Cluster 1036729

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he nature of disgorgement claims suggest that a financial loss is not required for standing, as a loss is not an element of a disgorgement claim.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013) (“ERISA’s duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary from profiting even if no loss to the plan occurs.”); Berkelhammer v. ADP TotalSource Grp., Inc., 74 F.4th 115 , 117 n.1 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that, under ERISA, a fiduciary must “act[] with reasonable care to diversify investments”), would not be “based on, aris[e] from, or [be] any way related to” a Wage and Hour Violation (recall that the definition of “Wage and Hour Violation,” construed in…

Rather, as discussed in detail supra, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege, beyond conclusory allegations, that Horizon and Anthem possessed discretion to administer the Plan beyond application of “purely ministerial tasks.” Confer, 952 F.2d at 39 ; see Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 422 (“When a plan or policy requires the performance of an act of . . . administration in a specific manner, then ERISA’s fiduciary duties are not implicated.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“ERISA ... defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan.”).

“Disgorgement” is simply a form of “[r]estitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful gain” rather than by the plaintiff’s loss, and is often described as “an ‘accounting for profits.’” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51 cmt. a, at 204 (2011); see Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 419 (“[D]isgorgement and accounting for profits are essentially the same remedy.”); 1 Dobbs § 4.3(5), at 610 (“[A]ccounting for profits . . . forces the [defendant] to disgorge gain…

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (“But the terms of the policy in Mogel required an immediate lump sum payment upon receipt of proof of a claim.

Co., 725 F.3d 406 , 419–20 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Edmonson’s claim for disgorgement . . . is an equitable remedy available under ERISA.”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 419 (3d Cir. 2013). “‘Statutory standing is simply statutory interpretation,’ and [courts] ask whether the remedies provided for in ERISA allow the particular plaintiff to bring the particular claim.” Id. (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 419 (3d Cir. 2013). “‘Statutory standing is simply statutory interpretation,’ and [courts] ask whether the remedies provided for in ERISA allow the particular plaintiff to bring the particular claim.” Id. (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also Tignor v. Dollar Energy Fund, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 189 , 197 (W.D.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415-19 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (d Cir. 2013)).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2016).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 360-61 ); see also Tignor v. Dollar Energy Fund, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 189 , 196-97 (W.D.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding the traceability requirement met “where the conduct in question might not have been a proximate cause of the harm, due to intervening events”); Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 366 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that an indirect causal relationship will suffice, so long as there is a fairly traceable connection, even if the direct cause of injury is a third party).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 , 360–61 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pilot Life Ins.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pilot Life Ins.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 , 360–61 (3d Cir.2000)). 48 Finkelman I, 810 F.3d at 194 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 ). 9 defendant[] cause the harm?” redressability looks forward and asks, “will a favorable decision alleviate the harm?” 49 Plaintiffs’ theory of standing can be summarized as: Plaintiffs paid more for their health insurance because MetLife illegally kept $65 million in rebates instead of using those reba…

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013). 7 parties have not done so because the settlement might include individuals who are only “potentially” owed royalties.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013)). 13 3. the “judicial relief” that Williams “request[s]” “would likely . . . redress” her injury.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir, 2013); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S, 154, 168-69 (1997) (cautioning against “wrongly equat[ing] ... injury “fairly traceable’ to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation”).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 , (1990)); see also Boyles v. Am.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013)).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 417 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that an injury-in-fact exists by virtue of a defendant’s “use of assets that belonged to” the plaintiff).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 , 360 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013), and may be satisfied by “an indirect causal relationship.” Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 142.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs had standing because their claim was for disgorgement, a remedy in restitution, and that there was no requirement “that a plaintiff suffer a financial loss, as relief in a disgorgement claim is measured by the defendant’s profits” and the “nature of disgorgement claims suggest that a financial loss is not required for standing, as loss is not an element of a disgorgement claim” (cleaned up)). 18 Edward D.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 417 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff had standing to bring ERISA disgorgement claim and “incurred an injury-in-fact because she suffered an individual loss, measured as the spread or difference between the profit [defendant] earned by investing the retained assets and the interest it paid to her” (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013).

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2013)) (“[D]isgorgement . . . is a classic form of equitable relief designed ‘to deprive[] wrongdoers of ill- gotten gains,’ [which] may be recovered under § 1132(a)(3).”); In re Blue Cross of W.

Co., 725 F.3d 406, 420 (3d Cir. 2013); see Great-W.