Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 19-11-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 11. Enforcement of Duty of Support, 19-11-1 through 19-11-191.

ARTICLE 1 CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT

19-11-1. Short title.

This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Child Support Recovery Act."

(Ga. L. 1973, p. 192, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Modification procedure not dependent upon public assistance.

- When the Department of Human Resources (DHR) petitions the superior court to adopt its recommendation, the court is not required to find a need for additional support but, without regard to whether a child is receiving public assistance, may increase child support based solely on a significant inconsistency between an existing order and the amount which would result from application of the child support guidelines; the Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq., does not contain any basis for continuing to distinguish between the procedure available when the child is receiving public assistance and that which is available in the absence of any such assistance. The trial court erred in concluding that evidence of the need for additional support was necessary and that DHR lacked standing, and in failing to apply child support guidelines and to justify any departure therefrom. Falkenberry v. Taylor, 278 Ga. 842, 607 S.E.2d 567 (2005).

Public assistance is nondistinguishing factor.

- Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq., does not contain any basis for continuing to distinguish between the procedure available when a child is receiving public assistance and that which is available in the absence of any such assistance. Falkenberry v. Taylor, 278 Ga. 842, 607 S.E.2d 567 (2005)(Unpublished).

Same procedure available when child not receiving public assistance.

- In a child support modification action, the trial court erred in concluding that evidence of the need for additional support was necessary and that the Department of Human Resources (DHR) lacked standing to file a modification action on behalf of a child not receiving public assistance unless it could show the child's need for additional support; by express statutory amendment, the General Assembly no longer reserved for the private bar those modification actions which involved children who did not receive public assistance and needed no additional support, but whose court-ordered provider enjoyed an enhanced financial status. Falkenberry v. Taylor, 278 Ga. 842, 607 S.E.2d 567 (2005)(Unpublished).

Cited in Phillips v. Brown, 263 Ga. 50, 426 S.E.2d 866 (1993).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Applicability of alternative dispute resolution program fees to child support recovery actions.

- Civil actions brought pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq., are subject to the fee imposed under O.C.G.A. § 15-23-7 to support alternative dispute resolution programs, but the state, the state's agencies, and political subdivisions should not be compelled to make advance payment of the fee which should ordinarily be collected from the child support obligor upon the conclusion of the action. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Criminal responsibility for abandonment or nonsupport of children who are being cared for by charitable institution, 24 A.L.R. 1075.

Liability of father for retroactive child support on judicial determination of paternity, 87 A.L.R.5th 361.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1

Total Results: 7  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Dep't of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 31, 1994 | 263 Ga. 756, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 317

...We granted certiorari to Fleeman v. Dept. of Human Resources, 208 Ga. App. 97 (430 SE2d 135) (1993), in which the Court of Appeals held DHR is barred in this action by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and by the terms of the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq....
Copy

Kelley v. Dep't of Human Resources, 498 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 13, 1998 | 269 Ga. 384, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 1263, 98 FCDR 1263

...Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for Georgia Department of Human Resources. SEARS, Justice. In this interlocutory appeal, we conclude that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial associated with a petition filed in the Superior Court by the Department of Human Resources pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12, seeking the adoption of an agency recommendation that a child support order be modified....
...The decree awarded Owens custody of the couple's child, and instructed Kelley to make weekly child support payments of $35.00. In 1997, Owens initiated a Department of Human Resources ("DHR") agency review request for an increase *743 in child support, pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12. DHR conducted a financial review, as required by section 19-11-12, and found a significant inconsistency between the child support awarded in the original decree and the amount that would result from an application of the statutory guidelines prescribed in OCGA § 19-6-15....
...After a hearing, the trial court denied Kelley's jury trial request, and granted a certificate of immediate review. This Court then granted Kelley's interlocutory application to appeal in order to consider whether the trial Court erred in ruling that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial under OCGA § 19-11-12....
...In fact, actions for the modification of child support payments were created by the General Assembly in 1955, when it enacted OCGA § 19-6-19. [6] The statutory proceeding at issue in this case, an agency review and modification of child support obligations, was created by the General Assembly in 1973, when it enacted OCGA § 19-11-12 as part of the Child Support Recovery Act. [7] When enacting section 19-11-12, the General Assembly did not provide for a jury trial....
...the legislature. As stated, that did not occur here. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that there is neither fundamental constitutional nor a statutory right to a trial by jury in a child support modification proceedings brought under OCGA § 19-11-12. 2. Kelley urges that a jury trial is demanded under section 19-11-12, when that Code section is compared to OCGA § 19-6-19....
...e to a change in circumstances, specifically provides for a jury trial. [9] We disagree with Kelley's argument for several reasons. First, while section 19-6-19 was enacted in order to allow parents to initiate a proceeding for support modification, section 19-11-12 was enacted as part of the Child Support Recovery Act [10] in response to a federal mandate *744 requiring each State to establish procedures for its child support agency to review and adjust certain child support orders. [11] Thus, even though they both relate to the modification of child support obligations, we conclude that Code sections 19-11-12 and 19-6-19 are two separate statutes enacted for different legislative purposes. Moreover, because we presume that all statutes are enacted with the legislature's full knowledge of the existing law, [12] we must conclude that the legislature intended to differentiate section 19-11-12 from the previously existing section 19-6-19 when it provided that, in actions brought under section 19-11-12, the trier of fact shall be "the administrative law judge for administrative orders, or a judge of the superior court for court orders, as the case may be." [13] Furthermore, we construe these two Code sections to be consistent, rather than inapposite to one another as urged by Kelley. The provisions in the Child Support Recovery Act, including section 19-11-12, are "in no way exclusive" and are "in addition to, and not in substitution of, other provisions provided by law." [14] Nothing in the Child Support Recovery Act indicates that section 19-11-12, which requires DHR to review child support orders and provide child support enforcement services for applicants, [15] is intended to be a substitute for a parent-initiated modification proceeding brought under section 19-6-19....
...ld support obligations, [16] and that if either parent desires, the Code does not preclude them from seeking a jury trial for a modification proceeding under section 19-6-19, regardless of whether an agency review also has been initiated pursuant to section 19-11-12. Accordingly, we conclude that the review and modification proceedings of OCGA § 19-11-12 are reconciled to and consistent with the modification proceedings set forth in OCGA § 19-6-19....
...creating disparate categories among them. [18] Kelley argues that because jury trials are allowed in private modification actions, but denied in agency review and modification proceedings, a separate classification has been created for litigants in section 19-11-12 proceedings, in derivation of the guarantee of equal protection under the law....
...section 10-11-12 agency review proceeding. Hence, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as any classification drawn by the statute, "under any conceivable set of facts ... bears a rational relation to a legitimate end of government." [19] Section 19-11-12 complies with the federal mandate that requires States to put in place effective procedures whereby every three years, the State conducts a review of support orders being enforced and, if appropriate, adjusts those orders in accordan...
...ry guidelines established for the determination of appropriate child support award amounts. [20] Such reviews must be conducted taking into account the *745 best interest of the child involved. [21] Accordingly, we find that any distinction drawn by section 19-11-12's designation of the trial judge as the trier of fact in this matter is supported by the legitimate governmental goals of (1) effectively and efficiently complying with the federal mandate described above, and (2) ensuring that the State oversees the maintenance and enforcement of child support awards in amounts that will protect the interests of the children involved. Moreover, as discussed above, any distinction drawn by section 19-11-12's denial of a jury trial is of limited impact, as a jury trial may be sought in a modification proceeding brought under section 19-6-19, which may be initiated by either parent regardless of whether a concurrent review action has been brought under section 19-11-12. Judgment affirmed. All of the Justices concur. NOTES [1] See OCGA § 19-11-12(a) (1991 and Supp. 1997). [2] See OCGA § 19-11-12(c)(4)....
...44, 47, 148 S.E.2d 494 (1966); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121 (1928). [5] Strange, 222 Ga. at 46, 148 S.E.2d 494. [6] We note that OCGA § 19-6-19 does specifically provide for a trial by jury, and this disparity with OCGA § 19-11-12 is discussed in divisions two and three, infra. [7] Ga. L.1973, p. 192, § 1. [8] See Ga. Const. (1983), Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI. [9] OCGA § 19-6-19(a). [10] OCGA § 19-11-1, et seq. [11] See OCGA §§ 19-11-12(b); 42 USC § 666(a). [12] Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994). [13] OCGA § 19-11-12(d)....
Copy

Phillips v. Brown, 426 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1993 | 263 Ga. 50, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1157

...Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. HUNSTEIN, Justice. The Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) sued appellant Timothy Phillips pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., seeking reimbursement for certain public assistance benefits which it had paid for the support of Tameka Brown, the minor child alleged to be the appellant's daughter....
Copy

Burns v. Swinney, 314 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 18, 1984 | 252 Ga. 461

...Cromartie, Jr., for appellant. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Ralph M. Hinman, Mary Foil Russell, for appellees. HILL, Chief Justice. This is a child support recovery case. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted OCGA § 19-11-10 (Code Ann....
...The mother defended on the grounds, among others, that she had met her support obligations, that the father was gainfully employed during the period in question, that the children were not eligible for AFDC benefits, and that she had not been given notice pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-10 (Code Ann. § 99-909b), supra. The trial court ordered the mother to repay the state half the amount sought, $485, [1] and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding OCGA § 19-11-10 (Code Ann. § 99-909b) inapplicable where the state bypasses the administrative procedure in favor of judicial proceedings. We granted certiorari. Several provisions of the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq....
...the child support statutes, or other appropriate state and federal statutes to assure that the responsible parent supports the child." OCGA § 19-11-9 (a) (Code Ann. § 99-908b) provides: "The department shall attempt to locate absent parents." OCGA § 19-11-10 (Code Ann....
...§ 99-918b) provides: "The procedures, actions, and remedies provided in this article shall in no way be exclusive but shall be in addition to and not in substitution of other proceedings provided by law." The Court of Appeals held that the notice requirement of OCGA § 19-11-10 (b) (Code Ann. § 99-909b), supra, is inapplicable where the department does not make an investigation, authorized by OCGA § 19-11-10 (a) (Code Ann. § 99-909b), supra, to determine whether a parent is able to support a child receiving public assistance. The department argues in favor of the Court of Appeals' decision and points to the word "may" in OCGA § 19-11-10 (a) (Code Ann....
...A parent's obligation to support may be established by court order; e.g., criminal proceeding for nonsupport, OCGA § 19-11-3 (Code Ann. § 99-903b), divorce, alimony and child support decree, OCGA § 19-11-5 (Code Ann. § 99-904b), supra, or administrative order directing child support, OCGA § 19-11-15 (c) (Code Ann. § *464 99-912b). Such obligation also may be established by agreement with the department. OCGA § 19-11-15 (a) (Code Ann....
...to pay child support, and where the nonpaying parent's address is known or can be ascertained, the state, although not required to make an investigation as to the nonpaying parent's ability to support the child before making AFDC payments, see OCGA § 19-11-10 (c) (Code Ann....
Copy

Gresham v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 363 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 14, 1988 | 257 Ga. 747

...Droze, for appellee. *751 M. Kathryn Hoover, Jenny K. Mittelman, amicus curiae. MARSHALL, Chief Justice. We granted certiorari in this case, Gresham v. Dept. of Human Resources, 184 Ga. App. 17 (360 SE2d 736) (1987), which is a child support recovery action, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., brought by the Department of Human Resources against the putative father of an illegitimate child....
...After the grant of certiorari, the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc., has filed an amicus curiae brief in which it is argued that the Court of Appeals' majority, in Div. 4 of their opinion, erred in rejecting the defendant's argument that, under OCGA § 19-11-10, as interpreted in Burns v....
...e defendant from contesting paternity in any future child-support recovery action, it is not void as against public policy, and, for this reason, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's demand for jury trial. We further hold that OCGA § 19-11-10, as interpreted in Burns v....
...The father remarried, and the children's stepmother applied for, and received, Aid-to-Families-with-Dependent-Children (AFDC) payments. The department later instituted a child-support recovery action against the mother. The mother argued, inter alia, that she had not been given notice pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-10. The mother was nonetheless ordered to make partial reimbursement to the state, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on certiorari we reversed. In Burns, we reviewed subsections (a), (b), and (c) of OCGA § 19-11-10, which provide: "(a) In cases in which a parent's obligation to support has not already been established by a court order, the department may conduct investigations to determine whether a responsible parent is able to support the dependent child receiving public assistance....
..."(c) The notice shall inform the parent that he may be liable for reimbursement of any support furnished prior to determination of his financial circumstances as well as future support." The Court of Appeals in Burns v. Swinney, 168 Ga. App. 902 (1) (310 SE2d 733) (1983) held that the notice requirement of § 19-11-10 (b) was inapplicable where, as there, the department did not make an investigation, as authorized by § 19-11-10 (a), to determine the parent's ability to support a child receiving public assistance....
...to pay child support, and where the nonpaying parent's address is known or can be ascertained, the state, although not required to make an investigation as to the nonpaying parent's ability to support the child before making AFDC payments, see OCGA § 19-11-10 (c) ..., must notify the parent of the duty of support and of the application for AFDC payments before such parent becomes obligated to reimburse the state *750 for such payments....
...461, supra, to be inapplicable under the facts of this case, because, unlike Burns, there was no extant court order here relieving the appellant of his child-support obligation. 4. Under our decision in Burns v. Swinney, supra, and under the language employed in OCGA § 19-11-10 (a), we cannot agree with this holding of the Court of Appeals in this case. The material fact common to both this case and Burns is that the parent's obligation to support has not, in either case, been established by a court order; thus, the notice requirement contained in § 19-11-10 is applicable in both cases under the express language employed in subsection (a) of that statute....
Copy

Cox v. Dep't of Human Resources, 334 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 255 Ga. 6

...When petitioner received $7,500 as the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy, she became disqualified to receive further AFDC benefits. [1] The DHR then initiated this action on behalf of the minor child against petitioner, pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., to recover $6,853 paid to petitioner for the benefit of the minor child....
..."may continue to collect such support payments from the absent parent." [7] (Emphasis supplied.) Under OCGA § 19-11-9 the legislature requires the DHR to "attempt to locate absent parents" in order to determine their child support obligations. OCGA § 19-11-12 sets forth the standards for determining whether "the absent responsible parent" is able to support his child....
...Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [9] Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur except Marshall, P. J., and Weltner, J., who dissent. WELTNER, Justice, dissenting. 1. (a) One of the purposes of the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., is plainly stated at § 19-11-2 (a) (3), as follows: *10 "The underlying purposes of this article are ......
...ootnote 5, infra. [5] We do not here deal with a situation where the custodial parent is able, but unwilling to provide for the child. The DHR is given broad authority under the CSRA to determine whether the parent is able to support the child. OCGA § 19-11-10....
Copy

Falkenberry v. Taylor, 607 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 2005 | 278 Ga. 842, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 130

...Thomas Falkenberry (Father) and Thelma Taylor (Mother) were divorced in 1994. In the final decree, Father was awarded custody of their minor child, and Mother was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $45 per week. In 2002, Father requested the Department of Human Resources (DHR) to review the order. OCGA § 19-11-12(c). Although the child was not receiving public assistance, DHR recommended an increase of child support to $605 per month. Mother objected, and DHR filed a petition requesting that the trial court adopt the recommendation. OCGA § 19-11-12(d)....
...al support. We granted Father's application for discretionary appeal to consider whether it is still necessary to prove a need for an increase in child support payments, in light of the 2003 amendments to the Child Support Recovery Act (Act). OCGA §§ 19-11-1 et seq....
...In the 2003 amendments to the Act, the General Assembly unambiguously broadened its intent, expressly permitting DHR to accept applications for child support services from non-custodial parents and to review, and even to seek downward modifications of, support awards under the provisions of the Act, including OCGA § 19-11-12. OCGA §§ 19-11-6(e), *569 19-11-8(c). Furthermore, OCGA §§ 19-11-6 and 19-11-8 must be read in conjunction with OCGA § 19-11-12, which "sets forth the review procedures to be followed by DHR when reviewing for possible modification both administratively and judicially imposed child support orders....
...52, 53(2), 537 S.E.2d 70 (2000). As amended in 2003, that statute now requires DHR to review, upon written request of the obligor or obligee, "IV-D court orders for child support, as defined in paragraph (1) of Code Section 19-11-3, for possible modification...." OCGA § 19-11-12(c)(1). See also OCGA § 19-11-12(b)(1)....
...The sole basis for a recommendation for a change in the award of support under this paragraph shall be a significant inconsistency between the existing child support order and the amount of child support which would result from the application of Code Section 19-6-15. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 19-11-12(c)(3). See also OCGA § 19-11-12(d)(2)....
...ut regard to whether the child is receiving public assistance, may increase child support based solely on a significant inconsistency between the existing order and the amount which would result from application of the child support guidelines. OCGA 19-11-12(e)....