Cluster 1136824

Stat. § 48.035 (1) must comport with the “due process clause[] . . . right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant’s theory of the case.” See Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 (1980).

Ground Two (A) relates back if it shares a common core of 19 operative fact with a ground in the initial petition; it matters not whether Ground Two (A) shares 20 a common legal theory.43 Respondents do not argue that Orth did not allege any facts in the 21 amended petition that he did not allege in the initial petition, and such an argument would fail. 22 42 ECF No. 32-5 at 21–22 (quoting Vipperman v. State, 614 P.2d 532, 534 (Nev. 1980)). 23 43 See Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3…

Further, "a court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination without violating the Confrontation Clause," and "[p]recluding [a defendant] from eliciting inadmissible hearsay on cross-examination . . . is not the type of severe limitation on cross-examination that violates the Confrontation Clause." United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Fernandez, 839 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that due process does not req…

See Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. 1361, 1370 , 148 P.3d 727, 734 (2006); Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980).

But, due process affords defendants the right to present evidence in support of their arguments, Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), and the rape-shield law does not bar such evidence where its admission is necessary to protect the defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, including where the evidence is used to show the victim's prior independent knowledge.

But, due process affords defendants the right to present evidence in support of their arguments, Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596, 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), and the rape-shield law does not bar such evidence where its admission is necessary to protect the defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, including where the evidence is used to show the victim's prior independent knowledge.

But, due process affords defendants the right to present evidence in support of their arguments, Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), and the rape-shield law does not bar such evidence where its admission is necessary to protect the defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, including where the evidence is used to show the victim's prior independent knowledge.

But, due process affords defendants the right to present evidence in support of their arguments, Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), and the rape-shield law does not bar such evidence where its admission is necessary to protect the defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, including where the evidence is used to show the victim's prior independent knowledge.

Due process "assure[s] an accused the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant's theory of the case." Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980).

“Although a criminal defendant has a due process right to ‘introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant’s theory of the case,’ that right is subject to the rules of evidence.” Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194 , 205 n.18, 163 P.3d 408 , 416 n.18 (2007) (quoting Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980)).

Although a criminal defendant has a due process right to “introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant’s theory of the case,” Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), that right is subject to the rules of evidence, including the rules that evidence must be relevant, and that even relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of …

In the Matter of the Proposed Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR 3.80) Regarding Release From Custody or Bail Reduction, ADKT 340 (Order Adopting Rule 3.80 of the Rules of Practice for the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, May 23, 2003). [1] See Matter of Varain, 114 Nev. 1271, 1277 , 969 P.2d 305, 309 (1998) (observing that the judge's brief communication with the defendant did not affect the substance or merits of the State's prosecution). [1] B…

We also reject Pineda's invitation to revisit our prior rulings on the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense." See Hill v. State, 98 Nev. 295, 297 , 647 P.2d 370, 371 (1982) (rejecting the "imperfect self-defense" theory). [27] NRS 50.275 provides: If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or …

Williams also cites to Vipperman v. *1185 State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980), wherein this court ruled that “[t]he due process clauses in our constitutions assure an accused the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant’s theory of the case.

This court has previously held that the due process clauses of our constitutions guarantee a defendant “the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant’s theory of the case.” Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980).

See Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 , 614 P.2d 532, 534 (1980) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974); State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 514 , 221 P.2d 404, 409 (1950)) (the due process clauses of the Nevada and United States Constitutions " assure an accused the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant's theory of the case").

See Matter of Mosley, 120 Nev. 908, 922 , 102 P.3d 555, 565 (2004) (reviewing the Commission’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion). 120 Nev. 204 , 88 P.3d 827 (2004). 96 Nev. 592 , 614 P.2d 532 (1980).