Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938). · Go Syfert
Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
137 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: PIERSON v. JOPLIN (okla, 2016-04-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1938 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1938 1982 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PIERSON v. JOPLIN (2×)
Okla. · 2016 · confidence medium
It describes the constitutional courts created under article 3 of the Constitution." Mookini v. United States , 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938). 4 The phrase, "the original petition filed February 23, 2011," in the Court of Civil Appeals opinion is clear in context, where Appellees were referring to the date of the original petition for wrongful death claim not the first petition filed in Pierson I .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nguyen v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 2003 · confidence medium
Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 205 (1938). “[Without an addition expressing a wider connotation,” that term ordinarily excludes Article IV territorial courts, even when their jurisdiction is similar to that of a United States District Court created under Article III.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parrott v. Govt of VI
3rd Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Moreover, "vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a `District Court of the United States.' " Mookini v. United States , 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Territorial Court of Virgin Islands v. Richards
D.V.I. · 1987 · confidence medium
Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1937).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bauer v. McCoy
N. Mar. I. · 1982 · confidence medium
A "district court of the United States" is an Article III court. 18 Mookini v. U.S., 308 U.S. 201, 205 , 82 L.Ed. 748 , 58 S.Ct. 543, 545 (1938).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Norman's on the Waterfront v. West Indies Corp.
D.V.I. · 1974 · confidence medium
Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc.
D.V.I. · 1972 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court has noted that the term “district court of the United States” has an *297 “historic significance” as denoting “the constitutional courts created under Article III. . . .” Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (Hughes, C.J.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Moses Lewis
3rd Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
Assuming the propriety of the ruling which struck this evidence, we find no error here. *507 Finally, appellant contends that the Virgin Islands District Court, because it is a legislative, rather than constitutional court, lacked the power under 18 U.S.C. § 2514 to grant immunity to a witness who testified for the government. § 2514 vests such power only in “court[s] of the United States.” § 22 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands ( 48 U.S.C. § 1612 ) states that “[t]he District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a district court of the United Sta…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Rare Breed Triggers, LLC
E.D.N.Y · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 76 (2003) (concluding that the phrase “district court” in a statute did not include “Article IV territorial courts, even when their jurisdiction is similar to that of a United States District Court created under Article III” (quoting Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938))); Summers v. United States, 231 U.S. 92, 101-102 (1913) (“[T]he courts of the Territories may have such jurisdiction of cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the circuit and district courts, but this does not make the…
discussed Cited "see" Hardin v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See 28 U.S.C. § 516 . s Plain tiff, citing Supreme Court cases covering territorial courts (Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) and Mool~in v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938)), incorrectly asserts that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas is not an Article III court.
examined Cited "see" William J. Ozenna v. R. W. May, Warden, Etc. (3×)
9th Cir. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mookini v. United States, 1938, 303 U.S. 201 , 58 S.Ct. 543 , 82 L.Ed. 748 (rules for criminal proceedings in “District Courts of the United States” do not apply to territorial courts); Ex parte Krause, D.C.Wash., 1915, 228 F. 547 (offense against Alaska territorial law not offense against the United States within the meaning of Rev.Stat. § 1014); United States v. Doo-Noch-Keen, 1905, 2 Alaska 624 (crimes defined in The Alaska Code are purely local in character, “and in no sense federal laws”.
discussed Cited "see" Glidden Co. v. Zdanok (2×)
SCOTUS · 1962 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 205 .
examined Cited "see" Hendricks v. Alcoa Steamship Co. (6×)
E.D. Pa. · 1962 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 , 58 S.Ct. 543 , 82 L.Ed. 748 (1938), where the court said: “We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a ‘District Court of the United States.’ ” Cf. International Longshoremen’s, etc. v. Juneau Spruce Corp., supra, pp. 240-243, 72 S.Ct. pp. 237-239.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Marrone
D. Alaska · 1959 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mookini v. United States, supra, 303 U.S. at page 205 , 58 S.Ct. [at page] 545.
examined Cited "see" Novick v. Gouldsberry (3×)
9th Cir. · 1949 · signal: see · confidence high
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A.; see, Mookini v. United States, 1938, 303 U.S. 201 , 58 S.Ct. 543 , 82 L.Ed. 748 .
examined Cited "see" International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Ackerman (3×)
D. Haw. · 1949 · signal: see · confidence high
See 303 U. S. at page 205 , 58 S.Ct. 543 , 82 L.Ed. 748 .
examined Cited "see" Government of the Capital v. Executive Council (3×)
prsupreme · 1944 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mookini et al. v. United States, 303 U. S. 201 , 58 S. Ct. 543 , 82 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Mitchell v. Mullgrav (3×)
virginislands · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Fund of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 465 , 35 V.I. 356 (D.V.I. 1997); see also Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 , 58 S. Ct. 543 , 82 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board
3rd Cir. · 1941 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 1938, 305 U.S. 197 , 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 with National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1938, 303 U.S. 201 , 58 S.Ct. 571 , 82 L.Ed. 831 , 115 A.L.R. 307 and National Licorice Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 1940, 309 U.S. 350 , 60 S. Ct. 569 , 84 L.Ed. 799 . 1940, 309 U.S. 350 , 60 S.Ct. 569 , 84 L.Ed. 799 . § 9 (c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (e).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
MOOKINI Et Al.
v.
UNITED STATES
319.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 28, 1938.
303 U.S. 201
Mr. O. P. Soares submitted on brief for petitioners., Mr. Bates Booth, with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Solicitor General Bell, Assistant Attorney General McMahon, and Messrs. William W. Barron and W. Marvin Smith were on the brief, for the United States.
Hughes, Cardozo.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners were convicted in the District Court of the Territory of Hawaii of violating § 35 of the Criminal Code relating to fraudulent claims. 18 U. S. C. 80. The verdict was rendered on May 28, 1935; motions for a new trial were overruled on June 19, 1935; and petitioners were sentenced on June 29, 1935. Appeal was allowed by the District Court on September 27, 1935.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that the appeal was not taken in the manner or within the time permitted by the Criminal Appeals Rules promulgated by this Court on May 7, 1934 (Rule III, 292 U. S. 662, 663), dis[*203] missed the appeal. 92 F. (2d) 126. In view of the importance of the question as to the application of the Criminal Appeals Rules to the District Court of the Territory of Hawaii, we granted certiorari.

