¹ Alleged Misstatements and Scheme Liability. Defendants argue that the SEC’s § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim must be dismissed as to the Appendix A issuers because the SEC has failed to identify misstatements with particularity and only vaguely references a “fraudulent trading scheme.” [Defs.’ Br. at 10.] Defendants assert that the SEC has failed to provide the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud. [See id. at 10–12.] In response, the SEC submits two arguments. First, it argues that Rule 9(b) does not require that it plead every detail of every alleged fraud forming the basis of its Complaint. [Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5.] Rather, because the SEC is alleging a fraudulent scheme or pattern of fraudulent conduct, it need only supply a representative sample of the alleged fraud. [Id. at 6.] Second, in any case, the SEC argues that its allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for fraud under Rule 10b-5(a), (b), and (c) as to Defendants’ trading in all ten issuers. [Id. at 7–9.] The Court first considers whether the SEC can meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements by pleading representative examples of fraud. In support of its position, the SEC leans heavily on two False Claims Act (“FCA”) cases: United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006) and Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014). In Joshi, a doctor (Dr. Joshi) brought a qui tam action under the FCA against a hospital (St. Luke’s) and its chief of anesthesiology (Dr. Bashiti). 441 F.3d at 553–54. He alleged that the hospital and the chief of anesthesiology conspired and submitted false claims to the government seeking payment for anesthesia services, medical supplies, and prescriptions. Id. Examining the sufficiency of his allegations of fraud, the court agreed that the doctor had failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. See id. at 556 (“Simply put, the complaint fails to identify specifically the ‘who, what, where, when, and how’ of the alleged fraud.”). Recognizing, however, that the doctor had alleged a wide-ranging fraudulent scheme—a “systematic practice of St. Luke’s and Dr. Bashiti submitting and conspiring to submit fraudulent claims over a sixteen-year period”—the court explained that Rule 9(b) provides some latitude: Clearly, neither this court nor Rule 9(b) requires Dr. Joshi to allege specific details of every alleged fraudulent claim forming the basis of Dr. Joshi’s complaint. However, to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement and to enable St. Luke’s and Dr. Bashiti to respond specifically to Dr. Joshi’s allegations, Dr. Joshi must provide some representative examples of their alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and content of their acts and the identity of the actors. Id. at 557. In Foglia, the Third Circuit considered a split between the circuits on what a plaintiff must show at the pleading stage to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement in the context of an FCA action. 754 F.3d at 155. The Foglia court observed that the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require a plaintiff to show “representative samples” of the allegedly fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and content of the acts and the identity of the actors. Id. at 155–56 (citing Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557) (other citations omitted). Contrasting those courts’ approach with the “more nuanced” reading of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the Foglia court determined that the “nuanced” approach would suffice: to satisfy Rule 9(b) for a claim under the FCA, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege “ ‘particular details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.’ ” Id. at 156 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also id. at 157–58. Having reviewed these cases, the Court is not persuaded that the “relaxed” approach to Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement in the FCA context is applicable to a securities fraud action. While some courts appear to credit this approach in actions brought by the SEC under federal securities laws, see, e.g., SEC v. Bluepoint Inv. Counsel, LLC, 2021 WL 719647, at *15 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2021) (“[D]istrict courts in this circuit have held that ‘a plaintiff who pleads a fraudulent scheme involving numerous transactions over a period of years need not plead specifics with respect to every instance of fraud, but it must at least provide representative examples.’ ”) (cleaned up) (quoting United States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukranian Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 872, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2012)), this Court is not aware of binding authority in the Third Circuit authorizing it to do so. In fact, the Fifth Circuit in Grubbs—a case that the Foglia court endorsed in adopting a “nuanced” approach to satisfying Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement in an FCA action, see Foglia, 754 F.3d at 156—even contrasted claims under the FCA from securities fraud claims. