) in this District. (Id. ¶ 38.) On September 11, 2020, “while physically present in this District, Griffin sent a lulling email to [a Lion Air client] in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (Id. ¶ 39.)

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DISCUSSION Edelson has the burden to show venue is proper in this District. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). As a preliminary matter, in its opposition’s introduction, Edelson insists the reason it filed suit in the Northern District of California is because Defendants’ fraudulent scheme was facilitated by Thomas Girardi’s assertion that he could exert improper influence with the courts in southern California. Edelson argues that “[t]o prevent the long shadow of Thomas Girardi from darkening the results in this case— whatever they may be—Plaintiff filed here, in a forum that is unimpeachably neutral.” (Dkt. No. 85 at 10.) The problem with this argument is that it is untethered to the law. Various statutes dictate proper venue, and none of them alter the standard that applies because the plaintiff alleges that a particular venue may be perceived as not neutral. Applying the governing law, Plaintiff has tru o C tc irtsiD se ta tS d e a in ro fila C fo tc irtsiD n re 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 4 5 6 7

n p s thuo a abrt tt s m rto a efe n f t et tA U h ii rat se. ns l d t eb p oe vu a r e irr tn2 td s2 t8 e o n8 s n f U i o U nto r h. tS. f heS o . s mC. ceh C lv.o i a . s e§ iw s m§ n i1i ton s3 an g g9 gs i1 at vgh i( niia ( b nvb st ) gi t()v n 2( Me r2 g) in ,) s r r u ev .i e s e Gte n oi rs u t ii o fe tp f s r t ii h no cs e p lp aa e c nr ir mo l d. a2 p i Moe mr f r

i o d .n c e L cc“ iu e ra air tj r u oe od rd c i . icc ” tu si a rE trl e edd ndei t s hl hst r eo ci rn lc e at ;a i i ms in ts ew i asr g th n asi ioc t nh th s a c ta t l o eas nau r lb y ws Mt ha en rt .t h ia el r

tin Uh tro N 18 Griffin. (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 351–63.) Edelson then argues that the Court may exercise pendent venue over the other claims. See United Tactical Sys. LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 733, 753 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Once a court has determined that venue is proper as to one claim, it may exercise pendent venue to adjudicate closely related claims.”). Venue is not proper under Section 1391(b)(2) as to either deceit claim. The only event Edelson offers is a September 11, 2020 email from Mr. Griffin, while physically present in this District, to a Lion Air client in which he misrepresented material facts with knowledge of falsity and intent to deceive and induce her reliance. See Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining elements of deceit under California law). That does

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not come anywhere close to a “substantial part of the events” giving rise to Edelson’s deceit claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which allege a holistic scheme to prevent any of the five client families from learning about the fraud over a period of years. The overall course of alleged conduct is much bigger than in Cheery Way, such that a handful of connections to this District do not amount to a substantial part of the events. See Cheery Way (USA), Inc. v. Ngoc Diep Duong, No. C12-0486 JSC, 2012 WL 1670172, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (two contracts and some payments made in this District, within overall course of “three unsatisfactory transactions”). While Section 1391(b)(2) does not require a majority or a predominance of events to have occurred in this District, it requires more than Edelson alleges here. See Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2020). B. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) tru o C tc irtsiD se ta tS d e a in ro fila C fo tc irtsiD n re 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 i 1 s t tn h ot8 a a “ tt tU hua M etn . eS y os r. . tF .Cd ” hLo i . es r iG§ rt r rR a Doi ca a–9 etc nV fk i ed5n ie nd ( Mt w da ee ) aoe h r. n, .r i tc I GTI snhn h rc u f i[ e .l nft u s fh v de ie .e n e n R A r dc r kI 1ee e C a g 8d fe i uO

