Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905). · Go Syfert
Search
Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime. ✓
238 citation events (43 in the last 25 years) across 44 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Thomas (mont, 2019-07-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1905 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1905 1965 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Thomas (3×)
Mont. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Dawson v. State (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. · 2001 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
a statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Barr
D.D.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
In Rooney v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court found that a statute which increased the required time between conviction and the implementation of a death sentence was not an ex post facto punishment because it benefitted the prisoner. 196 U.S. 319, 266 (1905).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moussazadeh, Ex Parte Max
Tex. Crim. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
App. 1971). "[A] statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime." Rooney v. North Dakota , 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905). 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moussazadeh, Ex Parte Max
Tex. Crim. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
App. 1971). “[A] statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime.” Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905). 9 of the plea agreement is not determinative of this Court’s deficient-performance inquiry under Strickland.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dyer v. Bowlen
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
As Justice Harlan held in Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 326 (1905), where a “difference of [statutory] phraseology is not material,” there is no ex post facto violation.2 On the other hand, a reasonable application of the law provided by Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller requires the conclusion that retroactive application of the “seriousness” provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Garner
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See id. (collecting cases).2 Akins v. Snow In Akins, this Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the retroactive application of the amendments to Georgia’s regulations governing parole consideration at issue here, see Ga. 2 Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-326 (1867); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 , 39…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Department of Corrections v. Morales (2×)
SCOTUS · 1995 · confidence medium
Thus, although the Court has carefully examined laws changing the conditions of confinement to determine whether they are favorable or unfavorable to the prisoner, see, e. g., Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 325 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 171 (1890), no Member of the Court has ever voted to uphold a statute *517 that retroactively increased the length of time that a prisoner must remain imprisoned for past offenses, see, e. g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987) (unanimous opinion); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981) (without dissent).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cirrincione
N.D. Ill. · 1985 · confidence medium
If the shortening of the time of confinement ... before execution, would have increased, as undoubtedly it would have increased, the punishment to the disadvantage of a criminal sentenced to be hung, the enlargement of such time must be deemed a change for his benefit. 196 U.S. at 325 , 25 S.Ct. at 266 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lerner v. Gill
R.I. · 1983 · confidence medium
I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed a ‘greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the ... offense,’ Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 [ 25 S.Ct. 264, 265 , 49 L.Ed. 494 ] (1905) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weaver v. Graham (2×)
SCOTUS · 1981 · confidence medium
See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (1937); Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 324-325 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 171 (1890); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798). [9] Through this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly *29 changed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Warden v. Marrero
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed a "greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the . . . offense," Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 325 (1905) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Warden v. Marrero
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed a “greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the .. . offense,” Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 325 (1905) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Pierre v. Jones (2×)
La. · 1942 · confidence medium
“In response to the meticulous objection based upon change of place for execution and increased number of witnesses it suffices to refer to what this court said through Mr. Justice Harlan in Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 , 11 S.Ct. 143 , 34 L.Ed. 734, 736 , and Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325, 326 , 25 S.Ct. *818 264, 49 L.Ed. 494, 496, 497 , 3 Ann.Cas. 76.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Malloy v. South Carolina
SCOTUS · 1915 · confidence medium
In response to the meticulous objection based upon change of place for execution and increased number of witnesses it suffices to refer to what this court said through Mr. Justice Harlan in Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, 491 , and Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 325, 326 .
examined Cited "see" Robert Ogg v. Frank X. Klein, United States Marshal, Northern District of California (3×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 , 25 S.Ct. 264 , 49 L.Ed. 494 (1908); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gullickson v. Torkelson Brothers, Inc.
N.D. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Territory v. Miller , 4 N.D. 173 , 29 N.W. 7 (Dakota Terr. 1886), (holding there was no ex post facto violation because the clear intent and effect of the legislation identifying classes of homicide was to mitigate, not increase, the severity of punishment in certain murder cases). [¶44] Similarly, this court in State v. Rooney , 12 N.D. 144 , 95 N.W. 513 (1903), aff'd , 196 U.S. 319 (1905), held that a new statute controlling the place of confinement and the timing of execution of a convicted murderer was ameliorative.
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Burr (3×)
N.D. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Territory v. Miller, 4 Dakota 173 , 29 N.W. 7 (1886), (holding there was no ex post facto violation because the clear intent and effect of the legislation identifying classes of homicide was to mitigate, not increase, the severity of punishment in certain murder cases). [¶ 44] Similarly, this court in State v. Rooney, 12 N.D. 144 , 95 N.W. 513 (1903), aff'd, 196 U.S. 319 , 25 S.Ct. 264 , 49 L.Ed. 494 (1905), held that a new statute controlling the place of confinement and the timing of execution of a convicted murderer was ameliorative.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rooney
v.
North Dakota
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 23, 1905.
196 U.S. 319
Mr. B. F. Spalding, with whom Mr. Seth Newman was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:, Mr. Emerson H. Smith, with whom Mr. W. H. Barnett was on the brief, for defendant in error:
Harlan.
or within some convenient inclosure within such county
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #26,913 of 633,719
Citer courts: Montana Supreme Court (3) · Supreme Court of Georgia (2)
Mr. Justice Harlan,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

