Conf. of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1952). · Go Syfert
Conf. of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1952). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
165 citation events across 38 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Englert v. City of McKeesport (pawd, 1986-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1953 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1953 1989 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Englert v. City of McKeesport
W.D. Pa. · 1986 · confidence medium
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir.1910) (adopting “direct injury” test); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.1951), ce rt. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952) (employing the “target area” approach); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-1152 (6th Cir.1975) (asking whether the injury is “arguably within the zone of interests protected by the antitrust laws”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CONSOLIDATED GAS CO. OF FLORIDA v. City Gas Co.
S.D. Fla. · 1985 · confidence medium
The former test looks at the immediate connection between the parties; the latter examines whether the claimant “is within the area of economy which is endangered by a breakdown of *1365 competitive conditions in a particular industry.” Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haff v. Jewelmont Corp.
N.D. Cal. · 1984 · confidence medium
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has for many years applied the so-called “target area” test, under which the plaintiff “must show that he is within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.” Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952); accord, Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-47 (5th Cir.1980); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir.1979); Calderone Enterprise…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1982 · confidence medium
According to defendants, parties that are adversely affected by the means of achieving an anticompetitive goal but that are not directly affected once the goal is reached are without standing because their injury is “incidental to the accomplishment of the illegal object.” Defendants’ Memorandum at 23 (citing Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir.1951), ce rt. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.
D. Alaska · 1982 · confidence medium
Solinger v. A & M Records, 586 F.2d 1304 , 1310 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 , 129 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1045 , 94 S.Ct. 551 , 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan
N.D. Ill. · 1982 · confidence medium
Bichan v. Chemetron Corporation, supra, 681 F.2d at 516; In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 ,127-28 (9th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom., 414 U.S. 1045 , 94 S.Ct. 551 , 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Frank J. Ostrofe v. H. S. Crocker Company, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 , 94 S.Ct. 551 , 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973), we emphatically re-embraced the target area theory for antitrust standing first set out in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952), and we held that the plaintiff must allege injury “in the area of the economy in which the elimination of competition occurred.” 481 F.2d at 128.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris
E.D. Wash. · 1981 · confidence medium
See, Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 , 1311-12 n.8 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 , 99 S.Ct. 1999 , 60 L.Ed.2d 377 (1979); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 ; Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau, 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.
D. Mass. · 1981 · confidence medium
II Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 334d (1978), quoting Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tv Signal Company of Aberdeen, a Corporation v. American Telephone & Telegraph, a Corporation, and Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, a Corporation (2×)
8th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 , 395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 , 83 S.Ct. 721 , 9 L.Ed.2d 717 (1963); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 , 77 S.Ct. 128 , 1 L.Ed.2d 85 (1956), whereas the target area test asks whether plaintiff is "within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions," Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952); see, e. g., Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Limited (2×)
1st Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 , 94 S.Ct. 551 , 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973). 'In order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws a plaintiff must show . . . that he is within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.' Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). 17 In holding that ESI had standing, we necessarily held that the distribution level of the minicycle market was affected by the agr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation v. E. A. Cowen Construction, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Assuming all the facts to be as alleged, we find that, although Comet may have a cause of action for breach of contract, it cannot obtain “the windfall of treble damages.” Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lloyd L. Hayes, Hayes, Inc. v. T. G. Solomon, Gulf States Theatres, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 , 97 S.Ct. 690 , 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation (2×)
N.D. Cal. · 1979 · confidence medium
Otherwise he is not injured “by reason” of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws.’ Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Shapiro v. General Motors Corp. (3×)
D. Maryland · 1979 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
Originally, the “target area” test was framed as encompassing plaintiffs who were within “that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.” See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Solinger v. A&M Records (2×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), Cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). 27 Solinger alleged that he has standing to pursue his claims under section 1 and 2 both as a prospective purchaser of I.M.S. and as an employee of that company.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc. (2×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n
