Cluster 111671

In lifting a barrier to benefits, Congress should not be "required to take an all-or-nothing approach," but should be allowed to "proceed more cautiously" where "[i]t had valid reasons for doing so." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1886 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986); see also id. at 348 , 106 S.Ct. at 1886 ("A constitutional rule that would invalidate Congress' attempts to proceed cautiously in awarding increased benefits [under the Act] might deter Congress fr…

We will not set aside the government’s “distinctions among classes of beneficiaries” to allocate funds “unless [it] is clearly wrong” and “a display of arbitrary power,” “not an exercise of judgment.” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986) (quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).

We will not set aside the government’s “distinctions among classes of beneficiaries” to allocate funds “unless [it] is clearly wrong” and “a display of arbitrary power,” “not an exercise of judgment.” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986) (quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).

When faced with a similar situation 10 years later, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that “it was rational for Congress to assume that divorced widowed spouses are generally less dependent upon the resources of their former spouses than are widows and widowers.” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1986).

Id. at 349-50, 106 S.Ct. 1881 .

See id. (applying strict scrutiny where issue was ban on marriage unless applicant was current on child support payments); cf. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345-50 (1986) (applying rational basis test to Social Security law that denied survivor benefits upon remarriage to divorced surviving spouses but not widowed surviving spouses); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (applying rational basis test to Social Security law that discontinued Social Security dependent bene…

E.g., Greater Chicago Combine & Center, Inc. v. City of Chicago, supra, 431 F.3d at 1073 ; cf. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1986); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 , 488- 89 (1955); Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2003).

Distributing Social Security and Medicare benefits is a massive undertaking which “requires Congress to make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries while making allocations from a finite fund.” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986).

Cf. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (noting that "[t]his Court consistently has recognized that in addressing complex problems a legis- lature `may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute'" (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955))). 16 exist that would serve the same purpose as a challenged practice with a less disparate impact should take into account whether the proposed alte…

After all, a legislature "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).

The Due Process Clause does not impose any such “ ‘constitutional straightjacket.’ ” 476 U.S. at 348 , 106 S.Ct. at 1886 (citations omitted).

Cf., e.g., Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (explaining that a legislative body "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Baker, 916 F.2d at 748 (holding that a state legislature may constitutionally elect to address "only one aspect or a few aspects of a multifaceted problem").

Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 , 182 n. 1 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975); Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 341 (1986); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340, 345 (1986).

The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937).” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340, 345 (1986).

See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 373 ("[O]ur review of distinctions that Congress draws in order to make allocations from a finite pool of resources must be deferential, for the discretion about how best to spend money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress rather than the courts." (citing Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986))).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 , 106 S. Ct. 1881, 1886 , 90 L.

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1886 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316, 324 (1986). ¶29 The Washburns lastly contend the ordinance does not rationally advance the county’s interests because it places the financial design burdens on homeowners who will probably never be confined to wheelchairs.

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345-49 , 106 S.Ct. 1881 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) (noting that a court should not disturb Congress’s decision in this context unless “the distinctions [it] made were arbitrary or irrational”); Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 , 97 S.Ct. 431 , 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976) (same); see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 673 (distinguishing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 , 98 S.Ct. 95 , 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), another social-security ca…

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 , 106 S.Ct. 1881 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).

The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’ ” Oliver, 821 F.2d at 1515 (quoting Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1885 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) citations omitted); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 345 , 106 S.Ct. at 1885 (The Social Security program is a “massive one, and requires Congress to make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries while making allocations from a fini…

The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’ ” Oliver, 821 F.2d at 1515 (quoting Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1885 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) (citations omitted)); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 345 , 106 S.Ct. at 1885 (The Social Security program is a “massive one, and requires Congress to make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries while making allocations from a fi…

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 352 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1888 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348-50 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1886-87 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986); Boles, 443 U.S. at 289 , 99 S.Ct. at 2772 ; Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53 , 98 S.Ct. at 99 ; Mathews, 429 U.S. at 188-89 , 97 S.Ct. at 435-36 ; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 780-85 , 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2474-77 , 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1887 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) (in conferring benefits, Congress may “take one step a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind”) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 , 75 S.Ct. 461, 465 , 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1887-89 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986) (Marshall, J„ dissenting).

See Bowen v. Owens, 106 S.Ct. at 1889 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 -83 & n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 1321-23 & n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494-96 , 101 S.Ct. at 1216-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wilson, 450 U.S. at 244-45 , 101 S.Ct. at 1087-89 (Powell, J., dissenting). 30 Further, a consideration of the policy interests at stake demonstrates that inconsistency with articulated purposes should be the core element of the "could not" …

See Bowen v. Owens, 106 S.Ct. at 1889 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 -83 & n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 1321-23 & n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494-96 ,101 S.Ct. at 1216-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wilson, 450 U.S. at 244-45 , 101 S.Ct. at 1087-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).

See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 , 106 S.Ct. 1881 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986).

Or so the legislature may think”]; see also Bowen v. Owens (1986) 476 U.S. 340, 348 [ 106 S.Ct. 1881 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 ] [Congress may chose to proceed cautiously, rather than taking an all-or-nothing approach to addressing a complex problem].) There may well be sound policy reasons for the Legislature to adopt ameliorative provisions like those in SB 1437 for individuals charged with, or convicted of, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

See, e.g., Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986).

See, e.g., Bowen v. Owens , 476 U.S. 340 , 347, 106 S.Ct. 1881 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986).

Id. at 623, 105 S.Ct. at 2868; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 , 102 S.Ct. 2309 , 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (holding that Alaska statute using length of residence as basis for distribution of oil reserve dividends violated Equal Protection Clause.) While rational basis scrutiny governs judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the areas of social welfare and economics, see Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1885 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986), …

Newcomers, by establishing bona fide residence in the State, become the State's "own" and may not be discriminated against solely on the basis of their arrival in the State after May 8, 1976. 63 Id. at 623, 105 S.Ct. at 2868; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 , 102 S.Ct. 2309 , 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (holding that Alaska statute using length of residence as basis for distribution of oil reserve dividends violated Equal Protection Clause.) 64 While rational basis scrutin…

City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ; see also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986). 16 42 U.S.C. § 402 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that a husband who is not entitled to old age insurance benefits based on his own employment may receive "husband's insurance benefits" based on the earning record of his spouse.

Legislatures, and hence the people through direct legislation, may address problems in phases. “[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 , 75 S.Ct. 461, 465 , 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); see also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 346-348 , 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1885-1886 , 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 4…

See also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).