Baker v. State, 241 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Baker v. State, 241 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
66 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: HOSTETLER v. THE STATE (ga, 2024-06-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) HOSTETLER v. THE STATE (4×)
Ga. · 2024 · confidence medium
S., 278 Ga. 859, 862 ( 607 SE2d 546 ) (2005); Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978), disapproved on other grounds by Abebe, 304 Ga. at 615 n.2. (b) Appellant argues that as a result of her allegedly invalid conviction, she will be subject to an enhanced recidivist sentence if she is convicted of a second DUI, and that this potential consequence constitutes a restraint on her liberty which prevents her petition 4 Though we declined in Turner to extend the presumption of collateral consequences arising from felony convictions to misdemeanor convictions, we never explained why.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of M. F., a Child (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“Although [an appellate] court may exercise its discretion to decide a criminal case even after the sentence has been served, it is not bound to do so.”1 We decline to reach the merits of this appeal because the defendant has not shown, on this record, any adverse collateral consequences arising from the juvenile court’s adjudication of him as delinquent.2 1 Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 431-432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Adams and Doyle, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA § 16-8-14 (a). 2 OCGA § 16-5-23 (a). 3 Rodriguez-Martinez v. State, 243 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1) ( 533 SE2d 443 ) (2000). 4 Chaplin v. State, 141 Ga. App. 788, 789 (1) ( 234 SE2d 330 ) (1977). 5 Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 431-432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ritchie v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Johnson, P. J., and Miller, J., concur. 1 Gamble v. State, 181 Ga. App. 871 ( 354 SE2d 174 ) (1987). 2 Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978). 3 Rodriguez-Martinez v. State, 243 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1) ( 533 SE2d 443 ) (2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Newton v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
(Cits.)’ Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
(Cits.)’ Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gamble v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
“Although a court may exercise its discretion to decide a criminal case even after the sentence has been served ([cits.]), it is not bound to do so. [Cits.]” Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henry v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ).
examined Cited "see" Abebe v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978) (applying the doctrine of adverse collateral consequences in the context of an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction); see generally Johnson v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 438 ( 211 SE2d 732 ) (1975); Raheem v. State, 333 Ga. App. 821 , 821 n. 2 ( 777 SE2d 496 ) (2015).
examined Cited "see" Abebe v. State (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State , 240 Ga. 431 , 432, 241 S.E.2d 187 (1978) (applying the doctrine of adverse collateral consequences in the context of an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction); see generally Johnson v. Ricketts , 233 Ga. 438 , 211 S.E.2d 732 (1975) ; Raheem v. State , 333 Ga. App. 821 , 821 n. 2, 777 S.E.2d 496 (2015).
discussed Cited "see" Jayko v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: accord · confidence high
Medina, 312 Ga. App. at 400 n. 3 (characterizing Supreme Court of Georgia decision in a parenthetical as granting courts “discretion to address the merits of cases rendered moot by the defendant’s service of his sentence”); accord Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 431-32 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978) (dismissing as moot challenge to conviction and noting that “[although a court may exercise its discretion to decide a criminal case even after the sentence has been served, it is not bound to do so.”) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover (2×)
Ga. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 432 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
discussed Cited "see" McWhorter v. Greene (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431 ( 241 SE2d 187 ).
examined Cited "see" Davis v. Thomas (6×)
Ga. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431 ( 241 SE2d 187 ) (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Kappers v. DeKalb County Board of Health (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431 ( 241 SE2d 187 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Baker
v.
the State
32757.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 3, 1978.
241 S.E.2d 187
Smathers, Derrickson & Bowen, Joy Smathers, for appellant., Hinson McAuliffe, Solicitor, James L. Webb, Richard E. Stark, Assistant Solicitors, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, for appellee.
Hill.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
Hill, Justice.

Charles L. Baker was tried and convicted of violating Code Ann. § 26-2610 (b) (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249,1316; 1974, p. 470) which prohibits the use of unprovoked obscene and vulgar or profane language in the presence of a woman, or of a male under the age of fourteen. Prior to trial the defendant attacked the constitutionality of this section on the ground of gender-based discrimination. The State Court of Fulton County determined it was constitutional. The defendant was sentenced on April 28, 1977, to serve six months to run concurrently with a previous sentence and he appealed to> this court on constitutional grounds.

Notice of appeal was filed in the trial court on May 25,1977. The record was docketed in this court on August 1, and the defendant’s enumerations of error and brief were routinely filed on August 22, albeit after the defendant was released from confinement on August 16, 1977.

This appeal is dismissed as moot in view of the fact that the sentence has been served. Although a court may[*432] exercise its discretion to decide a criminal case even after the sentence has been served (St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (63 SC 910, 87 LE 1199) (1943); Chaplin v. State, 141 Ga. App. 788 (234 SE2d 330) (1977)), it is not bound to do so. Jacobs v. New York, 388 U. S. 431 (87 SC 2098, 18 LE2d 1294) (1967); Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U. S. 439 (87 SC 2107, 18 LE2d 1300) (1967).

Submitted September 16, 1977 Decided January 3, 1978. Smathers, Derrickson & Bowen, Joy Smathers, for appellant. Hinson McAuliffe, Solicitor, James L. Webb, Richard E. Stark, Assistant Solicitors, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, for appellee.

We decline to reach the merits of this appeal because the defendant has not demonstrated any efforts to expedite the appeal, preparation of record, etc., and has not shown, on this record, adverse collateral consequences as in Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687, 689 (208 SE2d 493) (1974). Moreover, the question raised is not one which can never be decided because it inevitably becomes moot prior to an appeal, as in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110, n. 11 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975). If defendant’s sentence had not been set concurrently with another sentence, he should have been eligible for bail pending appeal of his misdemeanor conviction,(Code § 27-901), and his appeal would not have become moot.

Appeal dismissed.

All the Justices concur.