S.D.N.Y. · 1977 · confidence medium
Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 , 76 S.Ct. 301 , 100 L.Ed. 818 (1956). [22] Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. New York Clearing House Ass'n
S.D.N.Y. · 1977 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construction Trades Council
E.D. Pa. · 1977 · confidence medium
Assuming Karseal was ‘hit’ by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was Karseal ‘aimed at’ with enough precision to entitle it to maintain a treble damage suit under the Clayton Act?” Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cited at 483 F.2d at 396 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hauer v. Bankers Trust New York Corp.
E.D. Wis. · 1977 · confidence medium
The United States Supreme Court noted in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263, n. 14 , 92 S.Ct. 885, 891 , 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972): “The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.” The plaintiffs rely on the following statement from Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952): “[I]n order to state a cause of action…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Cromar Company v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation and Atlantic Richfield Company (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Otherwise he is not injured 'by reason' of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Broyer v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
E.D. Pa. · 1976 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles
E.D. Pa. · 1976 · confidence medium
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Morgan v. Automobile Manufacturers Assn., 414 U.S. 1045 , 94 S.Ct. 551 , 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). *727 The conclusion that the plaintiff could not prove his case at trial gains fiiither support when this case is examined from another vantage.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jack Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corporation
6th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
The classic formulation of the test was made in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952), in which the court stated: [T]o state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of the conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has been committed which harms him.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League
C.D. Cal. · 1974 · confidence medium
Otherwise he is not injured “by reason” of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.’ Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).” 481 F.2d at 127-128 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees & Technicians v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
This court has held in two prior cases that similar allegations of violations of the Sherman Act by IATSE unions were insufficient to avoid immunity under the labor laws—Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158, 167 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 , 71 S.Ct. 64 , 95 L.Ed. 608 (1950), reh. den., 340 U.S. 885 , 71 S.Ct. 194 , 95 L.Ed. 643 (1950) and Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). 6 We adhere to the principles followed in those cases. 7 Upon dismissal of Count I the district cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
Under these allegations the appellee unions were acting in their own self-interest rather than conspiring with non-business groups to create a monopoly among fellow conspiratory business interests. 7 This court has held in two prior cases that similar allegations of violations of the Sherman Act by IATSE unions were insufficient to avoid immunity under the labor laws-Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158, 167 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 , 71 S.Ct. 64 , 95 L.Ed. 608 (1950), reh. den., 340 U.S. 885 , 71 S.Ct. 194 , 95 L.Ed. 643 (1950) and Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, I…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jesus Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California, an Unincorporated Association
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
In determining that the appellants did not have standing to bring this action under Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, the district court relied on the following decisions: Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert, denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952); Hoopes v. Union Oil Company, 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied 379 U.S. 880 , 85 S.Ct. 143 , 13 L.Ed.2d 87 (1964) ; Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n
3rd Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
App. 19a, 20a. . 352 U.S. 445, 453 , 77 S.Ct. 390, 395 , 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957). . 185 F.Supp. 826 (1960), affirmed 281 F.2d 481 (3 Cir. 1960). . 185 F.Supp. at 829 . . 334 U.S. 219, 236 , 68 S.Ct. 996, 1006 , 92 L.Ed. 1328 (1948). . 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). . 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. den., 342 Ü.S. 919, 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). . 221 F.2d at 362 . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) International Association Of Heat And Frost Insulators And Asbestos Workers, Etc., v. United Contractors Association, Inc. Of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
3rd Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
Presidents Con., 113 F.Supp. 737, 742 (E.D.Pa., 1953) 5 431 F.2d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 1970) 6 381 U.S. at 663, 85 S.Ct. at 1589, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 7 339 U.S. at 491 , 70 S.Ct. at 715 8 381 U.S. 665, 666 , 85 S.Ct. at 1591 9 321 F.Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 10 Id 11 Id. at 607 12 Complaint p 10, App. 11a 13 We deal with the mechanics of the resolution of these issues in part II infra 14 325 U.S. 797 , 65 S.Ct. 1533 , 89 L.Ed. 1939 (1965) 15 App. 10a, 11a 16 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) 17 Id. at 334 18 352 U.S. 445 , 77 S.Ct. 390 , 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957) 19 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942) 20 Intern…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
Otherwise he is not injured ‘by reason’ of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws.” Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31. State of California v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., Robert Morgan v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., City of Philadelphia v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., State of New York v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., City of New York v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., City and County of Denver v. American Motors Corporation
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
Otherwise he is not injured 'by reason' of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws." 20 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HF & S. COMPANY v. American Standard, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Kan. · 1972 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campo v. National Football League
E.D. La. · 1971 · confidence medium
Conference of Stuio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1961); Karseal Corporation v. Richfield Oil Corporation, 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Service, Inc. v. Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, 382 F. 2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967). 4.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Isidor Weinstein Investment Co. v. Hearst Corporation
N.D. Cal. · 1969 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. United States Steel Corporation
D. Minnesota · 1969 · confidence medium
Mass.1956) (recovery denied manufacturer of ingredient used in beverage syrup against competitor of bottler of syrup for alleged antitrust violations in sale of syrup even though manufacturers and bottler had identity of ownership.) See also Conference of S tudio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952). 15 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Washington v. American Pipe & Construction Co.
D. Haw. · 1968 · confidence medium
Hoopes v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9 Cir. 1967); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, supra n. 8 , 328 F.2d at 220 ; Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9 Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9 Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Washington v. American Pipe & Construction Co.
W.D. Wash. · 1967 · confidence medium
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loews Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9 Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert Hoopes and Rae S. Hoopes v. Union Oil Company of California, a Corporation
9th Cir. · 1967 · confidence medium
See also Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362-364 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hylton Harman, Trustee of the Coffeyville Loan and Investment Company, Inc. v. The Valley National Bank of Arizona
9th Cir. · 1964 · confidence medium
Injury and damage were alleged to have resulted from the refusal of the state court receiver to honor the Association’s contractual obligations to *567 CLIC, a result which appellees “could reasonably foresee.” Appellees argue that the complaint must be rejected under the line of authority holding that “shareholders, creditors, directors and officers of corporations injured by monopolistic practices of competitors,” and other “persons incidentally injured by a conspiracy” cannot sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act (Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 …
cited Cited "see" Sacramento Valley Chapter v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
E.D. Cal. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
cited Cited "see" Thomsen v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951).
cited Cited "see" Harold D. Blankenship, an Individual v. The Hearst Corporation, a Corporation, William H. Myers, an Individual
9th Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 , 54 — 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
discussed Cited "see" South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Incorporated v. Joseph T. Newton, Jr.
4th Cir. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9 Cir. 1951), cert. den., 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9 Cir. 1955).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nassau County Ass'n of Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1972 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952) (claiming, inter alia, that defendants’ acts would destroy conference of labor unions; “damage the appellants suffered . . . was incidental to the accomplishment of [defendants’ alleged] illegal object.” 193 F.2d at 54 .) Judge Mansfield, in Cordova, specifically rejected the argument, made in detail here, that eases allowing suits based on constitutional claims could cure the defect created by the language of the antitrust laws. 321 F.S…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.
D. Colo. · 1970 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew’s, supra, 193 F.2d at 54-55 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Billy Baxter, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Company and Cana Da Dry Corporation (2×)
2d Cir. · 1970 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9 Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 , 72 S.Ct. 367 , 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F.Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2 Cir. 1940).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CONFERENCE OF STUDIO UNIONS Et Al.
v.
LOEW’S INC. Et Al.
12816_1.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jan 28, 1952.
193 F.2d 51
Kenny & Cohn, Los Angeles, Cal., Todd & Todd, San Francisco, Cal., and George1 E. Bodle, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.’1, Wright & Garrett, Harold F. Collins, O’Melveny & Myers, Homer I. Mitchell and William W. Alsup, all of Los Angeles,. Cal., for appellees Loew’s Inc., et al., Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, and Michael G. Luddy, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees Int. Alliance, et al.
Healy, Orr, Pope.
Cited by 118 opinions  |  Published
ORR, Circuit Judge.