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 189 (“[A] claim under the False Claims Act and a claim under common law or securities fraud are not on the same plane in meeting the requirement of ‘stat[ing] with particularity’ the contents of the fraudulent misrepresentation.”) (alteration in original). Therefore, the Court concludes that the SEC cannot avoid Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements as to the Appendix A transactions by reference to their representative sample theory and a body of FCA cases. As the SEC contends that each transaction identified in Appendix A constitutes a § 10(b) violation, the Appendix A allegations must themselves be sufficiently stated with particularity. Still, the SEC need not rely on the FCA’s “nuanced” pleading standard to clear this sticky wicket: Rule 9(b) does not require the SEC to allege “every material detail of the fraud, such as the date, location, and time,” so long as it uses “alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into [its] allegations of fraud.” In re Rockefeller, 311 F.3d at 216 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the question is whether the allegations are sufficient to “place the defendant on notice of the ‘precise misconduct with which it is charged.’ ” Frederico, 507 F.3d at 200 (quoting Lum, 361 F.3d at 223–24) (cleaned up). In this sense, SEC’s allegations concerning Issuers 1 and 2 should inform the Court’s consideration of Appendix A as it asks whether the table contains the material details of allegedly violative trading as part of a “long running fraudulent scheme” to circumvent Regulation SHO. Here, the SEC alleges that Defendants (a) submitted false trading orders to executing broker-dealers for long sales as to the issuers identified in Appendix A when the Private Funds did not have net long positions or (b) submitted short sale trading orders to executing broker-dealers for short sales as to the issuers identified in Appendix A while misrepresenting that Defendants had obtained sufficient “locates.” [Compl. ¶ 98; see also infra App’x A.] In other words, the SEC alleges that Defendants engaged in the exact same two forms of abusive trading in the securities of the Appendix A Issuers as described concerning the securities of Issuers 1 and 2. [Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–9; Compl. ¶¶ 41–95.] While the SEC cannot rely on “representative examples” of adequately pleaded trading violations to bootstrap inadequately pleaded trading violations, see supra at pp. 29–31, each instance of Defendants’ allegedly abusive trading should be considered together. This action only involves two forms of circumventing Regulation SHO. Consider the SEC’s allegations concerning Defendants’ trading in Issuer 4 as an example. The SEC alleges that, between June 25 and July 6, 2018, Defendants submitted orders on behalf of the Warrant Fund to an executing broker-dealer for sales of 381,642,544 shares of Issuer 4 that were marked as long sales when, in fact, they were short sales. [Compl. ¶ 98; see infra App’x A, Row 5.] This instance of “naked” short selling resulted in $204,169.89 of profits. [Id.] The SEC argues that “there is absolutely no ambiguity about what Defendants did and why it was wrong.” [Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.] The Court must agree. Though it may be unorthodox to rely on an appendix containing a table to supply the material allegations of fraud, the Court will not prioritize form over substance. The Complaint and the information contained in Appendix A together contain the necessary facts to comply with Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement and survive dismissal. As to Issuer 4, the SEC alleges that Defendants—through the Warrant Fund managed by Sabby and controlled by Mintz—authorized the “naked” short sales, submitting mismarked orders to executing broker-dealers (who); that the short sale orders were mismarked as long sales (how); that the orders resulted in the sale of 381,642,544 shares of Issuer 4 (what); that such sales reaped over $200,000 in proceeds (why); and that such conduct occurred between June 25 and July 6, 2018 (when). [Compl. ¶ 98; see infra App’x A, Row 5.] These allegations plainly refer to the material misstatements giving rise to the alleged § 10(b) violation—i.e., that the short sale orders were mismarked as long sales, in contravention of Regulation SHO (i.e., 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(g)). See Kearns, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (explaining that, to state a prima facie violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC must, among other things, identify that the defendant made a misrepresentation). Accordingly, the information contained in Appendix A is sufficient to place Defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with which they are charged.17, 18 See Frederico, 507 F.3d at 200. Defendants also submit that the SEC has failed to sufficiently allege scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). [Defs.’ Br. at 10–11; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 10–12.] A party can incur liability for employing a fraudulent scheme or engaging in any fraudulent act in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, even without making an oral or written statement. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific- Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008). To state a claim for scheme liability under Rule 17 In so holding, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the Complaint fails to explain Mintz’s role in the Appendix A transactions and to attribute particular misstatements to him. [Defs.’ Reply Br. at 7.] The SEC has alleged that Mintz, as the principal and managing partner of Sabby during the relevant period, had responsibility for making investment decisions for the Private Funds and the obligation to consult trading records prior to authorizing a sale order. [Compl. ¶¶ 15, 37–39.] It further alleges, as to each Appendix A transaction, whether Mintz authorized orders with false information about the number of locates obtained or orders that were mismarked as long sales. [Id. ¶¶ 98; App’x A.] While the level of detail that the SEC includes is indisputably less than its allegations regarding the allegedly violative trading in Issuers 1 and 2, the SEC has set forth sufficient information to enable Defendants to discern the material allegations of fraud as to each Appendix A Issuer. See SEC v. Gu, 2022 WL 2753478, at *3 (D.N.J. July 13, 2022) (“Despite Defendant’s protests, he is not prevented from meaningfully being able to respond to the Complaint . . . This Court will therefore deny his motion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 While the Court concludes that, in this instance, the SEC’s allegations are sufficient to comply with Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements, this Opinion should not be construed as an open-ended approval of the SEC’s practice more generally—i.e., summarizing material allegations of fraud in an appendix attached to the operative complaint. In another case, this practice may require the SEC to replead its allegations in narrative form and in separately numerated paragraphs to clarify the circumstances of fraud as to each occurrence. For the reasons already explained, however, this result will not be required here, but the SEC is forewarned. 10b-5(a) or (c), the SEC must allege “(1) that the defendant committed a deceptive or manipulative act, (2) in furtherance of the alleged scheme to defraud, (3) with scienter.” Lucent II, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 350. “[M]isstatements and omissions can form part of a scheme liability claim, but an actionable scheme liability claim also requires something beyond misstatements and omissions, such as dissemination.” SEC v. Rio Tinto plc, 41 F.4th 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2022); see also Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, Defendants contend that the SEC has not pleaded a single fraudulent scheme, but rather attempted to plead multiple schemes involving different issuers and transactions. [Defs.’ Reply Br. at 10.] Defendants also argue that reliance on scheme liability cannot save the SEC’s failure to identify particular misstatements attributable to each Defendant. [Id. at 10–11.] Neither argument is convincing. Viewing the information identified in Appendix A in the context of the SEC’s other allegations concerning trading in the securities of Issuers 1 and 2, [Compl. ¶¶ 41– 95], the Court concludes that the SEC has identified deceptive conduct independent of its allegations that Defendants made false or misleading statements. As noted above, the SEC alleges that Defendants “submitted” false and misleading trade order instructions or false and misleading representations concerning the number of “locates” obtained. [Compl. ¶ 98.] A fair inference from these allegations is that Mintz authorized the dissemination of false information and participated in concealing information from executing broker-dealers. As to Issuers 1 and 2, for instance, Mintz allegedly resisted efforts by Executing Broker-Dealer A to obtain documentation to confirm that Defendants had a sufficient number of “locates” prior to submitting their short sale orders. [Id. ¶¶ 61–69.] The SEC also alleges that Defendants were previously sanctioned for violating Rule 105 of Regulation M on two occasions, resulting in the imposition of a cease-and-desist order, disgorgement, and a civil penalty.19 [Id. ¶ 16.] The Appendix A transactions, in this light, are alleged to be “part of a fraudulent scheme to circumvent trading rules.” [Id. ¶ 97.] Based on these allegations, the Court determines that the SEC has sufficiently identified the circumstances of the alleged fraudulent conduct—repeated circumvention of Regulation SHO and efforts to conceal Defendants’ scheme. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 587 U.S. __, __, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1101 (2019) (observing that the words “device,” “scheme” and “artifice” in Rule 10b- 5 “capture a wide range of conduct”). Though based on the alleged misstatements, the SEC’s scheme liability claim contains the “something extras” required to survive dismissal. See Stubos, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 201. 19 The SEC permissibly identifies that Sabby has been previously sanctioned by the Commission for improper short sales, [Compl. ¶ 16], and the Court recognizes that this allegation is relevant here. However, in connection with identifying Sabby’s Regulation M violations, it labels Sabby a “recidivist,” [id. ¶ 1], and impugns Mintz’s reputation accordingly. This is inappropriate. Rule 105 of Regulation M has a different set of requirements from Regulation SHO. The Court exercises its authority to strike the SEC’s reference to Sabby as a “recidivist” as impertinent and scandalous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1) (recognized that a court may sua sponte “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter”).

