MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a Tennessee Department of Correction inmate housed in the Northeast Correctional Complex (“NECX”), filed a pro se complaint for violation of § 1983 arising out of incidents during his confinement [Doc. ^[1]], a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. ^[2]], and his prisoner trust account statement [Doc. 3]. The Court will address Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. ^[2]] before screening the complaint [Doc. ^[1]]. I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS As it appears from his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. ^[2]] and prisoner trust account statement [Doc. 3] that Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee in one lump sum, this motion [Doc. ^[2]] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to his inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six- month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(b)(1)(A) and(B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of his preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee has been paid

to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order to the Court’s financial deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s facility to ensure compliance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requirements for payment of the filing fee. II. COMPLAINT SCREENING A. Standard Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard the Supreme Court set forth in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive a PLRA initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief “above a speculative level” fails to state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than lawyer- drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Allegations Plaintiff told Defendant O’Connor to take him off his Zoloft, but she refused to do so [Doc. ^[1] at 3]. However, she took him off his sleeping medications and unspecified medications for “seeing [and] hearing things that [are] not there” [Doc. ^[1] at 3–4]. She also changed the time that he took other mental health medications to noon [Id. at 4]. Two days later, Plaintiff took his medications at noon before taking a shower [Id.]. During his shower, Plaintiff got dizzy, tried to grab the shower divider, and fell in a way that injured his shoulder and hand [Id.]. The next day, Plaintiff saw a nurse, and medical staff put him on medicine and said they would refer him to the doctor [Id.]. On that same day, Plaintiff saw Defendant Former Warden Parris and told him what had happened [Id.]. The next day, Plaintiff saw the

doctor [Id.]. Three days later, he got an x-ray and medical providers told him he had a small acromioclavicular (“AC”) ligament separation [Id.]. Plaintiff “went to the triangle” a few months later and was not fully healed, so he placed another sick call [Id.]. Unspecified medical staff did another x-ray, told him the same thing he had heard previously, and put him in a sling for six more weeks [Id.]. But Plaintiff saw another doctor a couple months later who “told [him] the truth,” which is that he has a stage 2 AC injury and a torn rotator cuff [Id.]. Accordingly, the next month, prison officials sent him to the special needs facility for a week on two separate occasions [Id.]. Plaintiff saw Director Denmark after his second return from the special needs facility and told her what had happened, at which point prison officials again sent him to the special needs facility for two weeks to get an MRI [Id.]. But unspecified people want to give Plaintiff therapy instead of fixing his shoulder and do not want to give him anything for pain [Id.]. Plaintiff has sued Former Warden Mike Parris, Associate Warden of Treatment Stacy

Oaks, Warden Shawn Phillips, and Former Morgan County Physician Susan O’Connor [Id. at 3]. As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court “release [him] from prison with [his] charges dropped,” and to file a lawsuit against Defendants Parris, Phillips, and Oaks “for not wanting to help when [Plaintiff] hurt [him]self [ten] months ago” [Id. at 5]. C. Analysis For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Paris liable “for not wanting to help” him after that fall, Plaintiff cannot hold any supervisory Defendant constitutionally liable for a “failure to act” after an incident, even if they have knowledge of it. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that failure to respond to or remedy a grievance was insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel

under § 1983). Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to these Defendants, and they will be DISMISSED.

The fact that a prisoner did not receive the medical treatment he wanted does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[a] patient’s disagreement with his physicians over the proper course of treatment alleges, at most, a medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under § 1983”). Thus, where a prisoner

receives medical care, his disagreement with the adequacy of that medical care does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law”). But medical care that is “so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all” violates the Eighth Amendment. Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant O’Connor do not allow the Court to plausibly infer that she violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendant O’Connor knew that her decisions to take Plaintiff off certain medications and change the time at which he took certain medications posed any risk of harm to him. And Plaintiff’s

disagreement with Defendant O’Connor’s decision not to take him off Zoloft does not allege a constitutional violation. In short, Plaintiff questions the adequacy of the medical treatment Defendant O’Connor provided him but does not provide any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that this medical treatment was so inadequate that it could rise to the level of a constitutional violation. As such, Plaintiff’s complaint also fails state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to Defendant Conner, and she will be DISMISSED. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above: 1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. ^[2]] is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts is DIRECTED to submit the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this memorandum and order and the accompanying judgment order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and the Court’s financial deputy;

5. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983;

6. Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; and

7. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

So ordered. ENTER: s/J. RONNIE GREER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE