Appellant was convicted of importation and concealing of heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173 and 174 on the basis of narcotics secured as the result of a border search of her vagina. She has taken this appeal from judgment. The question is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the search was reasonable. ^[1] We conclude that it was not and that appellant’s motion to suppress the heroin should have been granted.

The preliminary search of appellant’s person was made by a woman customs clerk. Appellant was made to disrobe. She was made to bend over and expose her vaginal area. Something “sort of like a bubble” as observed protruding from the vagina. She was then taken to a physician who, from examination of her eyes and limbs, found no indication that she was under the influence of narcotics or had been a user. The vaginal search followed, revealing three packets of heroin and one of cocaine.

Rivas v. United States, supra, footnote 1, recognizes that to justify a border search of body cavities there must be a “clear indication” or “plain suggestion” that narcotics are being smuggled. Henderson v. United States, supra, footnote 1, makes it clear that when the cavity to be searched is a vagina, the search commences with the visual inspection[*1300] and the “clear indication” must exist at that time.

“Surely, to require such a performance [exposure for inspection] is a serious invasion of personal privacy and dignity, and so unlawful if ‘unwarranted’. Surely, in such a case, to be warranted, the official’s action should be backed by at least the ‘clear indication’, the ‘plain suggestion’, required in [Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)] and in [Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966)]” 390 F.2d 808.

In this case, then, the doctor’s probing of the vagina cannot be justified on the basis of what was disclosed by the vaginal inspection unless, prior to the inspection, there was a clear indication that appellant was in the possession of narcotics. Such an indication was lacking here. ^[2] ***** ^[2]

The physical examination of appellant had revealed no indication that she was a narcotics user or was then under the influence of narcotics. Customs agents had no information relating appellant herself to narcotics or narcotics dealers. The sole information on the basis of which the border agents acted was the fact, disclosed by an informer, that the car in which appellant rode across the border as a passenger had been observed earlier in the day parked in the driveway of the home of the lieutenant of a known dealer in narcotics. The informer testified he had never before seen the car in tliat driveway. No one was observed operating the car or entering or leaving either the car or the house.

From these facts one might suspect that the car’s presence in the driveway related to narcotics and not to legitimate social or commercial intercourse. One might suspect that anyone later found riding in the car was the unseen person engaged in the suspected activity. The facts, however, give rise to no clear indication as to any transaction or any person.

Judgment reversed.