Cluster 10321175

See e.g., Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that a jury could infer deliberate indifference from a prison doctor’s failure to promptly return an inmate to a specialist for follow-up care where the specialist had clearly detailed the risks of delaying the follow-up); but see Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 2025) (finding that a prison nurse practitioner was not deliberately indifferent for departing from a specialist’s suggestion th…

See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287 , 1295–96 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Persisting with an ineffective course of treatment [] can constitute deliberate indifference.”) (citing Greeno, 414 F.3d at 654–55).

Therefore, in undertaking this inquiry, we consider “the totality of an in- mate’s medical care when considering whether that care evi- dences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Ri- ley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties, 836 F.3d at 728 ).

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).

In assessing a claim that a prisoner was subjected to treatment by medical professionals devoid of medical judgment, the court should “look at the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

The plaintiff has not shown that Vick’s treatment of him was “so significant a departure from accepted professional standards or practices that it calls into question whether [she] actually was exercising . . . professional judgment.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)).

Rather, he has only demonstrated a disagreement between medical professionals. “[D]isagreement between two medical professionals about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1296 (7th argument if the evidence supported it.

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1296 (7th Cir. 2025). 10 8 Accord Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he principle of fair notice pervades the doctrine”). 9 See also Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 2020) (determining that a three-month delay in arranging for an inmate to see a specialist sup- ported the inmate’s claim of deliberate indifference); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 , 778–79 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that…

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1296 (7th Cir. 2025). 10 8 Accord Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he principle of fair notice pervades the doctrine”). 9 See also Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 2020) (determining that a three-month delay in arranging for an inmate to see a specialist sup- ported the inmate’s claim of deliberate indifference); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 , 778–79 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that…

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1297 (7th Cir. 2025); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007).

Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1297 (7th Cir. 2025); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007).

In assessing a claim that a prisoner was subjected to treatment by medical professionals devoid of medical judgment, the Court should “look at the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

In assessing a claim that a prisoner was subjected to treatment by medical professionals devoid of medical judgment, the court should “look at the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

“An inmate may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating that prison officials ignored a specialist’s instructions.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2016)).

"To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) that he had an objectively serious medical condition (2) to which prison officials were 'deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818 , 7 Defendants objected to Mr. Moton's Surreply on the basis that it was untimely under the Local Rules, [Filing No. 58 at 1-4], but the Court OVERRULES Defendants…

"To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) that he had an objectively serious medical condition (2) to which prison officials were 'deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Johnson, 5 F.4th at 824 ).

"Because depriving a prisoner of medical care serves no valid penological purpose, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545 , 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025)).

"Because depriving a prisoner of medical care serves no valid penological purpose, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545 , 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025).

"Because depriving a prisoner of medical care serves no valid penological purpose, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545 , 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); Jackson, 105 F.4th at 961 ; Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025).

In assessing a claim that a prisoner was subjected to treatment by medical professionals devoid of medical judgment, the court should “look at the totality of an inmate's medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

The designated evidence fails to show deliberate indifference.3 See, e.g., id. at 411–12; Jacob, 2025 WL 64011 at *2 (affirming summary judgment in favor of physician where pro se plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony indicating that physician's alleged three-year delay in adequately treating plaintiff's hypertension "departed at all, let alone substantially, from acceptable medical judgment."); Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1296 (7th Cir. 2025) (holding medi…

See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (in assessing deliberate indifference court must “look at the totality of an inmate’s medical care”).

See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025).

See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025) (in assessing deliberate indifference claim court must “look at the totality of an inmate’s medical care”).

See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287 , 1296 (7th Cir. 2025) (holding that it was not deliberate indifference to instruct plaintiff to order suitable shoes from the catalog).

See, e.g., Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1299 (7th Cir. 2025) (affirming decision to deny recruitment of counsel, noting that the plaintiff “had no difficulty communicating with the court in writing,” filed a “clear and straightforward” amended complaint that adequately explained the facts, responded to the defendants’ arguments, cited source documents, and filed hundreds of pages of documents with the court).