Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Pernice, 399 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1991). · Go Syfert
Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Pernice, 399 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Department of Human Resources v. Wood (gactapp, 1996-01-04)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Human Resources v. Wood (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See [OCGA] §§ 19-6-32; 19-6-33.” Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Pernice, 260 Ga. 732, fn. 1 ( 399 SE2d 65 ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Department of Human Resources v. Offutt (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
When made, this application to the department shall constitute an assignment of the right to support to the department.” (Emphasis supplied.) “OCGA § 19-6-32 (a) (1) provides that after a child-support agency has obtained a judgment establishing, enforcing, or modifying a child support obligation, the court shall enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not been entered.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Pernice, 260 Ga. 732, 733 ( 399 SE2d 65 ) (1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Human Resources v. Chappell
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Pernice, 260 Ga. 732, 733 ( 399 SE2d 65 ) (1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Rowland v. State
Ga. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hunter v. State, 260 Ga. 732 ( 399 SE2d 921 ) (1991).
Georgia Department of Human Resources
v.
Pernice
S90A1323.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 9, 1991.
399 S.E.2d 65
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant., Peter Pernice, pro se.
Bell.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
Bell, Justice.

This appeal concerns whether a trial court is required to enter an income-deduction order pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-32 (a) (l), [1] in a child-support recovery action brought by the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR). In the instant case the trial court ruled that income-deduction orders are not mandatory, and exercised its discretion not to enter one. We find that such orders are mandatory, and reverse the judgment insofar as it ruled the orders are not mandatory.

[*733] Decided January 9, 1991. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Peter Pernice, pro se.

In 1988 appellee and his wife were divorced. The final decree required appellee to pay his wife $100 per week in child support. Appellee failed to pay any support, and in 1989 the DHR, pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 to § 19-11-26, filed a motion for contempt against appellee and, in addition, requested that the court enter an income-deduction order pursuant to § 19-6-32 (a) (1). OCGA § 19-6-32 (a) (1) provides that after a child-support agency has obtained a judgment “establishing, enforcing, or modifying a child support obligation .. . , the court shall enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not been entered.”

In the instant case, the trial court ruled that appellee was in contempt of court, based on his failure to pay his support obligations. However, the court ruled that income-deduction orders are not mandatory, and declined the DHR’s request to impose one in this case.

The DHR appeals, contending that income-deduction orders are mandatory. We agree. OCGA § 19-6-32 (a) (1) provides that, in a child-support recovery action, a trial court “shall enter” an income-deduction order. The language of § 19-6-32 thus plainly mandates income-deduction orders. In this case, we therefore reverse that part of the trial court’s order in which the court ruled that income-deduction orders are not mandatory.

Judgment reversed in part.

All the Justices concur.
1

An income-deduction order is directed to the employer of a person obligated to provide child support. The order requires the employer to deduct from the employee’s income an amount set by the court to meet the employee’s support obligation, including arrearages. See §§ 19-6-32; 19-6-33.