The trial Court entered judgment on the pleadings. The complaint purports to allege a conspiracy in. restraint of trade and prays for treble damages and an injunction under the anti-trust laws. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

Appellants may be considered in two general classes. ’ One group is composed of the Conference of Studio Unions, an association of certain labor unions in the motion picture industry, and its member unions. The second group consists of certain individuals, members of the appellant unions. Appellees also may be so divided. One group consists of a number of the large motion picture companies, traditionally known as the Majors, and their responsible officers. The other, the labor appellees, includes the International Association of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada, Local 44 of that union, and the responsible officers of the International and Local. For convenience the labor appellees will hereafter be referred to as the I. A. T. S. E.

Appellee Majors leads, to a very large degree, in the production of. motion pictures in Los Angeles County, and employs by far the greater number of personnel engaged in motion picture production in said county. A comparatively small number of inexpensive films is produced by other motion picture companies who are competitors of the majors. This competing group is known as the Independents.

The complaint alleges that the appellees “ * * * combined and agreed each with .the other for the purpose of destroying the Conference and the member unions, and for the further purpose of eliminating as competitors the motion picture production companies herein described as the Independents.” As part of the conspiracy the appellees are alleged to have agreed that to do the work customarily performed for the Majors by members of the Conference unions the Majors would thereafter employ only members of locals of the I. A. T. S. E. or persons who had procured the written consent of a local of the I. A. T. S. E. In return for this employment preference the I. A. T. S. E. is alleged to have agreed to order its locals to furnish their most skilled members to render services to the Majors exclusively and to refrain from furnishing skilled members to any of the Independents unless and until all of the Majors had a full supply of employees and that it would order and require its locals to furnish employees in categories indispensable to the production of motion pictures to the Independents only at rates and under conditions higher and more onerous to the employer than the rates and conditions at which I. A. T. S. E. would furnish such employees to the Majors. The labor turnover was expected to result in a scarcity[*53] of new motion pictures, and to avoid giving an advantage to an individual Major during this interim period it is alleged that the Majors agreed to curtail production and distribution of motion pictures; to refrain from releasing motion pictures previously-produced but theretofore unreleased; to exact from exhibitors agreements requiring the latter to run motion pictures for longer periods of time than had been the custom prior thereto; to increase the length of thí run of any picture produced by the Majoft in theaters controlled or owned by them; to prepare for reissue motion pictures previously exploited and exhibited and to persuade distributors and exhibitors to accept reissued motion pictures in lieu of motion pictures not previously exhibited. In pursuance of the agreement the following overt acts are alleged: The Majors have hoarded new pictures; have exacted agreements from distributors for longer runs and in their own theaters have run pictures longer ; have forced reissues on distributors and the public and have curtailed the production of new pictures. In addition it is alleged the Majors have discharged all carpenters and painters members of the Conference unions and have broken off labor relations with the other Conference unions. The I. A. T. S. E., according to the complaint, has supplied the Majors with skilled help and has required the Independents to accept such laborers as remained and to employ them at higher rates of pay than charged the Majors. The complaint further charged that appellants have suffered damage in that, the individual appellants have Ipst wages by reason of their dismissal and the Majors’ refusal to reemploy them; the Conference has lost monthly revenue by reason of the withdrawal of certain of its member unions and has expended moneys for the purpose of endeavoring to reach agreement with the Majors for the rehiring of members of member unions; and, member unions of the Conference have expended moneys for the purpose of maintaining membership and in endeavoring to reach agreement with the Majors for the rehiring of members. As grounds for equitable relief it is alleged that irreparable injury will be caused the appellants in that member unions will be compelled to withdraw from the Conference and the Conference will be destroyed; members of its member unions will be compelled to withdraw from their •respective unions and the unions will be destroyed; members of its member unions will forever lose their opportunity for reemployment in the motion picture industry and will be compelled to seek employment in industries to which they are strangers.

The complaint was answered by a general denial and several affirmative defenses which will hereafter more fully appear. The motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted on the ground that appellants’ claims did not arise from injury to “business or property” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. Appellees urge here that the conspiracy and alleged effectuating acts are not forbidden by the anti-trust laws; or that, the conspiracy is divisible and sever-able as to that which is forbidden by the anti-trust laws and therefore is legal with respect to.appellants; that even though a conspiracy in restraint of trade is alleged the damages sustained by appellants did not result from any restraint of commercial competition; and, that the acts which are alleged to have injured appellants are unfair labor practices, and, therefore, the National Labor Relations.Board has exclusive jurisdiction of the case.