² Scienter. Next, the Court considers Defendants’ argument that the SEC’s § 10(b) claim must be dismissed because it fails to allege any plausible inference of scienter in connection with Defendants’ trading in the Appendix A issuers. [Defs. Br. at 12–14.] As noted, a claim under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder requires a showing of scienter. SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 272–73 (3d Cir. 1998); and McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1196–97 (3d Cir. 1979)). “Scienter is ‘a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,’ . . . [and] the scienter required for securities fraud includes recklessness.” Infinity Grp., 212 F.3d at 192 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12). To establish scienter, the SEC must either (1) “identify circumstances indicating conscious or reckless behavior by defendants or (2) allege facts showing both a motive and a clear opportunity for committing the fraud.” In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1422 (citation omitted); see SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (Lucent I), 363 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (D.N.J. 2005) (applying these standards in an SEC enforcement proceeding); SEC v. Rivero, 2023 WL 2238700, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2023) (same); SEC v. RRBB Asset Mgmt., LLC, 2021 WL 3047081, at *2 (D.N.J. July 20, 2021) (same). “To establish a corporation’s scienter, the mental state of an officer acting on the corporation’s behalf may be imputed to it.” SEC v. Cooper, 142 F. Supp. 3d 302, 313 (D.N.J. 2015) (Bumb, J.). The SEC need not allege scienter with particularity, but its allegations must support a plausible inference of scienter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”); Dubovoy, 2016 WL 5745099, at *5 (explaining that in a securities fraud action, the SEC need only allege facts that give rise to a plausible inference of scienter) (citing McGee, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 683). Here, the Court is satisfied that the SEC has alleged circumstances suggesting that Defendants knowingly or recklessly engaged in the alleged fraud. As noted above, the SEC alleges that, in each instance identified in Appendix A, Defendants “knowingly and recklessly” either submitted (a) false and misleading sale orders or (b) short sale trading instructions while misrepresenting that they had a sufficient number of “locates.” [Compl. ¶ 98.] Defendants engaged in these two forms of abusive trading, the SEC alleges, because “it was profitable to do so and more profitable than following the requirements of Regulation SHO.” [Id. ¶ 99.] The SEC also asserts that the Appendix A transactions are materially similar to Defendants’ trading in the securities of Issuers 1 and 2, as further evidenced by “Sabby’s prior history of short sale violations in connection with Rule 105 of Regulation M.” [Id. ¶ 97; see also id. ¶¶ 41– 95.] In this vein, the SEC alleges that Defendants concealed their misconduct as to such issuers: Mintz misstated the source of the “locates” for Defendants’ trades in the securities of Issuer 1 when there were no locates on file. [See id. ¶¶ 63–64.] He later acknowledged that he was personally aware of the Warrant Fund’s position in the common stock of Issuer 1 on June 21 and 22, 2018; that Defendants had not tendered their convertible securities prior to placing the trades; and that Defendants’ trades as to Issuer 1 were mismarked. [Id. ¶ 71.] Considering these allegations in their totality and situating the Appendix A transactions in their proper context—as part of a relevantly similar pattern of circumventing the requirements of Regulation SHO for years—the Court concludes that the SEC has raised a plausible inference that Defendants knowingly or recklessly engaged in the alleged fraud. See Dubovoy, 2016 WL 5745099, at *5 (explaining that allegations concerning similar trading pattern, among other things, supported inference that defendant intended to participate in the alleged fraud); SEC v. Riel, 282 F. Supp. 3d 499, 521 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (explaining that, to state a claim for securities fraud based on recklessness, it suffices to allege a defendant’s knowledge of facts that are contradicted by public statements) (citation omitted); SEC v. Constantin, 939 F. Supp. 2d 288, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Representing information as true while knowing it is not, recklessly misstating information, or asserting an opinion on grounds so flimsy as to belie any genuine belief in its truth, are all circumstances sufficient to support a conclusion of scienter.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Separately, the Court is satisfied that the SEC has pleaded sufficient facts to show that Defendants had both the motive to engage in abusive trading in circumvention of Regulation SHO and the clear opportunity to do so. Avoiding the “locate” requirements and failing to deliver securities by their settlement date enable a trader to manipulate the price of a security and avoid borrowing costs, leaving the trader with more money in his pockets. See “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, SEC Release No. 34-58774, 73 Fed. Reg. 61666, 61667 (Oct. 17, 2008) (observing that sellers sometimes “intentionally fail to deliver securities as part of a scheme to manipulate the price of a security, or possibly to avoid borrowing costs associated with short sales.”). No reasonable reading of the Complaint could generate doubt about Defendants’ alleged motive here: avoiding the costs associated with applicable regulatory requirements to earn Defendants higher (illicit) profits. See, e.g., Rivero, 2023 WL 2238700, at *9 (“As for motive and opportunity, money is the motive[.]”); RRBB Asset Mgmt., 2021 WL 3047081, at *5 (explaining that the SEC had alleged motive because defendant “could profit handsomely” from trading decisions). Similarly, Defendants’ opportunity to mismark sale orders and lie to executing broker- dealers about the number of “locates” they had obtained and to profit accordingly is obvious, and Defendants do not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the SEC has satisfied its burden to plead scienter “generally.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Lucent I, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 717.