It appears from the statement of the case that the statute in force when the sentence of death was pronounced differed from those in force when the crime was committed and when the verdict was rendered, in these particulars:

1. By the later law, close confinement in the penitentiary for not less than six months and not more than nine months, after judgment and before execution, was substituted for confinement in the county jail for not less than three months nor more than six months after judgment and before execution.

[*325] 2. By the later law, hanging, within an inclosure at the penitentiary by the warden or his deputy, was substituted for hanging by the sheriff within the yard of the jail of the county in which the conviction occurred.

We are of opinion that in the particulars just mentioned the statute of 1903 is not repugnant to the constitutional provision declaring that no State shall pass an ex post facto law. It did not create a new offense nor aggravate or increase the enormity of the crime for the commission of which the accused was convicted, nor require the infliction upon the accused of any greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the commission of the offense. The changes, looked'at in the light of reason and common sense and applied to the present case, are to be taken as favorable rather than as unfavorable to him. It may be sometimes difficult to say whether particular changes in the law .are or are not in mitigation of the punishment for crimes previously committed. But it must be taken that there is such mitigation when by the later law there is an enlargement of the period of confinement prior to the actual execution of the criminal by hanging. The giving, by the later statute, of three months’ additional time to live, after the rendition of judgment, was clearly to his advantage, for the court must assume that every rational person desires to live as long as he may. If the shortening of the time of confinement, whether in the county jail or in the penitentiary before execution, would have increased, as undoubtedly 'it would have increased, the punishment to the disadvantage of a criminal sentenced to be hung, the enlargement of such time must be deemed a change for his benefit. So that a statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime. Calder v. Ball, 3 Dall. 386, 391, Chase, J.; Story’s Const. § 1345; Cooley’s Const. Lim. *267; Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray, 438, 443; 1 Bishop’s Crim.Xaw, § 280. Besides, the extension of the time to live, given by the later la¡w, increased the opportunity of the n.c-[*326] cused to obtain a pardon or commutation from the Governor of the State before his execution.

Nor was the punishment, in any substantial sense, increased or made more severe by substituting close confinement in the penitentiary prior to execution for confinement in the county jail. It is contended that “close confinement” means “solitary confinement,” and Medley’s Case, 134 U. S. 160, is cited in support of the contention that the new law increased the punishment to the disadvantage of the accused. We do not think that the two phrases import the same kind, of punishment. Although solitary confinement may involve close confinement, a criminal could be kept in close confinement without being subjected to solitary confinement. It cannot be supposed that any criminal would be subjected to solitary confinement when the mandate of the law was simply to keep him in close confinement;

Again, it.is said that the law in force when the crime was committed only required confinement, whereas the later statute required' close confinement. But this difference of phraseology is not material. “Confinemént” and “close confinement.” equally mean such custody, and only such custody, as will safely secure thé production of the body of the prisoner on the day appointed for his execution.

The objection that the later law required the execution of the sentence of death to take place within the limits of the penitentiary rather than in the county jail,.as provided in the previous statute, is without merit. However material the place of confinement may be in case of some crimes not involving life, the place of execution, when the punishment is death, within the limits of the State, is of no practical consequence to the .criminal. On such a matter he is not entitled to be heard.

The views we have expressed are in accord with those announced by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. State v. Rooney, 12 N. Dak. 144, 152.

We are of opinion that the law of 1903 did not alter the[*327] situation to the material disadvantage of the criminal, and, therefore, was not ex 'post facto when applied to his'case in the particulars mentioned.

Judgment affirmed.