In the case of Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 9 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 158, one of the member unions of the Conference brought an action making the same parties defendants in that action who are appellees in this, seeking treble damages under the anti-trust laws. The cause of action in the Schatte case was bottomed upon the premise that the Majors had combined with I. A. T. S. E. to force the Independents to hire I. A. T. S. E. members; that members of the I. A. T. S. E. ‘were less efficient workers than members of the Conference Union, and that the purpose and effect of the agreement was to increase production costs to the Independents and thus ultimately drive them out of business. We held in that case that no violation of the antitrust laws had been shown because no restraint on “commercial competition” had[*54] been alleged, no more being alleged than an agreement to compel the Independents to adopt certain employment policies. In the complaint in the instant case an attempt is made to allege a restraint on commercial competition by showing wage rate discrimination against the Independents and the agreement entered into among the Majors to restrict production. In reference to the complaint in the Schatte case we said that in the event the alleged conspiracy be considered illegal no recovery could be had because there was no allegation of “ * * * damage * * * which stems from a conspiracy in violation of anti-trust laws * * *. The loss of their rights of employment is not a result of any lessening of commercial competition among the studios.” 182 F.2d 158, 167. We think the same observation holds true with respect to the allegations of the complaint' in the instant case.

The appellants’ connection with the alleged illegal conspiracy is not such as would bring them within the contemplation of the anti-trust law. The entire import of the alleged conspiracy, insofar as competitive conditions are concerned, is the attempt to destroy the Independents. Any restraint on commercial competition would occur in the production of motion pictures and we fail to see how the appellants are in a position to complain about that situation. They are not in the business of producing motion pictures ; they do not exhibit motion pictures; they neither compete with the Majors nor purchase from them. In fact, they are not employees of the companies whom it is alleged the appellees intend to destroy. The damage alleged to have been suffered by appellants does not flow from any injury to the competitive situation of the motion picture industry, that is, their injury has not arisen from the acts allegedly perpetrated against the Independents.

It has been held that shareholders, creditors, directors and officers of corporations injured by monopolistic practices of competitors cannot recover their individual losses. [1] The reasoning of the courts in the cases cited in Note 1 is that the conspiracy to restrain competition was directed at the corporation and the damage suffered by the plaintiff was merely incidental. So, in the present case, insofar as the conspiracy was to restrain trade by destroying competitors it was directed at the Independents, and the alleged damage the appellants suffered therefrom was incidental to the accomplishment of the illegal object.

Appellants urge that the acts which allegedly damaged them should not be looked at in isolation but must be reviewed in the context of and, therefore, colored by, the illegal conspiracy. Such a contention, while of course true as a general proposition, does not help them here. The cited cases (see Note 1) illustrate the rule that persons incidentally injured by a conspiracy cannot sue. In those cases the acts which injured the plaintiffs resulted in or tended to bring about the restraint of trade contemplated by the conspiracy; but that was not considered the sole test for liability. The fact that their injury was incidental was controlling. Not one of the acts alleged to have caused injury to the appellants effectuated or tended to create a restraint on commercial competition in the motion picture industry. Cf. Peterson v. Borden Co., 7 Cir., 1931, 50 F.2d 644. A conspiracy may have many purposes and objects; the conspirators may perform an almost infinite variety of acts in furtherance of the conspiracy; but, in order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of the conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has been committed which harms him. He must show that he is'[*55] within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise he is not injured “by reason” of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws.

Such a construction is in accordance with the basic and underlying purposes of the anti-trust laws to preserve competition and to protect the consumer. Recovery and damages under the anti-trust law is available to those who have been directly injured by the lessening of competition and withheld from those who seek the windfall of treble damages because of incidental harm.

Judgment affirmed.

1

. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 3 Cir., 1910, 183 F. 704; Gerli v. Silk Ass’n, of America, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1929, 36 F.2d 959; Corey v. Boston Ice Co., D.C. Mass.1913, 207 F. 465.

Nor can a landlord who lost a tenant, or a regularly retained lawyer whose services are no longer necessary, bring suit. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Jobns-Manville Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1939, 30 F.Supp. 389; affirmed on opinion in 2 Cir., 1940, 113 F.2d 114; see United Cooper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 2 Cir., 1916, 232 F. 574, 577.