Cluster 110752

McCready, 457 U.S. at 479 (“The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.”).

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 , 110 n.5 (1986); see also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property.”).

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property.”).

See Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 483-84 , 102 S.Ct. at 2551 (“Although [plaintiff] was not a competitor of the conspirators, the injury she suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy market.”).

Although under the antitrust law the lack of restrictive language reflects Congress’ “expansive remedial purpose” and its “broad ... deterrent objectives”, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472, 473 , 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2544, 2543 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982), we recently explained that “ ‘Congress did not intend to provide a private remedy for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.’ ” Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 843 (9th …

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters , 459 U.S. 519 , 534, 103 S.Ct. 897 , 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) ("Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."); Blue Shield of Va., Inc. v. McCready , 457 U.S. 465 , 477, 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected b…

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 4 59 U.S. 519, 534 , 103 S.Ct. 897 , 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) (“Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.”); Blue Shield of Va., Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by…

Cf. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“the unrestrictive language of the section, and the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us not to cabin § 4 in ways that will defeat its broad remedial objective.

See, e.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482-83 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“[A]n increase in price resulting from a dampening of competitive market forces is assuredly one type of injury for which [15 U.S.C.] § 4 potentially offers redress.”).

Contractors of Cal., Inc., 459 U.S. at 545 , 103 S.Ct. 897 ; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“[T]he splintered recoveries and litigative burdens that would result from a rule requiring that the impact of an overcharge be apportioned between direct and indirect purchasers could undermine the active enforcement of the antitrust laws by private actions.”). 93 .

See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“[T]he unre-strictive language of [section 4], and the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us not to cabin § 4 in ways that will defeat its broad remedial objective.”).

See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 , 478 n.13 (1982) (“[T]he princi- ple of proximate cause is hardly a rigorous analytical tool.”).

See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 , 478 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("[T]he principle of proximate cause is hardly a rigorous analytical tool").

Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482-83 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“an increase in price resulting from a dampening of competitive market forces is assuredly one type of injury for which § 4 potentially offers redress”) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 , 99 S.Ct. 2326 , 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)).

See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 , 473 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“Only by requiring violators to disgorge the ‘fruits of their illegality’ can the deterrent objectives of the antitrust laws be fully served.”) (citation omitted).

The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” See also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his busine…

The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition." See also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his busine…

See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property”).

See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property").

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 ; cf. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“Consistent with the congressional purpose, we have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the [standing provision of the Clayton Act].”).

The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”); Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“Consistent with the congressional purpose, we have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the [standing provision of the Clayton Act].”).

Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472, n.9 (1982) ("in the face of [the congressional antitrust policy] this Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress"); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486, n.10 (1977) (treble damages under the Sherman Act were provided to make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing the difficulty of maintaining a private suit).

Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529-536 , 103 S.Ct. at 903-907 ; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2547 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action for threefold damages”).

Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529-536 , 103 S.Ct. at 903-907 ; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2547 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action for threefold damages").

See also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2550 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (“the injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation”) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 489 , 97 S.Ct. at 697 ).

Since 1975, no firm has ever had more than a 31% market share 3 See also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 , 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2547 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property.") 4 The Associated General test is further illuminated by the Supreme Court's act…

Standing exists under the inextricably intertwined exception where the alleged injury is a “necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.” Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-79, 484 (1982) (emphasis added).

Penn Allegheny, 627 F.3d at 102 (noting that the defendant must have had “anticompetitive ends”); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 (1982) (finding antitrust injury where the plaintiff’s injury was “the very means by which” the defendant allegedly “sought to achieve its illegal ends”).

