Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC (2007)

Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 , 79 S.Ct. 756 , 3 L.Ed.2d 815 (1959)); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 501 (noting that the FLSA exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them”) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960)); Nicholson v. World Bus.

Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959)); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 501 (noting that the FLSA exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them”) (quoting Arnold v. Ben 8 Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)); Nicholson v. World Bus.

But see Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501-02 (6th Cir.2007) ("[T]he employer claiming an FLSA exemption does not bear any heightened evi-dentiary burden.”). 19 .

Until recently, courts “narrowly construed [exemptions] against the employers seeking to assert them.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2007).

An exemption is an affirmative defense, and an employer seeking to assert one “must establish through ‘clear and affirmative evidence’ that the employee meets every requirement of [the] exemption.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ale v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 269 F.3d 680 , 691 n.4 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir.2007) .(quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960)).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (“FLSA overtime exemptions are ‘affirmative defense[s] on which the employer has the burden of proof. . . [t]he defendant must establish through ‘clear and affirmative’ evidence that the employee meets every requirement of an exemption.”).

See Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301 , at *13 (“In the court’s view, converting plaintiffs weekly salary into an approximate hourly wage is an appropriate way of finding a common basis with which to compare the wages paid to others.”); see Speedway, 506 F.3d at 508 (“At the time of her termination, [plaintiff] earned $522 per week, and, assuming she worked an average of fifty hours per week, her weekly salary equaled $10.44 per hour.”); see Jackson v. Go-Tane Servs., Inc., 56 Fed.A…

Mass. Aug. 27, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis in original) (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The Sixth Circuit has noted that “courts cannot rely upon the plaintiff’s or the employer’s description of the plaintiff’s position or authority; instead we must look at the plaintiff's actual duties to determine whether she qualifies for the executive exemption.” (Emphasis omitted.) (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir.2007).

Mitchell, 428 *803 F.Supp.2d at 743 (rejecting argument that supervisor was merely complying with directives from higher level management); see, e.g., Thomas, 506 F.3d at 507 (“Even though [supervisor’s] discretion was somewhat circumscribed by her district manager’s supervision [¶]... ] she daily exercised discretion over matters vital to the success of her station.”); Kastor v. Sam’s Wholesale Club, 131 F.Supp.2d 862, 868 (N.D.Tex.2001) (the fact that a manager had to obta…

Id. at 507.

See In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 514-18 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment to the employer when the employee spent most of her time on non-managerial tasks but “during 100% of the time, even while doing [non-managerial] jobs, she was also the person responsible for running the store[— ][i]ndeed, there was no one else to do so”); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 504-09 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment …

But “the mere fact that an employee [is] ‘in charge’ does not necessarily mean that her primary duty involved the exercise of management-related responsibilities.” McKinney, 656 F.Supp.2d at 124 (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir.2007)).

Speedway, 506 F.3d at 507 (“[W]e reiterate that the third factor considers only the ‘relative freedom from supervision’; it does not demand complete freedom from supervision, such that she is answerable to no one, as this would disqualify all but the chief executive officer ....”) (emphasis in original).

(See Bargas v. Rite Aid Corp. (C.D.Cal. 2017) 245 F.Supp.3d 1191, 1212 [applying California law in finding store manager “had discretion in prioritizing and delegating tasks to her employees on a daily basis”]; Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC (6th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 496, 507 [gas station manager’s discretionary exempt duties included delegating work among her employees and determining the weekly work schedule].) Various forms of problem-solving may also qualify as exem…

See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e need consider only federal law on this issue, as the Ohio statute expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in the FLSA.”).

See Murray v. Stuckey's, Inc., 50 F.3d 564 , 570 (8th Cir.1995) (standardized procedures and policies may circumscribe but do not eliminate discretion of on-site store manager); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir.2007) (manager still exercised discretion on a daily basis even though store had standardized operating procedures); Grace v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 637 F.3d 508 (4th Cir.2011) (manager still exercised discretion even though she was…

See Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., 50 F.3d 564 , 570 (8th Cir.1995) (standardized procedures and policies may circumscribe but do not eliminate discretion of on-site store manager); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir.2007) (manager still exercised discretion on a daily basis even though store had standardized operating procedures); Grace v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 637 F.3d 508 (4th Cir.2011) (manager still exercised discretion even though she wa…

Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 846-847 (6th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

(Doc. 16 at 97; Doc. 20 at 180); see Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (“the [OMFWSA] expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in the FLSA”); Gilbo v. Agment LLC, No. 19-cv-00767, 2020 WL 759548 , 2020 U.S. Dist.

