Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951). · Go Syfert
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Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
103 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Barrett Blackwell v. The State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2023-11-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1951 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1951 1988 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barrett Blackwell v. The State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1951) (“[W]here several articles 5 Blackwell exclusively relies on cases in which a single count was based on separate offenses—that is, offenses separated by time and place or of a separate character and type. 7 are taken at the same time and place as one continuous act, though owned by different people, the offense is a single larceny.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Guam v. Vincent Rodriguez Cepeda
Guam · 2021 · confidence medium
They are stated in the information primarily as a matter of description for the purpose of identification and to show ownership in a person or persons other than the accused.” 2009 Guam 3 ¶ 23 (quoting Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1951) (en banc)), overruled on other grounds by Barrett-Anderson v. Camacho, 2018 Guam 20 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Holborough v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
In Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1951) (en banc), the Supreme Court held that [t]he names of the owners of the stolen property constitute no part of the offense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Drawdy v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Hayes, 803 So.2d at 700 -01 (citing Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 560-61 (Fla.1951)); Murray v. State, 890 So.2d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Staley v. State, 829 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Partch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1951); Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983)); see also Saavedra v. State, 576 So.2d 953, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding the crucial question in determining whether distinct acts occurred is typically whether defendant had time to reflect and form a new criminal intent between the acts). 2 In addition to the foregoing, Florida courts have also held the Florida sexual battery statutes are particularly susceptible to the distinct acts exception because the statutes “may be violated in multiple, alternative ways, i.e., ‘oral, anal, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dyson v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 29 , 478 N.E.2d 727 (1985) (single larceny when defendants obtained money from several people on a single evening for a single period of time by placing a phony night deposit box on the wall of a bank); State v. Waller, 280 S.C. 300, 301 , 312 S.E.2d 552 (1984) (single larceny when defendant broke into apartment and stole property belonging to three different people); State v. Myers, 407 A.2d 307, 309 (Me.1979) (single larceny when defendant broke into office and stole funds, from a single cash box, that belonged to three different entities); Rea…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruller v. State
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
In our recent decision in Hayes , we reaffirmed our holding in Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1951), which held that where *208 several items of property are taken at the same time (within a matter of minutes) and from the same place, as one continuous act, a defendant could not be convicted of multiple counts of larceny for each item of property taken.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hayes v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302-04 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983); Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1951).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Richardson v. Commonwealth (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Martin v. State, 797 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Alaska.Ct.App.1990) (single larceny doctrine “is limited to situations in which the prosecution has not proved separate intents to steal and sufficiently different acts of conduct to constitute separate offenses”); Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1951) (multiple larcenies constitute one offense “when stolen under the same circumstances with the same intent”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fraenza
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1981 · confidence medium
“The names of the owners of the stolen property constitute no part of the offense.” Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1951).
discussed Cited "see" Nesbitt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hillman v. State, 410 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (holding that "two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences" when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfather's wallet, pistol, and car, and taking a grandson's fishing equipment) (citing Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla.1951)).
cited Cited "see" Cobb v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951).
cited Cited "see" In the Interest of J.J.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla.1951).
cited Cited "see" Colvin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951); Joiner v. State, 382 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla.1955); Drakes v. State, 400 So.2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951).
discussed Cited "see" Castelberry v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951).
discussed Cited "see" Edmond v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 559 , and cases collected at 28 A.L.R.2d 1179 . .
cited Cited "see" Horton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 559 ; Matera v. State, Fla.App.1969, 218 So.2d 180 ; and Tirko v. State, Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 388 .
cited Cited "see" Gaumond v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hearn v. State, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 559 ; Cross v. State, Fla.App.1970, 237 So.2d 324 ; Ross v. State, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 464 ; and Gaynor v. State, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 19 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Edmond v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bishop, Criminal Law § 687 (1st ed. 1856) and § 1062 (7th ed. 1882). [2] 2 Leach 707, 168 Eng.Rep. 455 (Crown 1796). [3] Theft, Act, 1968, § 9, 8 Halsbury's Statutes of England 788 (3d ed. 1969). [4] See Hearn v. State, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 559 , and cases collected at 28 A.L.R.2d 1179 . [5] Section 560.110 R.S.Mo. 1953, V.A.M.S.; Williford v. Stewart, 1946, 355 Mo. 715 , 198 S.W.2d 12 ; State v. Huff, 1944, 352 Mo. 1161 , 181 S.W.2d 513 . [6] Ashe v. Swenson, 1970, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (Brennan, J., concurring); Ex parte Lange, 1873, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 …
HEARN et al.
v.
STATE.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 14, 1951.
55 So. 2d 559
Dickinson.
Cited by 68 opinions  |  Published

[*560] Wm. W. Flournoy, De Funiak Springs, for appellants.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and William A. O'Bryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

DICKINSON, Associate Justice.