In NicSand, the Sixth Circuit found no antitrust injury when the plaintiff (NicSand) was driven out of the automotive sandpaper industry because the defendant (3M) executed exclusive deals — lasting 9 “Competitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened.” Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 483 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 10 Fanatics allegedly achieved those deals by offering licensors equi…

A party can show that they have suffered the type of injury that Congress sought to protect if their injury is “inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspiracies sought to inflict on . . . the [relevant] market.” Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982) (finding that a subscriber had standing to sue a health plan for conspiring with psychiatrists to deny reimbursement for care provided by psychologists because the subscriber’s injury was “inextri…

Standing exists under the inextricably intertwined exception where the alleged injury is a “necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.” Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-79, 484 (1982) (emphasis added).

A party can show that they have suffered the type of injury that Congress sought to protect if their injury is “inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspiracies sought to inflict on . . . the [relevant] market.” Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982).

But the motivations behind those decisions were to prevent duplicative recovery engendered by allowing every person on the supply chain to claim damages for a single antitrust violation and to avoid burdening courts with “‘massive evidence and complicated theories,’ where the consequences would be to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws by private suits.” McCready, 457 U.S. at 474, n.11 .

The discount reseller’s lost profits constituted antitrust injury because “its inability to survive in the market in the absence of price competition, where its business model hinged on aggressive price competition . . . [was] ‘precisely the type of loss that defendants’ conduct would be likely to cause’ by colluding to strip retailers of pricing discretion.” Id. at 429 (alteration omitted) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 (1982)).

In SAS of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit expressed doubt that the phrase “inextricably intertwined”—which the Supreme Court employed in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982)—“was ever intended as a legal test of standing.” 48 F.3d at 46 .

Loeb Indust., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469 , 484 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Blue Shield of Va., Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)).

A party can show that they have suffered the type of injury that Congress sought to protect if their injury is “inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspiracies sought to inflict on . . . the [relevant] market.” Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483 (1982) (finding that a subscriber had standing to sue a health plan for conspiring with psychiatrists to deny reimbursement for care provided by psychologists because the subscriber’s injury was “inextri…

Because denying 17 coverage to consumers was the “very means” through which the conspirators allegedly effected 18 19 the scheme, plaintiff’s injuries were “inextricably intertwined” with the anticompetitive harm. 20 Id. at 479, 484 .

“An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s economy; but ‘despite the broad wording of [the antitrust laws] there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.’” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982) (quoting Ill.

Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)).

But the Court found no potential for duplicative recovery in McCready’s case because she already had paid the psychologist, and her injury was not too remote because it was “clearly foreseeable” to the alleged conspirators and, in fact, was “a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.”"!° McCready’s alleged injury therefore was “inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy mar…

SALT RIVER PROJECT 23 “seeks to recover as damages the sums lost to [him] as the consequence of [SRP’s] attempt to pursue that scheme.” Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted).

Dawn, Inc., 849 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982)).

The Supreme Court held that consumers like the plaintiff who participate in the same market as the competitors targeted by the defendants’ anticompetitive scheme could sue the alleged wrongdoers because the alleged anticompetitive harms were “borne directly by the customers of the competitors.” 457 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added).

The injury suffered by the plaintiff must be of the type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 486 (1982) (internal citations omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff does not allege that it “participate[s] in the defendants’ market[,]” id., a plaintiff may show an actual injury if that injury is “inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982).

Cf. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982) (analyzing “the relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned . . . in providing a private remedy under [the Clayton Act]”); Associated Gen.

To be clear, the amended complaint describes no plausible instance “[w]here the 23 injury alleged is so integral [to] an aspect of the [violation] alleged, there can be no 24 question’ that proximate cause is satisfied.” Id. at 139 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. V. 25 McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 (1982)). 26 To the contrary, ThermoLife’s own allegations illustrate “‘discontinuity’ between 27 the injury to the direct victim [(ThermoLife’s licensees)] and the injury to the indirec…

Only the first prong, antitrust injury, is at issue in this case.1 ʺCongress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property.ʺ Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982).

(See Pl.’s Resp. 17.) In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982), the Court held that the plaintiff had alleged antitrust injury because her injury was “inextrica- bly intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict” on the market.