Ohio May 24, 2021); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAm., LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

Id. “[T]he employer satisfies this burden only by providing ‘clear and affirmative evidence that the employee meets every requirement of an exemption.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

Code § 4111.03(A) (“An employer shall pay an employee . . . in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the [FLSA].”); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007 (“[W]e need consider only federal law on this issue, as the [OMFWSA] expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in the FLSA.”).

Tenn. 1987)). “[C]ourts cannot rely upon the plaintiff’s or the employer’s description of the plaintiff’s position or authority; instead we must ‘look at the plaintiff’s actual duties’ to determine whether she qualifies for the executive exemption.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Ale, 269 F.3d at 692 ).

Until recently, courts “‘narrowly construed [these exemptions] against the employers seeking to assert them[.]’” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 , 80 S. Ct. 453 , 4 L.

Co., 493 S.W.2d at 467 , and Blue Grass has not met its burden to show “that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”3 Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2007).

Until recently, courts “‘narrowly construed [these exemptions] against the employers seeking to assert them[.]’” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 , 80 S. Ct. 453 , 4 L.

Traditionally, courts “narrowly construed [exemptions] against the employers seeking to assert them.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).

The same analysis will apply to whether Brennan is an employee for all of his wage and hour claims.1 1 See Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that Ohio’s minimum wage and hour statute “expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in the FLSA.”); see also Dikker v. 5-Star Team Leasing, LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 844 , 854 n.3 (W.D.

Given this gap in the record, the court is unable to conclusively determine whether this factor weighs in favor of a finding that management was or was not Plaintiff’s primary duty. (c) Factor Three: Relative Freedom from Direct Supervision “[T]he third factor considers only the ‘relative freedom from supervision’; it does not demand complete freedom from supervision, such that she is answerable to no one, as this would disqualify all but the chief executive officer from sat…

Under the relative importance factor, “courts must compare the importance of the plaintiff’s managerial duties with the importance of her non-managerial duties, keeping in mind the end goal of achieving the overall success of the company.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 505 (6th Cir. 2007).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (providing that Ohio law expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in the FLSA). percent of the base rate or an addition of so many cents per hour) and premiums paid for hazardous, arduous or dirty work....

“FLSA overtime exemptions are affirmative defense[s] on which the employer has the burden of proof.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Until recently, courts “narrowly construed [the exemptions] against the employers seeking to assert them.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

The employer bears the burden of proving that the employee meets each of the exemption’s requirements by “clear and affirmative evidence.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

P. 56(c). 15 , 880 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting , 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 16 , 506 F.3d 496, 500-501 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 17 (citation omitted). 18 19 Doc. 1 at 19. 20 Doc. 62-1 at 1. 21 . in a memo two weeks later.22 In part, Chief Kilbane directed Mazzola to prepare a written action plan for any officers who failed to issue sufficient tickets.23 Plaintiff Mazzola believed Mayor Togliatti and Police Chief Kilbane…

In sum, Ability Works has not put forth the requisite “clear and affirmative evidence” that each Plaintiff meets “every requirement of an exemption.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).

P. 56(c). 63 , 506 F.3d 496, 500-501 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). genuine issue of material fact.”64 There must be enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the nonmoving party.65 A scintilla of evidence is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.66 B.

Trucking LLC, 823 F.3d 382 , 385 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2016)(“Because the FLSA and the OMFWSA have the same overtime requirements, the outcomes will be the same and the claims can be evaluated together.”); Douglas v. Argo-Tech Corp., 113 F.3d 67, n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the FLSA and Ohio laws “in a unitary fashion” because the statutes “parallel[ ]” each other.); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007)(finding O.R.C. § 4111.03(A) “expressly…

But in Thomas v. Speedway SuperAm-erica, LLC, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs bonus eligibility was too “indeterminable” to be included in the court’s hourly rate calculations, and instead simply divided the plaintiffs weekly salary by her total hours worked. 506 F.3d 496, 508-09 (6th Cir.2007).

Exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.” Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir.2007).

Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 505, n. 6 (6th Cir.2007).

See Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 675 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.1982) (assistant managers were considered exempt employees under the FLSA even where their exercise of discretion was “circumscribed by prior instruction .... ”); Thomas v. Speedway Super-America, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir.2007) (stating that an employee’s relative freedom from supervision- “does not demand complete freedom from supervision, such that she is answerable to no one, as this would disqualify al…

An employee falls under the administrative exemption if: (1) he is “[cjompensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week”; (2) his “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers”; and (3)his “primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment ■with respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (a). …