This is a companion case to the case of Hearn v. State, Fla., 54 So.2d 651.

In the other case the defendants were accused and convicted of the larceny of one cow, the property of one M.M. Adkinson. In this case the defendants are accused and have been convicted of the larceny of eight cows and two calves, the property of one J.A. Ganey.

The defendants in this case filed a plea of former jeopardy averring that the larceny of the nine cows and two calves occurred at the same time, at the same place, and under the same circumstances, even though the cattle were the property of different owners, and that thus there was only one larceny involved for which they could be tried.

The State filed a demurrer to the plea of former jeopardy, which demurrer was sustained and the trial had which resulted in a conviction of the defendants of the larceny of these eight cows and two calves, the property of said Ganey. Thus the only question involved is whether or not the defendants had been placed in former jeopardy by the trial of the case above mentioned, that is, the case involving the larceny of the cow belonging to Adkinson.

The facts in the two cases are identical; the nine cows and the two calves were all on the same open range, were rounded up at the same time, were placed in the same truck by the defendants at the same time from the same loading pen. The cattle were all grazing in and around the same area, and apparently were not too far separated by distance, because the act of rounding up, loading, etc., consumed only a few minutes of time. All of the cattle were transported in the same truck to Selma, Alabama, and sold at the same time, or attempted to be sold as a single lot when the defendants were apprehended.

The defendants were convicted in the morning of the larceny of the one cow belonging to Adkinson, and placed on trial in the afternoon for the larceny of the Ganey cows and calves. Thus the only question posed is whether or not two offenses are committed when separate objects are stolen at the same time, from the same place, under the same circumstances and as part of the same act, although the objects of the larceny belong to two separate individuals, or whether or not such constitutes a single larceny.

So far as we can determine this is a case of first impression in this State, although the converse thereof, that is that where property is stolen from the same owner or from different owners at different times or places or as a result of a series of acts, separated in either time, place or circumstances, one from the other each taking is a separate and distinct offense has been established as the law of this State since the case of Green v. State, 134 Fla. 216, 183 So. 728. If the converse is true, then it should follow that where several articles are taken at the same time and place as one continuous act, though owned by different people, the offense is a single larceny.

Each case of this nature must be determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. There is some conflict in the cases, but the clear weight of authority is to the effect that the stealing of several articles at the same time and place as one continuous act or transaction is a single offense, even though the property belongs to different owners, for the reason that it is only a single act or taking.

Some courts hold, however, that the prosecuting authorities may elect to try the larceny from each owner in such case as a separate and distinct offense and still others[*561] hold that they are necessarily separate and distinct, because of the separate trespass to the person or property of each owner; but this reasoning has been criticized on the ground that it ignores the character of the offense as one against the public and treats it as simply a trespass against the individual owner. 32 Am.Jurisprudence, Subject: Larceny, Article IX, page 895.

Larceny is an offense against the public, that is against the State, and the offense is the same whether the property stolen belongs to one person or several persons jointly or to several persons each owning separate parts thereof. The names of the owners of the stolen property constitute no part of the offense. They are stated in the information primarily as a matter of description for the purpose of identification and to show ownership in a person or persons other than the accused.

We will align ourselves with the majority rule in this country because we feel that to permit the dividing into several larcenies of objects which are the subject of larceny, although belonging to separate owners, when stolen at the same time, from the same place, and under the same circumstances with the same intent, would be violative of the spirit of the Constitution of the United States and the State of Florida that a man should not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. See also Notes in 31 L.R.A.,N.S., 723, and 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 967.

The State relies very strongly on the case of State v. Akers, 106 Mont. 105, 76 P.2d 638, wherein the Supreme Court of the State of Montana in a divided opinion held that in that case there were two separate thefts or larcenies of two separate animals, but a careful reading of the opinion leads us to the conclusion that the evidence showed that the animals were taken near the same time but at places a mile or so distant from each other. That space or distance distinguishes the case from the case at bar, where everything occurred at the same time, at the same place, and under the same circumstances.

Accordingly, it is our opinion that the learned Circuit Judge was in error in sustaining the State's demurrer to the plea of former jeopardy and that in fact the facts and circumstances of this case are identical with the other case for the larceny of which the defendants were convicted, all occurring at the same time and arising out of the same transaction, under the same circumstances and with the same intent, thus constituting this act a single larceny.

The judgment of conviction and the order sustaining the State's demurrer to the plea of former jeopardy interposed by the defendants, is therefore reversed.

TERRELL, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and MATHEWS, JJ., dissent.