It is not questioned that the appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals was allowed within the three months’ period specified in § 8 (c) of the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 940; 28 U. S. C. 225, 230; 48 U. S. C. 645.

The Criminal Appeals Rules were promulgated pursuant to the Act of March 8, 1934, amending the Act of February 24, 1933. 28 U. S. C. 723a. The Act authorized this Court—

“to prescribe, from time to time, rules of practice and procedure with respect to any and all proceedings after verdict, or finding of guilt by the court if a jury has been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal cases in district courts of the United States, including the District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands, in the Supreme Courts of the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, in the United States Court for China, in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and in the Supreme Court of the United States.”

In order to aid the Court in exercising its authority under the statute, the Attorney General of the United States at the request of the Court submitted on May 26, 1933, a draft of proposed rules. These were expressly limited to proceedings in cases brought in the District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The reason for this limitation was thus stated by the Attorney General:

“The Rules are limited in their application to proceedings in cases instituted in the District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. There is not sufficient data at hand upon[*204] which to predicate proposals at this time relative to practice and procedure in cases instituted in the District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands, or in the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, or in the United States Court for China. It is thought that it would be the part of wisdom to establish the rules for practice and procedure for Continental United States before attempting to provide for the Territories, Insular Possessions and Consular Courts, as these situations will undoubtedly require special treatment because of local conditions and the distance separating the trial court from the Appellate Court.”

In considering and revising the draft thus submitted, we approved this suggestion. The rules were accordingly limited to proceedings—

“in criminal cases in District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and in all subsequent proceedings in such cases in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Order of May 7, 1934, 292 U. S. 661.

No provision was made with respect to proceedings in cases brought in the District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone and Virgin Islands, in the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, or in the United States Court for China. We entertain no doubt of our authority to limit the application of the new rules in this way. The statute empowered the Court to prescribe rules “from time to time” with respect “to any or all proceedings,” after determination of guilt, in criminal cases in the courts which were severally described. The statute contains no requirement that the Court must prescribe identical rules with respect to all the courts mentioned regardless of varying conditions, or that rules for all these courts must be prescribed at one and the same time. On[*205] the contrary, the manifest intention of the Congress was to permit, the Court to exercise its discretion concerning the application of the rules.

The term “District Courts of the United States,” as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a “District Court of the United States.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154; The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453, 460; In re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, 268; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 182, 183; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 476, 477; Summers v. United States, 231 U. S. 92, 101, 102; United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 163. Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules to the. territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.

As the Criminal Appeals Rules were not made applicable to the District Court of the Territory of Hawaii, they did not supersede or alter the provisions of the Act of February 13, 1925, as to appeals from that court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. 28 U. S. C. 225, 230. The provision of the Organic Act of Hawaii (48 U. S. C. 645) to which the court below refers, that appeals from the District Court of the Territory to the Circuit Court of Appeals should be taken in the same manner as appeals from district courts, was always subject to modification in the discretion of the Congress which in its future legislation could make or authorize such distinctions in ap[*206] pellate procedure as appeared to be wise. The Act authorizing this Court to promulgate rules for criminal appeals, which should have the effect of legislation necessarily modified the former statutory provisions so as to give the Court full authority to prescribe the time and manner of taking appeals and to leave the Court free to determine to what courts, within the range of the authorization, its rules should apply. Pursuant to this authority, the Court has limited its rules so that they do not govern appeals from the District Court of the Territory of Hawaii and there is nothing in the earlier legislation which compels the extension of the rules beyond their intended and expressed application.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.