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d( a r ( “ g tt 9R hhe t ehanIC nn t C, O apo i rr r” r ge . ) t ue 1 rc m ea 9l sna 8p si v9tm a , e) c . ngs t , ues E nv eh d ee i iern s sla u sa pl oe f rv f n oi a es

pai n r ep sus rsr . e o e” a r p s t e sr tin Uh tro N 18 Edelson has not met its burden as to either Mr. Lira or Mr. Griffin. Edelson alleges Mr. Lira traveled here for business six times between March and August 2019; Mr. Griffin traveled here for business in October 2019; Mr. Griffin was here when he emailed the client in September 2020; and Mr. Griffin litigated two cases here (filed in 2018 and 2019). (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 37–39.) Assuming Edelson’s allegations are true, they are insufficient to support a finding that Mr. Lira or Mr. Griffin “transacts his affairs” here. Section 1965(a) requires something more than the scattered, tenuous connections to this District that are alleged here. See Corso v. Franz, No. 16CV2384FBSMG, 2018 WL 1513639, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (reasoning that because Section 1965(a) was based on Clayton Act venue provisions, which require business “transact[ed]” in the district to be substantial, Section 1965(a) requires the same); King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (noting Section 1965(a) was based on Clayton Act); see

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also Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 373 (1927) (“[A] corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district, within the meaning of [the Clayton Act], in such sense as to establish the venue of a suit . . . , [if] it ‘transacts business’ therein of any substantial character.”); Pincione v. D’Alfonso, 506 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring business to “be substantial in character, so that there is some amount of business continuity and certainly more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts with the particular judicial district” (cleaned up)). Edelson has not met its burden under the RICO venue statute. C. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” Edelson asserts that all Defendants are residents of California or may be deemed residents because tru o C tc irtsiD se ta tS d e a in ro fila C fo tc irtsiD n re 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 t r cb i t , c a0j spt le e lrc b y9 to tt e ,. p ii nco Mea gn ru rs u a.s t sne Do i d d i iv et N e re h tan Sa hru s e ed e c ow w to ia i aor si in vp va ee e1 rdr r3 es s io 9o sib 1n d sj ( ua ee bl enc ) sj t(tu

,i o or S) fi n s e b Nsd ce ti t ec ic o w oat i nv u o Y e sn 1en o, 3 u n ra 9e kon .tod ( bar (t l )Dh p l ( a e 1kDt r )t s .ea d o f Nt on e l n o eae sdl .a s a 1j nut n o ¶ro t ti s n s pd re rei o)D c s ; vit de i s io e df ee n e e in . n ad S a pe n U re ot . pD S e.o C re ., tin Uh tro N 18 basis for venue in this District. * * * Edelson has not met its burden to show that venue is proper in the Northern District of California. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) directs the Court to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” The Court finds it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case rather than dismiss it. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962) (explaining Section 1406(a)’s purpose of facilitating adjudication on the merits); cf. King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t would not be in the interests of justice to transfer this case because, among other reasons, King herself expressed no interest in transfer and . . . the action smacks of harassment and bad faith . . . .”). Edelson does not dispute that venue would be proper in the Central District of

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California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a). The Court also finds that, even if venue is proper here, the factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) favor discretionary transfer to the Central District of California. See, e.g., Kawamoto v. || CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1212-15 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding venue was proper and ordering discretionary transfer under Section 1404(a), but noting that even if venue were not proper, transfer under Section 1406(a) would be in the interest of justice for similar reasons). This case Clearly has its center of gravity in the Central District, where the majority of events occurred || and the majority of parties and witnesses are located. The moving Defendants meet their burden || under Section 1404(a) to show that the Central District is the more appropriate venue for this case. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). CONCLUSION Mr. Hatcher, Mr. Lira, Mr. Griffin, and CAL II’s motions are GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 41; E 13 Dkt. No. 43 at 2; Dkt. No. 47; Dkt. No. 54; Dkt. No. 55 at 7-13.) This case is TRANSFERRED to 2 14 || the Central District of California. 3 15 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 41, 47, 54, 61. 5 a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. § 2 17 |] Dated: December 2, 2022 SS 18 . Set) 19 Mm. ACQUELINE SCOTT CORL United States District Judge