³ Group Pleading. Finally, the Court addresses Defendants’ argument that the SEC’s claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be dismissed because it impermissibly “lumps Defendants” together. [Defs.’ Br. at 14–15 (citing Kennilworth Partners L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 417, 430 (D.N.J. 1999)).] It is true that a plaintiff does not state a claim for securities fraud against a group of defendants with the requisite particularity when it fails to state the role each defendant played in the fraud. See Kennilworth, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29, 430 (dismissing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims because plaintiffs “lump[ed] the defendants together and ma[de] general conclusory allegations of wrongdoing”). This result follows from Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. Id. Accordingly, the purpose of the proscription against group-pleading in this context is to ensure each defendant has notice of the “precise misconduct” with which he is charged. See id. (citing Rolo v. City Inv. Co. Liquidating Tr., 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d Cir. 1998)). Here, unlike in Kennilworth and the other cases that Defendants cite in their moving brief,20 the SEC is not asserting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims against a group of defendants who each have different roles in the alleged fraudulent scheme. Rather, as the only actor, Mintz is alleged to be at the center of the scheme, and Sabby is alleged to be liable for Mintz’s conduct because Mintz acted in furtherance of the fraud on the entity’s behalf. [See Compl. ¶ 15 (referring to Mintz as the principal and managing partner of Sabby and stating that, “[b]ecause of his position, Sabby is liable for Mintz’s conduct”).] It is thus clear what Mintz’s role was in the alleged fraud. Courts typically reject the impermissible-group-pleading argument where, as here, a defendant’s role in an alleged fraud is readily discernable from the pleading. See, e.g., SEC v. Mannion, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (rejecting defendants’ argument that pleading conflated their conduct and engaged in conclusory group pleading). 20 See Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, 2015 WL 3613499, at * 5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015); Russo v. Thor Indus., Inc., 2020 WL 5868801, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2020); Lucent I, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 724. Moreover, there is no suggestion in the pleading that Sabby is liable for conduct that is independent of or separate from Mintz’s actions. In other words, the SEC asserts that Sabby is vicariously liable for Mintz’s scheme to circumvent Regulation SHO. In such circumstances, courts look to agency-law principles and consider the conduct and scienter of the primary violator to determine whether the corporate defendant can be liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Complete Bus. Solutions Grp., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (“The principles of agency may be used to impute the actions of corporate officers and directors to the corporation itself . . . in essence, making the corporation liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”) (cleaned up) (quoting APA Excelsior III, L.P. v. Windley, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). Because the Court has concluded that the SEC’s allegations are sufficient against Mintz, it can readily impute his conduct and scienter to Sabby. See Cooper, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 316–17 (“Because Cooper has the requisite scienter, it may be imputed to the Cooper Companies as well.”) (citing Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2003)); CFTC v. Traders Glob. Grp. Inc., 2023 WL 7545316, at *11 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2023) (“Overall, the Court finds that the CFTC has met its prima facie burden to show scienter as to Defendant Kazmi, based on his own knowledge, and his relationship to Mr. Dentrinos and iSRisk. And, as the sole executive of Traders Global, Defendant Kazmi’s scienter may be imputed to the corporate Defendants.”). The SEC’s theory of fraud is sufficient to clear the pleading stage of this action. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. An Order shall issue separately. s/Renée Marie Bumb RENÉE MARIE BUMB Chief United States District Judge DATED: March 18, 2024